



United Nations

Nations Unies

**OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

*This Report is protected by paragraph 18 of
ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994*

INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE FRAUDULENT USE OF



REDACTED REPORT

ID Case No. 0012-09

23 JUNE 2009

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

This Investigation Report of the Investigations Division of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services is provided upon your request pursuant to paragraph 1(c) of General Assembly resolution A/RES/59/272. The report has been redacted in part pursuant to paragraph 2 of this resolution to protect confidentiality and sensitive information. OIOS's transmission of this Report does not constitute its publication. OIOS does not bear any responsibility for any further dissemination of the Report.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On [REDACTED] the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) received a report of possible misconduct implicating United Nations personnel in [REDACTED]
2. Specifically, the [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] had fraudulently utilized the unique [REDACTED] assigned to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in order to obtain [REDACTED].
3. OIOS conducted investigations into the matter and found that [REDACTED] had misused the [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]
4. This report details the investigation into [REDACTED] participation and involvement in the reported misconduct.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL NORMS5. Staff regulations and issuances:Staff Regulation 1.2

(b) Staff members shall uphold the highest standard of efficiency, competence and integrity. The concept of integrity includes, but is not limited to, probity, impartiality, fairness, honesty and truthfulness in all matters affecting their work and status;

Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2004/15 (In effect 1 December 2004)Section 5

5.1 Users of ICT resources and ICT data shall not engage in any of the following actions:

- b) Knowingly, or through gross negligence, making ICT resources ... available to persons who have not been authorized to access them;
- c) Knowingly, or through gross negligence, using ICT resources ... in a manner contrary to the rights and obligations of staff members;

[REDACTED] Administrative Instruction No. 08/2006 (In effect 1 August 2006)

- (3) Use of the [REDACTED] shall be in accordance with the highest standards of conduct expected of UN staff members and subject to the policy on the use of information and communications technology resources and data (ST/SGB/2004/15).

...

- (24) Any form of abuse by staff in utilizing their [REDACTED] that may result in financial loss to the organization directly or otherwise will result in the immediate deactivation of this service. Fraudulent use of another [REDACTED] will also result in its immediate deactivation followed by administrative action against the staff involved.

III. IMPLICATED PERSONNEL

6. [REDACTED] a [REDACTED] began [REDACTED] service with the Organization in [REDACTED] as a [REDACTED], a position [REDACTED] still [REDACTED]

IV. METHODOLOGY

- 7. The OIOS investigation included, but was not limited to the analysis of the—
 - i) itemized [REDACTED] of [REDACTED];
 - ii) [REDACTED] documentation identifying the [REDACTED] assigned to the [REDACTED] from which fraudulent [REDACTED] originated; and
 - iii) [REDACTED] corresponding to the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the disputed [REDACTED]
- 8. Finally, OIOS interviewed all relevant witnesses and subjects pertaining to this matter.

V. BACKGROUND

[REDACTED]

9. Due to an increase in [REDACTED] to [REDACTED], [REDACTED] experienced [REDACTED] congestion which impacted upon their operational capability. Therefore [REDACTED] was required to initiate a [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] that were not [REDACTED]. As the United Nations has limited [REDACTED] resources, the [REDACTED] issuances were only provided to [REDACTED] with [REDACTED]. These [REDACTED] also enabled [REDACTED] to place [REDACTED] at a rate than that offered by the [REDACTED]. As a result only [REDACTED] could be [REDACTED] without a [REDACTED]; all other [REDACTED] required the [REDACTED] to input their [REDACTED].

10. According to the [REDACTED] 'Guidelines on the Use of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] catered for the demand for [REDACTED] with, amongst other things, the employment of the [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

11. The [REDACTED] have the capability of retrieving [REDACTED] input by [REDACTED] without the need for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Therefore [REDACTED] assigned to [REDACTED] were compromised once they utilized the [REDACTED] allocated to [REDACTED].

VI. INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS

A. [REDACTED] ASSISTED IDENTIFICATION OF SUBJECT

12. After receiving complaints from [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] to their [REDACTED] that had not been [REDACTED] and OIOS collaborated in the identification of possible subjects. The results revealed that [REDACTED] incurred [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] during [REDACTED] that originated from the [REDACTED] assigned to [REDACTED].

B. ANALYSIS OF [REDACTED]

13. All relevant information from the respective [REDACTED] was entered into [REDACTED]. This data was then analyzed by sorting and cross-referencing the disputed [REDACTED] with the originating [REDACTED], which were then matched with the [REDACTED] assigned to those [REDACTED]. The disputed [REDACTED] produced by the [REDACTED] contained [REDACTED] implicating [REDACTED] in the misuse of their [REDACTED]. In addition, the analysis undertaken by OIOS extrapolated further [REDACTED] which were possibly misused by [REDACTED].

14. OIOS calculated that the [REDACTED] defrauded [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The affected [REDACTED] and a summary of these unauthorized [REDACTED] are depicted in [REDACTED].

C. INTERVIEW WITH SUBJECT

15. OIOS interviewed [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was allocated [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] was not issued with [REDACTED].

16. [REDACTED] acknowledged that [REDACTED] is the only person allocated [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] usually takes the [REDACTED] with [REDACTED].

17. When asked about the utilization of [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] had used the [REDACTED] to make [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. However, [REDACTED] added that [REDACTED] was unaware that the [REDACTED] were issued to [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also admitted that [REDACTED] stated that as soon as [REDACTED] learned the [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] were [REDACTED] and assigned on [REDACTED] stopped utilizing the [REDACTED]

18. According to [REDACTED] did not report the misuse because [REDACTED] did not know the owners of the [REDACTED] and was uncertain as to the appropriate reporting [REDACTED] claimed that [REDACTED] obtained the [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]

VII. FINDINGS

19. OIOS found that [REDACTED] fraudulently misused the [REDACTED] in order to make [REDACTED] for which [REDACTED] did not totalling [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

20. Based on the evidence collected and the findings above, OIOS concludes that [REDACTED] failed to adhere to the standard of integrity expected of United Nations personnel and that [REDACTED] contravened staff regulation 1.2(b) and relevant administrative issuances.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

21. In view of the preceding findings, OIOS makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: It is recommended that the [REDACTED] takes appropriate action against [REDACTED]

Recommendation 2: It is recommended that the [REDACTED] finalize estimated losses and consider seeking [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED] defrauded [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]