



**OIOS**

Office of Internal Oversight Services

## **INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION**

# **AUDIT REPORT**

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### **Security operations in UNON**

**Weaknesses in current administrative and coordination arrangements hamper the effectiveness of security and safety operations**

**3 December 2008**

**Assignment No. AA2007/211/03**

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United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES - BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE  
INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION - DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

TO Ms. Anna Tibaijuka, Director-General  
A United Nations Office at Nairobi

DATE 3 December 2008

REFERENCE IAD: 08-02025

FROM Dagfinn Knutsen, Director  
DE Internal Audit Division, OIOS 

SUBJECT **Assignment No. AA2007/211/03 - Audit of Security Operations in UNON**  
OBJET

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit.
2. In order for us to close the audit recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.
3. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as high risk (i.e., recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 14 in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.

cc: Mr. David Veness, Under-Secretary-General, DSS  
Mr. Alexander Barabanov, Chief, DAS  
Mr. Peter Marshall, CSA/SA, DSS  
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors  
Ms. Maria Gomez Troncoso, Officer-in-Charge, Joint Inspection Unit Secretariat  
Ms. Christina Post, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management  
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Programme Officer, OIOS  
Mr. Normand Ouellet, Chief, Nairobi Audit Service, OIOS

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## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

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### **FUNCTION**

*“The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).*

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Audit of Security Operations in UNON**

OIOS conducted an audit of security operations in UNON. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy of the arrangements for security and safety of United Nations staff and property at UNON. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

The overall conclusion is that arrangements for security and safety had improved since the last audit in 2005 but the effectiveness of operations is hampered by the absence of a professional level staff member to handle administrative matters internally and to act as a focal point with service providers. A major challenge also exists in the area of co-ordination. There needs to be a recognition of the hybrid nature of Nairobi as both a headquarters and a country operation, which requires a rethink of the way the headquarters and country actors interact and co-ordinate their activities, to ensure successful co-operation in the event of a crisis. Other key findings and actions are summarized below, and UNON has agreed to take action on all points raised:

- Whilst UNON should be commended for being one of the few duty stations within the United Nations system where a mass casualty drill has been conducted on a regular basis, UNON need to build on this success by preparing a policy, for approval by the Security Management Team, on the frequency with which evacuation and fire drills should be carried out. UNON also needs an action plan outlining the actions required to rectify the weaknesses identified in the mass casualty drill carried out in 2007 and to rectify existing problems affecting the operability of fire and safety equipment.
- To ensure that the Security and Safety Services has vehicles of the right type which are effective and fully operational, a needs assessment should be undertaken to determine vehicle requirements, procedures for vehicle maintenance and repair and mechanisms put in place to properly manage vehicles used by the Services.
- To minimize to the extent possible any loss or misuse of ammunition, existing controls over ammunition should be strengthened. This should include reviewing where and how ammunition is stored, ensuring that daily reconciliation is undertaken of ammunition in stock at the start and end of each day, and that logs show the whereabouts of all ammunition during the day and detailed explanations are recorded on the use of ammunition.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of security operations at the United Nations Office at Nairobi (UNON). The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

2. The approved budget for UNON Security and Safety Services (S&SS) for the biennium 2006-2007 was approximately \$19 million. The UNON intranet shows the functions of the Office of Chief S&SS as:

(a) Planning, coordination and implementation of all security arrangements for Kenya;

(b) Planning, coordination and implementation of security, fire protection and safety programmes that provide protection for United Nations delegates, staff, visitors, buildings and grounds; and

(c) Investigating losses, thefts, accidents and property damage claims and providing traffic control within the UNON Gigiri complex.

3. The S&SS is headed by the Chief of Security and Safety at the P-5 level. He is supported by two Professional (P) and 116 General Service (GS) staff. At the time of the audit, 16 GS positions had been vacant for more than six months due to resignations and retirements.

4. Comments made by UNON are shown in *italics*.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

5. The overall objective of the audit was to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the arrangements for security and safety of United Nations staff and property at UNON. This included assessing:

(a) The effectiveness and efficiency of security operations;

(b) The reliability and integrity of security management information;

(c) Whether security operations were conducted in compliance with United Nations Regulations and Rules and internally developed policies and procedures; and

(d) The adequacy of arrangements for safeguarding of security assets against loss, misuse and damage.

## III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. The audit covered the period January 2006 to May 2008 and focused on the adequacy of arrangements for conducting security activities in the UNON

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complex. The audit excluded arrangements for residential security and procurement which would be undertaken as separate audits at a later stage.

7. OIOS followed up on the implementation of recommendations made in its previous audit of UNON Security and Safety (AA2004/220/03). The audit included a risk assessment and review of internal control systems, interviews with staff, analysis of applicable data and reviews of the available documents and other relevant records.

## **IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. Governance**

#### Need to improve co-ordination between the Security Management Team and country team of Kenya

8. The Security Management Team (SMT) is chaired by the Designated Official for Security and is unique in its composition, in that only the senior United Nations agency representatives are members and not a cross section of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes at the duty station. The then Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) endorsed this in 1994 because of the unique nature of Nairobi as a headquarters duty station. Kenya is also a base for country operations, and whilst the individual roles and responsibilities of SMT are clear and training has been provided, how SMT will interact and co-ordinate its activities with other security actors in Kenya who are not part of the SMT has not been fully addressed. These include the Country team comprising all the funds and programmes, a Department of Political Affairs mission, regional offices and organizations whose staff members are working outside of Kenya, but have dependants based in Kenya. The absence of such a co-ordination mechanism creates a risk that some actors may not receive information in a timely manner and may not know how to discharge their responsibilities effectively during emergencies. As an example, because of the various mandates and roles of the many United Nations entities in Kenya, during the national crisis in January 2008, it was unclear who should be classified essential and non-essential personnel.

#### **Recommendation 1**

**(1) The UNON Administration, in consultation with the Department of Safety and Security, should establish a co-ordination mechanism to enable the Security Management and Kenya country teams to discharge their responsibilities, together and separately, in an effective and efficient manner.**

9. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 1 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of documentation dealing with the establishment of a central mechanism for co-ordinating Kenya security activities.*

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### Ineffective warden system

10. Nairobi operates one of the largest warden systems within the United Nations system involving over 50 wardens which is based on organizational units. S&SS has made efforts to ensure that wardens were aware of their roles and responsibilities. However, the large number of volunteer wardens, combined with the wide geographical spread of individuals which some wardens were responsible for, presents a serious command and control problem. Whilst individual responsibilities may be clear, the roles and responsibilities of the parent organizations in relation to security management team and other security players, was not clear. Effective co-ordination in the event of a crisis is therefore at risk, which was demonstrated during the security incidents in January 2008.

#### **Recommendation 2**

**(2) The UNON Administration, in consultation with the Department of Safety and Security, should undertake a review of the Nairobi warden system to ascertain what additional support mechanisms, resources, and training may be required to ensure the effectiveness of the system in the event of a crisis.**

11. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of the results of review to ascertain how to improve the effectiveness of the warden system.

### Role of Host Country in security matters is unclear

12. The Host Country agreement signed on 26 March 1975 did not define the Kenyan Government's responsibilities for security and safety of United Nations staff members, their dependants and property. The Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) is working on an amendment to the agreement and there is a Host Country Liaison Committee (HSLC) and related sub-group committees in place to meet and discuss security matters with the Host Country under the responsibility of the Office of the Director General, UNON. Whilst there was evidence of Host Country involvement to assist in countering threats, the effectiveness of the HSLC is reduced by the absence of inadequate meeting arrangements to discuss security related concerns, etc. The HSLC had also not met for 24 months, making it difficult to implement and act on security related problems on a timely basis.

#### **Recommendation 3**

**(3) The UNON Administration should establish a mechanism to ensure that the Host Country Liaison Committee meets regularly to discuss security related problems. This mechanism should include the composition, frequency of meetings, recording of minutes and follow-up of actions agreed to in the meetings.**

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13. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 3 remains open pending receipt of documentation supporting establishment of a mechanism to ensure that the Host Country Liaison Committee meets regularly to discuss security related problems.

## **B. Organizational structure**

### Roles and responsibilities of S&SS may not be understood

14. OIOS found that the roles and responsibilities of S&SS as indicated on the UNON intranet did not correctly describe its current roles – in particular, the function relating to planning, coordination and implementation of all security arrangements for Kenya, which is the responsibility of Chief Security Adviser in his dual function. S&SS agreed to make appropriate corrections.

### Weak arrangements for administering S&SS

15. The S&SS had an approved organization chart, which was supported by details of the roles and responsibilities of all the units. The organigram showed that there was no dedicated capacity for handling administration and dealing with UNON to ensure effective discharge of the administrative responsibilities of S&SS. These matters were handled by support staff in the office of the Chief of Security. Neither the Chief nor the Deputy had received any formal training in handling administrative matters, and OIOS is of the opinion that some of the issues identified in this report arise from the lack of a professional administrative support person within S&SS.

### **Recommendation 4**

**(4) The UNON Administration should liaise with the Department of Safety and Security and seek funding for the establishment of a post of Administrative Officer to oversee the administration of UNON Security and Safety Services and act as the focal point for dealing with the UNON Division of Administration.**

16. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 4 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing that UNON Administration liaised with the Department of Safety and Security to seek funding for the establishment of a post of Administrative Officer.

### Need to improve compliance with Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

17. As at 23 April 2008, the SOPs had been updated to meet local needs as recommended in the previous audit (AA2004/220/03) and were in the print shop for producing copies for distribution to all security personnel and subsequently provide training to staff members in their application. To further enhance and

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improve controls, S&SS needs to build in a linkage between the SOPs and performance appraisal work plans to assist in ensuring that the SOPs are complied with.

#### **Recommendation 5**

**(5) The UNON Administration should ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are distributed to security staff, that staff members receive training in their application, and compliance with SOPs is included as a goal in staff appraisal work plans.**

18. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 5 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 5 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing that SOPs have been distributed to staff, that staff members have received training in their application, and compliance with SOPs is included as a goal in staff appraisal work plans.

### **C. Human resources management**

#### Need to further strengthen arrangements for training

19. The S&SS arrangements for training had improved since the last audit. A training unit was in place and a training plan was being produced. These arrangements needed to be strengthened to improve the effectiveness of the training activities. Whilst S&SS could demonstrate that security officers had taken the basic and advance security in the field and the ethics and integrity awareness courses, OIOS' review of the security officers training plans revealed that there was no linkage between training and the corresponding performance appraisal. The training plan was based on a few mandatory courses and personal preferences.

#### **Recommendation 6**

**(6) The UNON Administration should strengthen the UNON Security and Safety Services training unit by developing procedures dealing with the involvement of the unit in the identification of training for security officers and ensuring that training is undertaken and linked to the performance appraisal.**

20. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 6 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 6 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing that UNON has strengthened the UNON Security and Safety Services training office by developing procedures dealing with the involvement of the office in the identification of training for security officers.

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### Recruitment practices have improved

21. OIOS was pleased to note that all of its previous recommendations relating to recruitment had been implemented. Sound arrangements were now in place involving the announcement of vacant posts in Galaxy, the use of generic job descriptions, development of classified job descriptions for GS security staff, and the updating of job descriptions for specialized posts such as the fire marshal and inspectors. An important element in improving the recruitment practices has been the strengthening of background checks. In 2006, in response to previous audit recommendations, S&SS conducted background checks of 48 former Kenyan military officers and 16 former Kenyan police officers recruited as security officers to determine whether the information submitted in their personal history profiles (PHP) was legitimate. These checks uncovered seven questionable cases which were referred to UNON and OIOS for further action, which was ongoing. This check is also now part of the recruitment process.

### Satisfactory arrangements for issuance of passes

22. Satisfactory arrangements were in place for the issuance of identification cards (IDs) to staff members and dependants and temporary passes for visitors.

23. A security officer has been assigned the responsibility of being in charge of the Identification Unit and an SOP has been developed addressing the category of IDs issued to staff members, their dependants and visitors. Between January and May 14, 2008 a total of 4,690 IDs were issued. We reviewed the documents requested for the issuance of IDs for the months of January, April and May 2008. In the case of staff members, an e-mail is sent by the Office of Human Resources Management requesting renewal of staff members' ID while in the case of visitors, staff members were required to send an e-mail to UNON S&SS ahead of time or meet their visitors at the UNON main gate entrance. These arrangements will be further strengthened in the future with the introduction of a computer system to verify staff members' data.

### Need to strengthen arrangements for overtime

24. OIOS recommended in its previous audit that S&SS should analyze the information available on overtime to determine whether overtime could be reduced by making changes to the system, or whether, and to what extent, additional resources were required. S&SS has made attempts since the last audit to strengthen arrangements for overtime, which included appointing a desk security officer with responsibilities for introducing and monitoring a new system for pre-approval of overtime. S&SS commented that about 20 of their security officers either retired or accepted employment elsewhere and as such, it is in the process of recruiting 20 other security officers to replace them. Despite these measures, S&SS continues to experience challenges, as expansion of facilities at the UNON Gigiri complex is in progress, which will require additional security resources for control purposes. Whilst OIOS acknowledges the initiatives undertaken, UNON was yet to fully implement the previous recommendation on controlling overtime. Therefore, this recommendation continues to remain open.

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## **D. Fire and safety**

### Need to follow up and implement lessons learned from the mass casualty drill of 25 May 2007

25. OIOS was pleased to learn that UNON S&SS is the only security service at a United Nations Headquarters Office Away from New York, or Regional Commission to have carried out three mass casualty drills in the last four years. The last mass casualty drill was conducted in May 2007 and a report was prepared which identified several weaknesses such as: (a) lack of suitable vehicles to transport the injured; (b) drivers of vehicles were not aware of the severity of the injuries to the mock victims nor were they provided with hospital information; and (c) lack of stretcher beds, oxygen and skilled personnel from the Host Country. The report was prepared by the Chief of Security in May 2007 and concluded that another such drill was to be conducted in 12-15 months with a view to correct the problems identified. S&SS commented that the types of problems identified would be rectified when the Access Control System project is implemented. UNON explained that the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) has no policy for conducting mass casualty drills, and as such this initiative by S&SS should be considered a best practice. There were no policies or guidelines in place on the frequency with which such drills should be carried out, which is especially important in light of the heightened security in Kenya, following the January 2008 post election violence.

#### **Recommendations 7 and 8**

**The UNON Administration should, in consultation with Department of Safety and Security:**

**(7) Establish a policy, for approval by the Security Management Team, outlining the frequency with which mass casualty drills should be carried out; and**

**(8) Prepare a paper for approval by the Security Management Team outlining the actions required to rectify the outstanding weaknesses identified during the mass casualty drill carried out on 25 May 2007.**

26. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 7 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing that a policy has been established, for approval by the Security Management Team, outlining the frequency with which mass casualty drills should be carried out.

27. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 8 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 8 remains open pending receipt of a paper approved by the Security Management Team outlining the actions required to rectify the weaknesses identified during the mass casualty drill carried out on 25 May 2007.

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### Serious flaws in operability of fire and safety equipment

28. OIOS recommended in its previous audit (AA2004/211/03) that S&SS should review the adequacy of the current resources of staff members and fire fighting equipment, make arrangements for the regular inspection of all fire fighting equipment and carry out servicing of this equipment where necessary. At the time of reporting, some action had been taken to rectify some aspects of the recommendation, as detailed below:

- (a) Hydrants located in blocks M to Q were functioning; however, we noted that a vehicle was blocking one of the hydrants located in the parking space near the delegates' entrance (See picture #1). Moreover, none of the hydrants located in blocks R to U or V to X were functioning and one of the hydrants in block F was blocked by a vehicle and the length of the hydrant did not comply with the fire and safety standards;
- (b) The fire and safety officer informed us that the number of fire extinguishers and carbon dioxide were not enough for the complex, and OIOS was able to confirm this statement during the walk through of the compound;
- (c) OIOS noted a large number of papers, old wood desk and cables in the blocks where hydrants are not working. S&SS stated that this has been cleared as of July 2008; (See picture #2)
- (d) Some of the fire extinguishers had been in use since the inauguration of the UN compound (20 years), but were operational; and
- (e) While conducting the inspection, OIOS noted that the stairs to Conference rooms 11 and 14 do not have hand rails and when it rains the floor becomes slippery becoming a hazard for staff members and visitors. S&SS commented that they have referred the matter to Building Management and Transportation Unit (BMTU) for action.

**Picture #1 – Hydrant by the Delegates entrance**



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**Picture #2 – Old papers, desk, wood, etc near non-function hydrants**



29. As a consequence of the action taken above, the original recommendation has been closed and has been replaced with the following.

**Recommendations 9 and 10**

**The UNON Administration should:**

**(9) Rectify all existing problems affecting the operability of fire and safety equipment; and**

**(10) Put in place a mechanism for regular monitoring and reporting on the operability of fire and safety equipment, which includes follow-up to ensure that all problems identified have been rectified.**

30. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 9 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009. Recommendation 9 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing that all existing problems affecting the operability of fire and safety equipment have been rectified.*

31. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 10 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009. Recommendation 10 remains open pending receipt of documentation of mechanisms put in place for regular monitoring and reporting on the operability of fire and safety equipment.*

**Inadequate arrangements for fire wardens**

32. OIOS recommended in its previous report that S&SS should ensure that a central register of every building's marshal and floor warden was maintained to determine at any time, which staff members have completed the training provided in the annual fire service presentation. Furthermore, this should also include a mechanism to monitor whether the building marshals and floor wardens are adequately carrying out their duties and a feature to record feedback on the briefings and training required. At the time of the audit a central register was not

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in place and S&SS procedures to maintain such a register were non-existent. The S&SS explained that they did not have the administrative capability to maintain such records. However, there was evidence that fire wardens did receive regular briefings from the S&SS Fire Officer. This recommendation therefore remains open and OIOS suggests that this be used as an example to illustrate the need to strengthen the administrative capability of S&SS.

## **E. Use of vehicles**

### Need to review the requirement for vehicles

33. No administrative review had been carried out to determine the vehicle requirements for S&SS and the current fleet comprised 12 vehicles, which were beyond replacement age as per section 3.2 of ST/AI/2006/1 – policy on the provision and use of official cars. More than 60 percent of these vehicles were manufactured in/or before 2001 with the oldest having been manufactured in 1986; two others whose years of manufacture were unknown, were not operational.

#### **Recommendation 11**

**(11) The UNON Administration should liaise with the Department of Safety and Security to ensure that provision is made in the regular budget for replacing these vehicles in line with ST/AI/2006/1, which governs the replacement of vehicles.**

34. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 11 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 11 remains open pending receipt of documentation that provision has been made in the regular budget for replacing old vehicles in line with the established regulations and rules of the UN governing vehicle replacement.

### Inadequate controls over vehicle usage

35. As recommended in the previous audit (AA2004/211/03) S&SS assigned a staff member in July 2007 to be in charge of vehicles. The staff member established the use of the log book, with pages numbered, in which the designated driver should record the number of miles driven, the purpose of the trip, name and signature and the date. Whilst good controls have been developed, there were inadequate arrangements in place to ensure that they were enforced. OIOS found evidence of log books which were incorrectly filled in and there was no evidence that action had been taken against staff members who failed to complete them correctly.

#### **Recommendation 12**

**(12) The UNON Administration should ensure that there is weekly monitoring of log books to ensure that they have**

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**been filled in correctly and procedures should be developed for dealing with staff members who fail to comply.**

36. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 12 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 12 remains open pending receipt of documentation that vehicle log books are monitored weekly to ensure that they have been filled in correctly.

**Inadequate controls over vehicle maintenance and repair**

37. At the time of the audit two vehicles were undergoing repair, one had been under repair since May 2007. The S&SS commented that the first time they had to take a vehicle to be repaired, Building Management & Transportation Unit (BMTU) sent the vehicle to the car dealer and they received a quotation of 600,000 Kenya shillings (approximately \$9,000) which was more than the vehicle was worth. However, through procurement section, they found a garage that would undertake the repairs for less money. BMTU explained that in cases where a vehicle is less than three years old; it will be taken to the car dealership and for older vehicles there are no rules or guidelines in place. BTMU also commented that procurement would not outsource as they considered that the fleet of 25 vehicles was too small for outsourcing.

38. The BMTU also confirmed that once a month the fleet assistant checks on the official vehicles assigned to the various sections. However, security vehicles were not always taken for regular maintenance due to shortage of vehicles. Some vehicles also had stolen mirrors and there were no evidence that these had been reported.

**Recommendation 13**

**(13) The UNON Administration should establish procedures for maintenance and repair of security vehicles, which include the identification of registered garages to which vehicles can be taken for repair and the establishment and enforcement of procedures for reporting missing parts.**

39. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 13 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 13 remains open pending receipt of documentation establishing procedures for maintenance and repair of security vehicles.

**E. Asset management**

**Need strengthen controls over ammunition**

40. During a spot check of the armoury, there was a discrepancy of 5,526 rounds of 9mm ammunitions in the possession of S&SS. S&SS explained that this was because officers had been to the range that day for re-qualification. Later, the ammunition did reconcile. Whilst there were inventory controls in

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place these did not allow for a daily reconciliation between opening and closing balances and tracking the daily use of every round of ammunition.

#### **Recommendation 14**

**(14) The UNON Administration should strengthen existing controls over ammunition. This should include reviewing where and how ammunition is stored and ensuring that daily reconciliation is undertaken of ammunition in stock at the start and end of each day, and the logs show the whereabouts of all ammunition during the day and detailed explanations are recorded for all use of ammunition.**

41. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 14 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009.* Recommendation 14 remains open pending receipt of documentation strengthening existing controls over ammunition.

#### Inventory of firearms

42. A spot check of the weapons in the armoury revealed that all weapons were present and accounted for.

#### Need to determine arrangements for storage of private firearms in the armoury

43. The armoury has been used for the storage of personal weapons and S&SS informed OIOS that this practice had been discontinued in 2006 and a draft policy on the storage of private firearms within the armoury has been created by DSS. As such, no recommendation has been raised.

#### Need to create policies dealing with staff bringing firearms onto the compound

44. OIOS found that there were no guidelines in the United Nations on staff members bringing weapons into office premises. Such guidelines are essential to ensure that staff members understand the circumstances under which personal weapons are allowed on the compound, and how such weapons should be handled. As there is a draft policy on the storage of private firearms that addresses this issue, OIOS is not raising any recommendation.

#### Failure to dispose of weapons in a timely manner

45. S&SS had 74 handguns, which had been earmarked as a donation to the Kenyan Government in September 2006, but no action had been taken to discuss and follow up with the Kenyan Government on whether they would accept the donation. The weapons were still stored in armoury.

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### **Recommendation 15**

**(15) The UNON Administration should discuss with the Kenyan Government on whether they would accept the donation of 74 handguns.**

46. *The UNON Administration accepted recommendation 15 and stated that it will be implemented by 31 December 2009. Recommendation 15 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing that discussions have been held with the Kenyan Government on whether they would accept the donation of 74 handguns.*

## **V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

47. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of UNON and the Department of Safety and Security for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
1	The UNON Administration, in consultation with the Department of Safety and Security, should establish a coordination mechanism to enable the Security Management and Kenya country teams to discharge their responsibilities, together and separately, in an effective and efficient manner.	Governance	H	O	Receipt of documentation dealing with the establishment of a central mechanism for co-ordinating Kenya security activities.	31 December 2009
2	The UNON Administration, in consultation with the Department of Safety and Security, should undertake a review of the Nairobi warden system to ascertain what additional support mechanisms, resources, and training may be required to ensure the effectiveness of the system in the event of a crisis.	Governance	H	O	Receipt of the results of review to ascertain how to improve the effectiveness of the warden system.	31 December 2009
3	The UNON Administration should establish a mechanism to ensure that the Host Country Liaison Committee meets regularly to discuss security related problems. This mechanism should include the composition, frequency of meetings, recording of minutes and follow-up of actions agreed to in the meetings.	Governance	H	O	Receipt of documentation supporting establishment of a mechanism to ensure that the Host Country Liaison Committee meets regularly to discuss security related problems.	31 December 2009
4	The UNON Administration should liaise with the Department of Safety and Security and seek funding for the establishment of a post of Administrative Officer to oversee the administration of UNON Security and Safety Services and act as the focal point for dealing with the UNON Division of Administration.	Governance	H	O	Receipt of documentation showing that UNON Administration liaised with the Department of Safety and Security to seek funding for the establishment of a post of Administrative Officer.	31 December 2009
5	The UNON Administration should ensure that Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are distributed to security staff, that staff members receive training in their application, and	Governance	M	O	Receipt of documentation supporting that SOPs have been distributed to staff, that staff members have received training in their application, and compliance with	31 December 2009

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
6	compliance with SOPs is included as a goal in staff appraisal work plans. The UNON Administration should strengthen the UNON Security and Safety Services training unit by developing procedures dealing with the involvement of the unit in the identification of training for security officers, ensuring that training is undertaken and linked to the performance appraisal.	Human resources	M	O	SOPs is included as a goal in staff appraisal work plans. Receipt of documentation showing that UNON has strengthen the UNON Security and Safety Services training office by developing procedures dealing with the involvement of the unit in the identification of training for security officers.	31 December 2009
7	The UNON Administration, in consultation with Department of Safety and Security, should establish a policy, for approval by the Security Management Team, outlining the frequency with which mass casualty drills should be carried out.	Operational	H	O	Receipt of documentation showing that a policy has been established, for approval by the Security Management Team, outlining the frequency with which mass casualty drills should be carried out.	31 December 2009
8	The UNON Administration, in consultation with Department of Safety and Security, should prepare a paper for approval by the Security Management Team outlining the actions required to rectify the outstanding weaknesses identified during the mass casualty drill carried out on 25 May 2007.	Operational	M	O	Receipt of a paper approved by the Security Management Team outlining the actions required to rectify the weaknesses identified during the mass casualty drill carried out on 25 May 2007.	31 December 2009
9	The UNON Administration should rectify all existing problems affecting the operability of fire and safety equipment.	Operational	M	O	Receipt of documentation showing that all existing problems affecting the operability of fire and safety equipment have been rectified.	31 December 2009
10	The UNON Administration should put in place a mechanism for regular monitoring and reporting on the operability of fire and safety equipment, which includes follow-up to ensure that all problems identified have been rectified.	Operational	M	O	Receipt of documentation of mechanisms put in place for regular monitoring and reporting on the operability of fire and safety equipment.	31 December 2009
11	The UNON Administration should liaise with the Department of Safety and Security to ensure that provision is made in the regular budget for replacing these vehicles in line with ST/AI/2006/1, which governs the	Operational	M	O	Receipt of documentation that provision is made in the regular budget for replacing old vehicles in line with the established regulations and rules of the UN governing vehicle replacement.	31 December 2009

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
12	replacement of vehicles. The UNON Administration should ensure that there is weekly monitoring of log books to ensure that they have been filled in correctly and procedures should be developed for dealing with staff members who fail to comply.	Operational	L	O	Receipt of documentation that vehicle log books are monitored weekly to ensure that they have been filled in correctly.	31 December 2009
13	The UNON Administration should establish procedures for maintenance and repair of security vehicles, which include the identification of registered garages to which vehicles can be taken for repair and the establishment and enforcement of procedures for reporting missing parts.	Operational	L	O	Receipt of documentation establishing procedures for maintenance and repair of security vehicles.	31 December 2009
14	The UNON Administration should strengthen existing controls over ammunition. This should include reviewing where and how ammunition is stored and ensuring that daily reconciliation is undertaken of ammunition in stock at the start and end of each day, and the logs show the whereabouts of all ammunition during the day and detailed explanations are recorded for all use of ammunition.	Operational	H	O	Receipt of documentation strengthening existing controls over ammunition.	31 December 2009
15	The UNON Administration should discuss with the Kenyan Government on whether they would accept the donations of 74 handguns.	Operational	L	O	Receipt of documentation showing that discussions have been held with the Kenyan Government on whether they would accept the donation of 74 handguns.	31 December 2009

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by UNON in response to recommendations.