



Office of Internal Oversight Services

## **INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION**

# **AUDIT REPORT**

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### **Audit of Safety and Security Operations in UNAMID**

**Security precautions and preparations in UNAMID  
are not commensurate with the risks associated  
with a mission that is operating under security  
phase IV**

**29 May 2009**

**Assignment No. AP2008/634/02**

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United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES / BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE  
INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION / DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

TO Mr. Rodolphe Adada  
A Joint Special Representative for the African Union-  
United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur and  
Designated Official for Darfur

DATE 29 May 2009

FROM Fatoumata Ndiaye, Acting Director  
DE Internal Audit Division, OIOS

REFERENCE IAD: 09- 02511

SUBJECT **Assignment No. AP2008/634/02 – Audit of Safety and Security Operations in UNAMID**  
OBJET

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit.
2. Based on your comments, we are pleased to inform you that we will close recommendations 2, 3, 6, 9, 25 and 34 in the OIOS recommendations database as indicated in Annex 1. In order for us to close the remaining recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.
3. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as high risk (i.e., recommendations 1, 4, 5, 10 to 17, 20 to 21 and 26 to 27), in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.
4. General Assembly resolution 59/272 states that original versions of OIOS reports not submitted to the General Assembly are, upon request, made available to any Member State. However, the resolution also provides the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services with the discretion to withhold the report under extraordinary circumstances. Due to the sensitivity of the information contained in the present report relating to the security and safety of the United Nations staff, the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services has decided to withhold such access by Member States to this report.

cc: Mr. Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations  
Ms. Susana Malcorra, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support  
Mr. David Veness, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security  
Mr. Henry Anyidoho, Principal Deputy Joint Special Representative, UNAMID  
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors  
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Mr. Seth Adza, Audit Response Team, Department of Field Support  
Mr. Moses Bamuwamye, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management  
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Programme Officer, OIOS

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## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

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### FUNCTION

*"The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization" (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).*

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Safety and Security Operations in UNAMID**

OIOS conducted an audit of safety and security operations in the African-Union - United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The overall objective of the audit was to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of security measures in place at UNAMID. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

The security precautions and preparations in UNAMID, including physical security systems in place and contingency and evacuation plans, were not commensurate with the risks associated with a mission that was operating under security phase IV, e.g.:

- Although the Mission was operating under security phase IV, more personnel were being deployed in the Mission area;
- The level of preparedness for an emergency evacuation was unacceptable for a mission operating under security phase IV. Emergency food, water and supplies at concentration points were critically low or non-existent, list of essential and non-essential staff members were not updated and the available air assets were insufficient;
- The Principal Deputy Joint Special Representative (PDJSR), who acts as the Designated Official (DO) ad interim, was more involved in security matters than the DO; and
- Other areas of concern included: poor controls over personnel security, non-compliance with minimum operating security standards, lack of a comprehensive staff tracking system, weak access control procedures at Mission compounds, inadequate supervision and training for security guards, ineffective warden system, inadequate staffing and resources and a general lack of staff awareness and discipline on security matters.

The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security indicated that between November 2008 and January 2009, a number of improvements to the preparedness of UNAMID for an emergency and/or an evacuation had been made. He added that the Department of Safety and Security will continue to monitor the enhancement of UNAMID's security. DFS also informed OIOS that substantial efforts had been made to enhance the Mission's emergency and evacuation preparedness, including stocking up the necessary contingency supplies at concentration points.


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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of safety and security operations in UNAMID. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
  2. The primary responsibility for security and protection of United Nations staff members, their spouses, dependents and their property, and of the Organization's property, against disturbances rests with the host government, in this case, the government of Sudan.
  3. The Designated Official (DO) is the key person in the United Nations security management system that is directly accountable to the Secretary-General, through the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS), for ensuring the security and safety of United Nations personnel and property in the country. The DO for Darfur is the Joint Special Representative (JSR) for UNAMID.
  4. As required under the United Nations security framework, the DO has established a Security Management Team (SMT) composed mainly of heads of agencies, programmes and funds with operations in Darfur. Its purpose is to ensure that security is managed and coordinated in an integrated manner on an inter-agency basis. Members of the SMT have a personal and collective responsibility to support the DO in the discharge of his/her mandate related to the safety and security of all staff, irrespective of the agency.
  5. DSS is responsible for ensuring an effective, professional and integrated security management for the United Nations. In exercising this responsibility, DSS assumes a lead role in crisis response and management for organizations participating in the United Nations security management system. These broadly include Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) field missions, specialized agencies, and funds and programmes.
  6. Security and safety personnel of individual participating organizations, including UNAMID, are responsible for security aspects and activities specific to their organizations, e.g., ensuring the implementation of and compliance with the relevant security standards, policies, and guidelines governing security preparedness planning, implementation and monitoring.
  7. The UNAMID Safety and Security Section, headed by a Chief Security Advisor (CSA) at the P-5 level, is composed of 110 international staff and 405 national staff. The Section is broadly divided into two functional units, namely: Security Operations Unit and Security Support and Administration Units as shown in the abridged organizational chart below:
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8. The 2008/09 budget provides for 654 posts for the UNAMID Safety and Security Section, of which 468 are national staff.

9. Comments made by UNAMID are shown in *italics*.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

10. The main objective of the audit was to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of the security measures in place at UNAMID.

## III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

11. OIOS reviewed the security measures relating to UNAMID personnel and premises in Darfur in November 2008 to January 2009. The audit methodology included a review of documents outlining UNAMID security and safety policies and guidelines and an assessment of compliance therewith; surveys and interviews with key personnel involved in security and safety at Mission headquarters (HQ); and field visits to two sectors: Nyala and El Geneina.

12. The audit did not cover the security of properties and equipment. Due to the security phase of the Mission and the unpredictability of the security situation, OIOS determined that it was more critical to focus on the security measures in place to safeguard UNAMID personnel and premises.

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13. Due to the criticality of security issues to UNAMID's operations, OIOS also held discussions with DPKO, the Department of Field Support (DFS) and DSS at the United Nations Headquarters. OIOS also reviewed and considered the results of the Integrated DPKO/DFS/DSS Security Assessment Mission (ISAM) conducted in October 2008 and the subsequent actions taken by the Mission to address the deficiencies noted by the ISAM, including its official response to the ISAM's report and the resultant UNAMID Security Enhancement Plan.

## **IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. Security Management and Organization**

#### The Designated Official and the Security Management Team

14. UNAMID is the lead United Nations agency in Darfur. The Joint Special Representative (JSR) is the Designated Official (DO) on all security matters for all the United Nations agencies operating in Darfur and UNAMID. The DO chairs the meeting of the Security Management Team (SMT) every Monday morning. The Darfur SMT consists mainly of UNAMID senior management and heads of United Nations agencies operating in Darfur. Its purpose is to support the DO and ensure that security is managed and coordinated in an integrated manner and on an inter-agency basis. OIOS noted several weaknesses in the structure and operations of the SMT in Darfur. These weaknesses, which are illustrated in the following paragraphs, seriously diminish the effectiveness of the SMT.

15. The security programme at UNAMID lacked strong leadership and strategic direction, with the many challenges specific to the Darfur environment such as poor living conditions, logistical problems, and difficulties in attracting qualified candidates in addition to the security situation described as a complex conflict involving bandits, insurgent splinter groups, government troops, warring tribes and lawless militias. Under these conditions, there will always be other urgent matters that require the immediate attention of the JSR, who is also the DO under the current security framework. It would be unrealistic to expect the JSR (or DO) to lessen his political role in order to ensure the proper functioning of security management within the Mission.

16. The DO only chaired 20 per cent of the SMT meetings. The Principal Deputy Joint Special Representative for Operations (PDJSR), who acts as DO ad interim, was more involved in security matters than the DO. The PDJSR is a member of the SMT and has chaired some 50 per cent the SMT meetings. The absence by the DO at the SMT meetings is an indication that security management was not a central part of the DO's activities.

17. The proper functioning of the SMT was also hampered by its size (31 members as of 31 October 2008), low attendance and some technology problems. Only one head of agency attended more than 50 per cent of the SMT meetings.

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Two members never attended an SMT meeting and the attendance rate was less than 20 per cent for half of the SMT members. In addition, since most SMT members resided in Khartoum, heavy reliance was placed on information technology tools that are not reliable in Darfur. There were instances where SMT members either could not connect to the telephone conferencing or did not receive important documents or briefings that will allow them to participate in discussions effectively. In such cases, meetings were postponed until further notice.

### **Recommendations 1 to 3**

**(1) The Designated Official for Darfur should take greater control and ownership of the management of security as intended under the United Nations security framework and provide the necessary leadership and direction needed to achieve a successful security programme at UNAMID;**

**(2) The Designated Official for Darfur should make recommendations to the Department of Safety and Security to adjust the composition of the Security Management Team to only include representatives who are able to practically support the Designated Official; and**

**(3) The Chief Security Advisor for Darfur, in cooperation with the UNAMID Communication and Information Technology Section, should ensure that technical communication lines for video-teleconferences of the Security Management Team are checked prior to the meetings and improved or repaired as necessary.**

18. *The DO accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the senior leadership and security personnel are aware of the full engagement of the JSR in security matters. Ad-Interim Designated Officials have been appointed to act for the DO during his absence. The Darfur SMT meets weekly and is attended by senior management of UNAMID. Moreover, the Security Section has developed: the concept of operations for Phase IV, mandatory security briefings, and staff and management tracking, to name a few. An Area Security Coordinator has been appointed for each of the three States in Darfur. Recommendation 1 remains open pending receipt of documentation indicating the actions taken by the DO to exercise greater control and ownership of the management of security as intended under the United Nations security framework.*

19. *The DO accepted recommendation 2 and stated that a separate SMT for North Darfur was recently constituted so as to enable the Darfur SMT to concentrate on its Darfur-wide role. The Composition of the Darfur SMT has been adjusted accordingly. Based on the action taken, recommendation 2 has been closed.*

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20. *The Chief Security Advisor accepted recommendation 3 and stated that the technical difficulties in conducting SMT meetings via teleconference have been addressed. Based on the assurances provided by management, recommendation 3 has been closed.*

The Safety and Security Section organization and functions

21. Under the United Nations security framework, the CSA is directly accountable to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and is appointed as the primary advisor to the DO and the SMT on all matters related to security. The DO is responsible for the day-to-day management of the CSA. On substantive matters, the CSA reports concurrently to the DO and to DSS.

22. In its budget for UNAMID for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009, the General Assembly authorized 654 posts for the Safety and Security Section which included a Principal Officer at the D-1 level and seven senior management staff at the P-5/P-4 level. OIOS noted that the Safety and Security Section was headed by a CSA at the P-5 level and the D-1 position has not been filled. Keeping in view the gravity of the security situation in Darfur, there is an urgent need to fill the D-1 position.

23. The Division of Mission Support (DMS) has not been able to provide the necessary logistical support that was needed to ensure a successful security programme. The Safety and Security Section relies heavily on the DMS for the proper functioning of security installations and the implementation of security requirements per the United Nations standards. But the Director of Mission Support, who is also a member of the SMT, has missed 75 per cent of SMT meetings held during 2008. Requests made by the Safety and Security Section to the DMS for the enhancement of security installations have been pending for more than a year.

24. According to paragraph 5.14 of the United Nations Field Security Handbook, the CSA is responsible for establishing and chairing a security coordination cell for duty stations where there are also single-agency security officers, to ensure that all security officers at a duty station are working together to further inter-agency security coordination. The Darfur security coordination cell meets every week; however, OIOS was not able to obtain all the minutes of meetings for the security coordination cell. Since inception, Mission security management had prepared minutes for only five meetings. Accordingly, OIOS was not able to ascertain whether security activities are coordinated on an inter-agency manner as required under the United Nations security framework.

25. The Safety and Security Section did not have clear guidelines for measuring its performance to determine how well it is accomplishing its mission of protecting UNAMID premises and personnel. Adequate and reliable performance measures are a necessary component of effective management.

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#### Recommendations 4 to 7

(4) The Designated Official for Darfur should take urgent measures to fill the Principal Officer (D-1 level) position within the Safety and Security Section.

(5) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that the Division of Mission Support (DMS) improves its support over the security programme at UNAMID. As a first step, the Designated Official should ask the DMS to expedite the enhancement of security installations recommended by the Safety and Security Section, which have been pending for more than a year.

(6) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that minutes are maintained for all security coordination cell meetings.

(7) The Designated Official for Darfur should formulate detailed performance measures, indicators and outputs for the Safety and Security Section to improve the management of and accountability over the security programme.

26. *The DO accepted recommendation 4 and stated that it expects to fill this post on or about 1 August 2009. Recommendation 4 remains open pending appointment of the Principal Officer within the Safety and Security Section.*

27. *The DO accepted recommendation 5 and stated that significant improvements have been achieved during January and February 2009. The Mission is currently up-dating its Security Enhancement Plan, which will remain in effect and under continual review until full MOSS and MORSS requirements have been met, and any other mitigating measures identified in light of threats and risks specific to Darfur have been implemented. Recommendation 5 remains open pending full implementation of the Security Enhancement Plan.*

28. *The DO accepted recommendation 6 and stated that the issue raised in the report has been addressed. Based on the assurances provided by management, recommendation 6 has been closed.*

29. *The DO accepted recommendation 7 and stated that the CSA has promulgated the appropriate direction to individual units. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of documentation detailing the performance measures, indicators and outputs for the Safety and Security Section.*

#### The Security Plan

30. The Mission has in place a security plan for Darfur which has generally been prepared in accordance with the United Nations Field Security Handbook.

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However, OIOS noted that a number of the plan's contents, e.g., attachments, annexes, lists, etc., were either missing, incomplete or outdated:

- The security plan did not include a detailed list of international staff;
- The list of nationally-recruited staff members did not include the spouses and eligible dependents;
- The security plan did not identify the Alternate Designated Official who will perform the function of the *Designated Official in the absence of the latter*;
- *In three separate instances, Darfur was referred to as being in phase III instead of phase IV;*
- There was no contingency plan dealing with a terrorist attack although the security plan indicated that staff members continue to face threats of terrorist attacks;
- The Senior Nationally-Recruited Officer (SNRO), who will manage the United Nations offices in the event that all internationally-recruited staff members are evacuated, was not identified;
- The WFP office, now occupied by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was identified as a concentration point, but OCHA indicated to OIOS that it was not equipped to serve as a concentration point during a crisis;
- The security plan indicates the availability of 644 beds in El Fasher. However, OIOS noted the availability of only 224 beds during an inspection of the concentration points;
- The West Darfur area security plan did not identify safe havens outside to Sudan; and
- The Zalingei medical evacuation plan did not identify the contact information of DSS security officer to whom all CASEVAC and MEDEVAC incidents should be reported.

31. The Darfur security plan was not updated after the security phase was raised from III to IV in July 2008. Per the Security Operations Manual, the DO should review the security plan after every emergency to determine strengths and weaknesses and modify the plan accordingly. Security plans that are outdated and incomplete may preclude the Mission from efficiently and effectively implementing them.

32. OIOS noted the lack of integration between the security function and the military and police components. For example, there were two emergency

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response plans that were separately developed for the military and police. All these plans should be integrated into a comprehensive Mission security plan to ensure coordinated security operations and/or evacuation during an emergency.

#### **Recommendations 8 and 9**

**(8) The Designated Official for Darfur should establish a process that ensures the completeness of updates to the security plan and all its annexes.**

**(9) The Designated Official for Darfur should integrate the military and police components into the Mission security plan.**

33. *The DO accepted recommendation 8 and stated that the Darfur Security Plan was updated immediately on declaration of Phase IV. In November 2008, the Plan (including all relevant attachments) was again updated in accordance with the Field Security Handbook, endorsed by the SMT and submitted to Headquarters in New York. Recommendation 8 remains open pending receipt of the updated Darfur Security Plan, including the steps taken to ensure the completeness of updates to the security plan and all its annexes.*

34. *The DO accepted recommendation 9 and stated that the UNAMID police security plan, military security plan, and UN Field Security Management System plan for Darfur are integrated and harmonized, as an interim local measure, through the UNAMID Security Enhancement Plan. A redefinition of the role of the military and police in overall security plans must be addressed by the United Nations Headquarters. Based on the action taken by UNAMID to integrate unarmed military and police personnel into the security plan, recommendation 9 has been closed.*

#### Emergency Preparedness

35. Darfur has been operating under security phase IV since 11 July 2008. The decision to raise the security level was made by the DO as recommended by the CSA because United Nations peacekeepers were being directly targeted and killed. Within a few days after the declaration of phase IV, the Mission evacuated 174 non-essential staff to Entebbe under difficult circumstances because the Mission was ill-prepared for the operation. The Mission's flight capacity was so underutilized that it took three days for the Mission to evacuate 174 staff members. An after-action review was completed to identify areas of improvement but at the time of the audit no significant actions had been taken to address the shortcomings. In addition, the Mission has not yet conducted an evacuation drill in El Fasher to apply some of the lessons learned; some minor exercises were held at sector airports.

36. The method of operation adopted by the Mission did not correspond to DSS policies and procedures on the handling of security matters. The Mission is still under phase IV, but more personnel are being deployed to Darfur on an

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ongoing basis. The non-essential staff members that were evacuated in mid-July 2008 have all returned to their respective duty station in Darfur and close to 50 per cent of current international civilian staff members joined the Mission after the declaration of phase IV. While the deployment of new personnel continues, the Mission is also planning for a potential evacuation of staff members to safe havens due to the volatile security situation in Darfur. The UNAMID management explained that it recognizes that the Mission area is under security phase IV, but the reality exists that the Mission must continue the deployment of military and police personnel in order to meet the Mission's mandates in support of humanitarian efforts and the protection of affected civilian population. The Mission added that, consequently, civilian support personnel are required to support the military and police in executing their work.

37. The continued deployment of personnel in the Mission is incompatible with the security level IV. Per the United Nations Field Security Handbook, the purpose of phase IV is to limit the number of international staff members at the duty station to those vital for emergency, humanitarian relief, security operations or any other operation deemed necessary by the Secretary-General. The CSA recommended raising the security phase to IV based on the worsening security situation in Darfur.

38. At the time of the audit, the Mission was not able to produce a complete and up-to-date listing of essential and non-essential staff. According to the United Nations Field Security Handbook, the determination of essential staff members should have been made by the DO and CSA under security phase III. During an evacuation, valuable time will be lost trying to determine the number of staff that must be evacuated, as was the case during the previous evacuation. This situation could result in loss of life.

39. The security plan indicates that UNAMID and other United Nations agencies will maintain a sufficient stock of food, water and other supplies for emergencies at four concentration points (including the Mission HQ). At the time of the audit, neither the Mission HQ nor any of the five other locations visited by OIOS had adequate stock of emergency rations or other supplies to be used during a crisis. One of the concentration points did not have any emergency rations or water available for use during a crisis. The concentration point for South Darfur, occupied by a military contingent, could not accommodate the 1,600 staff members that are expected to regroup in that location in the event of a crisis.

40. The Mission HQ only had enough emergency rations for less than one day, accommodation for 62 people and a total of 128 beds stored in a warehouse at the time of the audit. Although rations for military contingents pass through the Mission HQ, the stock of rations on hand may not be sufficient for the 1,800 staff members that are expected to concentrate in the Mission HQ during a crisis. There is also the possibility that the airport will be unusable for many days due to damages or due to lack of clearance from airport authorities. Based on these observations, OIOS is of the opinion that the Mission's level of preparedness was inadequate and not consistent with the United Nations guidelines.

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41. UNAMID air assets are presently not sufficient in the event of an evacuation. According to the Mission's latest assessment, it will require a total of 11 days to evacuate all staff members from Darfur to safe havens based on air asset availability and capacity. This timeframe is unacceptable given the security situation in Darfur. It is also not clear which air assets would be at the disposal of UNAMID since both the United Nations missions in Sudan share the largest aircrafts. The Mission security plan also identified two cargo airplanes with no seats available as air assets to be used during an evacuation.

42. The current location of the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) was identified as the Crisis Coordination Centre in the security plan. It will be the central location from which a crisis will be managed. OIOS noted that this location is an operating office which accommodates a total of 26 staff members. In times of crisis, it would not be possible to quickly hand over this office to the Crisis Coordination Centre. An alternate site was not identified in the security plan.

#### The October 2008 Integrated DPKO/DFS/DSS Security Assessment Mission

43. The ISAM concluded that "the level of vulnerability at which UNAMID personnel have been operating is unacceptable and immediate action must be taken to remedy the situation." Since the issuance of the report on 31 October 2008, OIOS found at the time of the audit that the required significant actions had not been taken to reduce UNAMID's vulnerability. Even the host government has stated on many occasions that the security of United Nations personnel cannot be guaranteed if and when the International Criminal Court indicts the President of Sudan for alleged genocide against the people of Darfur.

44. In response to the ISAM report, Mission management developed the UNAMID Security Enhancement Plan (SEP), which was still in draft as of 1 February 2009. Under the SEP, the five-phase security management system that is the basis for the current United Nations security framework will be replaced with a six-stage security system. Furthermore, the plan states that a sufficient number of civilian staff will still be retained in Darfur under the "preliminary evacuation" stage, which corresponds to security phase five in the current United Nations security framework. The United Nations Field Security Handbook clearly states that under security phase V, all remaining internationally-recruited staff members are required to leave without exception.

45. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security indicated that between November 2008 and January 2009, a number of improvements to the preparedness of UNAMID for an emergency and/or an evacuation had been made. He added that DSS will continue to monitor the enhancement of UNAMID's security. DFS also informed OIOS that substantial efforts had been made to enhance the Mission's emergency and evacuation preparedness, including stocking up the necessary contingency supplies at concentration points.

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**Recommendations 10 to 16**

**(10) The Designated Official for Darfur should formally seek clarification by the Secretary-General and/or the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security of the decision for and accountability over the continued deployment of staff in a security phase IV environment.**

**(11) The Designated Official for Darfur should schedule immediately an evacuation drill to apply the lessons learned from the previous evacuation and to ensure that the evacuation plan is working.**

**(12) The Designated Official for Darfur should produce complete and up-to-date lists of essential and non-essential staff following the guidelines provided in the United Nations Field Security Handbook.**

**(13) The Designated Official for Darfur should confirm that United Nations compounds identified as concentration points have the necessary accommodation and adequate stock of emergency rations, water and supplies to support a temporary concentration of staff in case of an emergency.**

**(14) The Designated Official for Darfur should confirm the sufficiency of aircraft needed to evacuate staff members within a safe window of time in the event of an emergency.**

**(15) The Designated Official for Darfur should identify a suitable, as well as an alternate, Crisis Coordination Centre from which a crisis will be managed.**

**(16) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that the UNAMID Security Enhancement Plan complies with the United Nations Field Security Handbook and seek the advice and approval of the Department of Safety and Security in cases where the Mission's plan is not consistent with the provisions of the security handbook.**

46. *The DO accepted recommendation 10 and stated that UNAMID code cable ELF-114 of 17 February 2009 refers to the status of the continued deployment of the Mission as an activity deemed essential by the Secretary-General under Phase IV of the Field Security Handbook. Recommendation 10 remains open pending receipt of UNAMID code cable ELF-114 of 17 February 2009.*

47. *The DO accepted recommendation 11 and stated that series of evacuation exercises, covering actions by Zone Wardens, UNAMID military*

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*extraction forces, and individual staff members was conducted in January and February 2009. Recommendation 11 remains open pending receipt of after-action reports related to the evacuation exercises conducted in January and February 2009.*

48. *The DO accepted recommendation 12 and stated that the staff priority list for all UNAMID persons under the United Nations Field Security Management System has been finalized. Recommendation 12 remains open pending receipt of an up-to-date staff priority list.*

49. *The DO accepted recommendation 13 and stated that concentration areas as of 4 March 2009 provided protected accommodation for 1,888 personnel in El Fasher, 1,500 in Nyala, 150 in Zalingei, and 100 in El Geneina. Stocks of food and water were at 7 days or higher. Recommendation 13 remains open pending a site visit to concentration points to assess capacity and verify levels of stocks.*

50. *The DO accepted recommendation 14 and stated that sufficiency of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft for full evacuation of all unarmed personnel within 5 days was confirmed in advance of 4 March 2009. Recommendation 14 remains open pending receipt of documentation confirming which helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will be used for full evacuation of all unarmed personnel within 5 days.*

51. *The DO accepted recommendation 15 and stated that a Crisis Management Centre (CMC) with a full suite of communications was established and tested on 26 February 2009. Recommendation 15 remains open pending a site visit to the CMC established on 26 February 2009.*

52. *The DO accepted recommendation 16 and stated that the Security Enhancement Plan will be conveyed to DSS so that it can be reviewed and advice and approval provided in areas where consistency with the Field Security Handbook is not advisable. Recommendation 16 remains open pending DSS review and approval of the Security Enhancement Plan.*

## **B. Security of Personnel**

### Compliance with the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards

53. The Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS) refer to the basic minimum level of security measures required to enhance the safety and security of UNAMID staff members at their places of residence. These include security provisions such as metal gates, window and door bars, concertina wire and generator. Under the Darfur MORSS, staff members are also authorized to hire three professional security guards to provide security for their residences on a 24-hour/7-day basis. Staff members can claim a monthly reimbursement of up to \$900 for the hiring of three professional security guards.

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- a. Lack of suitable housing and security equipment and supplies in the local market

54. UNAMID international staff members are responsible, with the assistance of the Mission, for ensuring that their residences are MORSS-compliant. The Safety and Security Section conducted 147 MORSS assessments as of 18 December 2008 and none of the houses was found to be MORSS compliant at the time of the initial assessment. The low MORSS compliance rate was mainly due to the lack of suitable housing in Darfur and the lack of supplies and equipment, such as generators, fire extinguishers, first aid kits, smoke detectors and concertina wires, in the local market. In OIOS' opinion, the Mission should have taken the initiative to assist the staff members in complying with MORSS by procuring such equipment and supplies for distribution to staff members on a cost-recovery/-reimbursement basis.

- b. Inadequate MORSS assessment and guidance to staff to assist them in complying with MORSS

55. There were no mechanisms in place within the security function to monitor residences for MORSS compliance after the initial inspection. There was no security officer assigned to monitor MORSS compliance on a full-time basis. It took many weeks for the Safety and Security Section to respond to inspection requests from staff members. Upon completion of the initial inspection, staff members are provided with a Residential Security Survey report with recommendations. However, no guidance was provided to staff members on how to address the deficiencies noted in the report or implement the recommendations.

56. There were also no formal arrangements to assist staff members in hiring professional security guards for their residences. Under the current arrangement, staff members are responsible for the hiring and training of the security guards. It is unreasonable to expect staff members arriving in a high-risk environment for the first time to hire and train professional security guards. Additionally, there is no assurance that the professional security guards hired by the staff member possess the necessary skills to provide security services.

#### **Recommendations 17 to 19**

**(17) The Designated Official for Darfur should procure generators, first aid kits, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers and concertina wires for distribution to staff members, on a cost-recovery/-reimbursement basis, and set a deadline for achieving compliance with the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards.**

**(18) The Designated Official for Darfur should establish a system to ensure that staff residences are monitored for compliance with the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards after the initial inspection.**

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**(19) The Designated Official for Darfur should assist staff members in the hiring and training of security guards for residences occupied by UNAMID staff members, if requested to do so.**

57. *The DO accepted recommendation 17 and stated that the target date for MORSS compliance is 1 January 2010. Recommendation 17 remains open pending procurement of generators, first aid kits, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers and concertina wire for distribution to staff members to achieve compliance with MORSS.*

58. *The DO accepted recommendation 18 and stated that a full-time security officer in the North Darfur office monitors MORSS compliance in El Fasher. Similar arrangements are in place in the other main centres. In OIOS' opinion, it is unrealistic for one security officer to monitor compliance with MORSS for over 1,800 staff members residing in North Darfur. Therefore, recommendation 18 remains open pending the establishment of an adequate system for monitoring MORSS compliance.*

59. *The DO accepted recommendation 19 and stated that limited resources and competing demands have not permitted the training of all security guards. This training shortfall will be addressed as additional resources become available. Recommendation 19 remains open pending receipt of documentation indicating the actions taken to assist staff members in the hiring and training of security guards for their residences.*

#### The zone warden system

60. Although a zone warden system appears to be in place, OIOS noted that it is not fully operational for the following reasons:

- The residential inspection database recorded that 147 inspections were carried out as of 18 December 2008. This is considerably below the 1,800 international staff residing in North Darfur, even taking into account those accommodated in the United Nations compound. Staff members could be residing outside the approved security residential sectors;
- Three zones did not have wardens assigned to them and five zones did not have deputy wardens. Security management explained that in the event of a crisis wardens assigned to other zones would also be responsible for the zones without wardens;
- There were only 23 wardens/deputy wardens for approximately 1,800 staff members in El Fasher. It would be unreasonable to expect a warden to monitor the movements of an average of 78 staff members;
- OIOS surveyed the 23 zone wardens/deputy wardens to obtain some basic information about their duties. Only four wardens responded to the survey and three of them did not receive a letter of appointment from the DO

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and a complete and accurate list of staff members residing in their zones. OIOS followed up with the CSA on the low response rate. The CSA explained that wardens sometimes do not take their responsibilities seriously because the warden position is voluntary in nature;

- OIOS' review of an undated list of staff members residing in each zone showed that the list was missing critical data on staff members such as employee number, section, contact details and location of residence; and
- The response rate to the daily radio check for wardens was at 19 per cent for a sample of days selected by OIOS for review. Only one out of 18 wardens/deputy wardens present in El Fasher responded to a surprise radio call initiated by OIOS. In addition, three wardens were not registered in the radio check database. Wardens are expected to monitor their radios at all times in order to receive instructions in the event of a crisis.

61. Based on the above shortcomings, OIOS is of the view that the warden system may not be able to assist in evacuating UNAMID staff to the concentration points in the event of a crisis. The Safety and Security Section indicated that it had taken initial actions to improve the warden system.

#### **Recommendation 20**

**(20) The Designated Official for Darfur should complete immediately all necessary actions to address the weaknesses in the warden system in order to ensure that it is fully operational, including: (a) the issuance of formal letters of appointment to wardens, setting out clearly their duties and responsibilities; (b) the development of a warden database that includes all critical information about staff members residing in each zone; (c) adjusting the number of staff members assigned to a zone warden to a reasonably manageable level; and (d) taking steps to ensure that wardens participate in daily radio checks.**

62. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 20 and stated that actions were taken to address weaknesses in the warden system such as the creation of new zones and training given to zone wardens. Measures are also in place to enhance compliance with radio checks.* Recommendation 20 remains open pending issuance of formal letters of appointment to wardens, the development of a warden database and zone warden compliance with radio checks.

#### Staff tracking

63. The Mission's Tracking Unit maintains a Microsoft Excel workbook to track staff movements. However, some staff members were not included in the tracking list. Additionally, staff members were accounted for twice under different sections while others were listed in the wrong section. Without an

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accurate and up-to-date staff tracking system, the Mission would not know the whereabouts of its staff members in the event of a crisis.

64. OIOS attempted but failed to determine the number of international staff members that were issued a radio because of the following discrepancies in data provided:

- Different staff members were assigned the same ID number in the staff list maintained by the Personnel Section; and
- The Communication and Information Technology Section database used to track radio issuances was also incomplete and inaccurate. For instance, staff members with radios were not included in the database. In many cases, the index number was used as ID number and vice versa. Additionally, the database indicated the issuance of more than one radio to many staff members.

65. A two-way radio could be the only available means of communication during a crisis. Therefore, it is critical that all staff members are issued a radio and a call sign.

#### **Recommendations 21 to 22**

**(21) The Designated Official for Darfur should maintain an accurate and up-to-date staff tracking database in order to know the whereabouts of staff members at all times.**

**(22) The Designated Official for Darfur should establish procedures to ensure that all staff members have been issued a hand-held radio and a call sign to allow them to communicate during an emergency; and ensure that records pertaining to issued radios are accurately and completely maintained.**

66. *The DO accepted recommendation 21 and stated that an integrated tracking database to include military and police personnel has been established. Recommendation 21 remains open pending receipt of staff data generated from the newly established tracking database.*

67. *The DO accepted recommendation 22 and stated that all staff members are required on arrival to sign for a radio and attend training on the use of the radio. Moreover, a database has been established to manage the issuance of radios to staff members. Recommendation 22 remains open pending receipt of data on radio issuances generated from the newly established database.*

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Staff awareness of and compliance with security measures

a. Radio Checks

68. International staff members are required to participate in daily radio checks between 1900 and 2100 hours. A radio check response rate is calculated and incorporated in the daily situation report of the Safety and Security Section. But a detailed radio check delinquency report was not prepared and submitted to Mission management. Record of non-compliance with daily radio checks or other security instructions were not kept in the staff members' personnel records.

69. For the month of November 2008, OIOS' calculation showed that the radio check response rate ranged between 25 and 45 per cent, indicating that between 365 and 495 international staff members did not participate in the radio checks during the period.

b. Training on security

70. There was no monitoring mechanism in place to ensure that staff members have completed the basic and advanced security in the field training courses. OIOS' review of 20 international civilian staff members' personnel records showed that only two staff members had their training certificates in their personnel file. The Personnel Section explained that a copy of the certificates is requested for the employee records, but it was never designed as a monitoring mechanism to ensure that staff members have completed the mandatory security training courses. Staff members could be deployed in such high risk environment as Darfur without the proper training on how to cope with various emergency situations.

c. Information on security

71. Communication between the Mission and staff members on security matters was inadequate to non-existent. Besides a few town hall meetings, there was no regular flow of communication to keep staff members informed on current events affecting their security. The Safety and Security Section was unable to provide OIOS with any broadcast information relating to the nature of the 39 criminal cases that occurred between January and October 2008, and how these incidents impact staff safety and security and the measures that staff can take and the Mission are taking to mitigate the risks. Per the United Nations Field Security Handbook, the CSA is responsible for ensuring that staff members are kept informed of matters affecting their safety and security.

**Recommendations 23 to 25**

**(23) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that records pertaining to staff members' non-compliance with radio checks and other security instructions are kept in their personnel files and that such staff members are reminded and/or reprimanded.**

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**(24) The Designated Official for Darfur should maintain a database on the completion of mandatory security courses and set a deadline for the completion of these mandatory courses.**

**(25) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that staff members are regularly informed of the latest security assessment, other information affecting staff safety and security, and the actions that staff members need to take in the event of an emergency.**

72. *The DO accepted recommendation 23 and stated that daily records are maintained on compliance with radio checks, with reports submitted to supervisors. Recommendation 23 remains open pending receipt of records on compliance with radio checks, documentation evidencing the submission of reports to supervisors and actions taken by supervisors to address staff members' non-compliance with radio checks.*

73. *The DO accepted recommendation 24 and stated that this item has been incorporated into the Mission's check-in and security clearance procedures. Recommendation 24 remains open pending receipt of data on staff completion of mandatory security courses.*

74. *The DO accepted recommendation 25 and stated that the Security Section provides daily situation updates to all staff through security broadcasts. Based on the action taken, recommendation 25 has been closed.*

## **C. Security of Premises**

### Physical security

75. The Safety and Security Section has developed the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) for Darfur, in accordance with the MOSS policy guidelines. It was developed to ensure that the minimum essential security practices and procedures are established and equipment and physical resources are available to mitigate the risk threats and risks faced by UNAMID. The Darfur MOSS recommended the following perimeter protection standards:

- Compound brick walls should be at least 2.5 metres high and topped with barbed/razor wire 1 metre high or barrier of Hesco bastions<sup>1</sup> (double at the base and single on the top) 2.5 metres high and topped with barbed/razor wire 1 metre high;
- Uniformed United Nations security guards should patrol building perimeter on a 24-hour/7-day basis;

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<sup>1</sup> Collapsible wire mesh container and heavy duty fabric liner, used as a temporary blast or small-arms barrier.

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- Vehicle parking outside main entrances and civilian vehicle parking up against perimeter wall/fence should not be allowed;
  - Electronic surveillance devices should include closed-circuit TV (CCTV) cameras;
  - Perimeter walls/fences should be illuminated during dark hours with flood light and spots covering walls/fence in light; and
  - The Mission should have an improvised explosive device (IED) detection capability.

76. OIOS' inspection visit of the following UNAMID premises: (a) the UN Police Compound; (b) the former AMIS Compound; (c) the El Fasher Super Camp; (d) the El Geneina office; (e) and the Nyala office, showed several instances of non-compliance with MOSS;

- The perimeter walls in the El Geneina and Nyala UNAMID offices were weak and had visible cracks. Single barriers of Hesco bastions and containers with visible gaps were used in Nyala to support the weak perimeter wall (Picture 1), but this additional security feature appeared insufficient to prevent unauthorized or forced access into the compound;
- Perimeter walls surrounding the former AMIS and UN Police compounds did not meet the standard requirement. The combined height for Hesco bastions and concertina wire was less than 3.5 metres. OIOS also noted gaps in the perimeter wall of the former AMIS Compound and a portion of the wall was not topped with concertina wire (Picture 2);
- The perimeter of the El Fasher Super Camp consisted of a weak fence topped with concertina wire which was less than 3.5 metres, as required under the Darfur MOSS. OIOS observed more than 50 holes throughout the perimeter fence (Picture 3). Security guards on duty informed OIOS that the fence was damaged by children living in the Abu Shouk Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp which is located across the main entrance of the El Fasher Super Camp;
- The lighting inside and around the perimeter of the El Fasher Super Camp was inadequate;
- None of the premises had electronic surveillance devices, screening equipment and IED-detection capability. The Nyala office had an X-ray machine and a walk-through metal detector that appeared to be working properly;
- Uniformed security guards were not required to patrol the compound perimeter on a 24-hour/7-day basis, except for the El Geneina office; and

- Civilian vehicles were allowed to park up against the perimeter fence of the El Fasher Super Camp (Picture 4).



**Picture 1**



**Picture 2**



**Picture 3**



**Picture 4**

77. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of United Nations staff members and their property, and of the Organization's property, against disturbances rests with the host government. To fulfill its responsibility, the Government of Sudan (GoS) constructed a security post in a residential area in El Fasher occupied mainly by UNAMID staff and has conducted static and mobile check points to improve security measures.

#### **Recommendation 26**

**(26) The Designated Official for Darfur should enhance the physical security of UNAMID premises to comply with the Darfur Minimum Operating Security Standards.**

78. *The DO accepted recommendation 26 and stated that the target date for compliance with the Darfur MOSS is 1 March 2010. Recommendation 26 remains open pending enhancement of physical security installations at Mission premises to comply with the Darfur Minimum Operating Security Standards.*

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Access control procedures

79. In the early stages of the audit, OIOS noted several lapses in access control procedures at the Mission headquarters (also known as the ARC Compound). Due to the severity of the vulnerabilities, OIOS communicated the issues to the DO on 12 November 2008, recommending that immediate action be taken to establish strict access controls at the gates of the ARC Compound. The DO accepted the recommendation and some actions were immediately taken. However, additional actions were still needed to fully address the recommendation. For instance, it was not sufficient for security guards to simply ensure that persons seeking admission are wearing an ID card. A further inspection is needed to ensure that ID cards are still valid and legitimate prior to access into the compound. Additionally, the security team did not develop or acquire the capabilities to detect security hazards inside vehicles and the following logistical problems had not been addressed: rearrangement of the reception area, improvement to the building structure, accurate calibration of screening machines and modification to the boom and sliding barriers.

80. The Darfur MOSS recommended the following access control procedures, among others:

- Only United Nations vehicles (no civilian vehicle access) are allowed inside UNAMID premises;
- All vehicles to be searched with a vehicle search mirror prior to access into outer cordon area at the designated “stand off” point;
- Gates closed and manned at all times during and after working hours;
- Visitor log and ID card system;
- Basic post instruction for guards in English and Arabic;
- Handheld metal detectors at all entrances;
- Clear visitor procedures;
- Metal gates and anti-ram barriers for vehicle inspection and identification;
- Safe room door and windows reinforced with solid locking system from inside; and
- Safe room with emergency stock for a minimum of five days [water, meals ready to eat (MREs), blankets, light source, first aid kit, etc.].

81. At the time of the audit, OIOS noted the following inadequate access control procedures in the El Fasher Super Camp, and the UN Police and former AMIS Compounds:

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- There was no designated “stand off” point. Vehicles entering the compounds are stopped outside the gate. In some instances, the gates were already opened so vehicles are stopped only after entering the compound;
  - Vehicle mirror search was not performed at the El Fasher Super Camp and the UN Police compound;
  - Security guards were posted at the entrance of the UN Police and the former AMIS compounds but the gates were not closed. Vehicles were allowed to proceed into the compound without any search and ID card verification;



- There was no anti-ram barrier at the main entrance of the El Fasher Super Camp;
- Handheld metal detectors were not available or used except in the Nyala office;
- Visitor procedures were not in place at the El Fasher Super Camp, the UN Police and the former AMIS compounds;
- Post instructions for security guards, when available, were written in English only;
- Deliveries into the El Fasher Super Camp, which was under construction, were not inspected to detect security hazards;
- There was no safe room (bunker) in the Nyala Office, the El Fasher Super Camp, and the UN Police and the former AMIS compounds. Two bunkers located in the ARC Compound were used as a rest area for the cleaning crew and storage for cleaning supplies;



- The safe room in the El Geneina Office could only accommodate 30 staff members. About 60 staff members were expected to regroup in the office in the event of a crisis. The quantity of water available would last for only 3 days and food for 2 days; and
- None of the premises had a reinforced iron gate with improved locking system. All the premises could be easily taken over by hostile elements. See below pictures of the main entrance door of the former AMIS Compound, the El Fasher Super Camp, and the LOB Compound, which houses a fuel station near the entrance.



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### **Recommendation 27**

**(27) The Designated Official for Darfur should take immediate action to further improve and maintain strict access control procedures at all UNAMID premises.**

82. *The DO accepted recommendation 27 and stated that the limited qualifications of personnel available on the local Sudanese market continue to be a problem. Access control at all facilities is improving through training, close supervision, and the hiring of additional guards. Recommendation 27 remains open pending enhancement of security installations at access control points and receipt of documentation evidencing training given to security guards, supervision provided to security guards and the hiring of additional security guards.*

### Fire safety

83. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Security Operations Manual provide that the Field Security Officer should: (a) formulate a fire evacuation plan for the office premises; (b) ensure that fire extinguishers, smoke detectors, axes, alarms and other firefighting equipment located in the office premises are adequate and in good condition; and (c) keep records on the maintenance of equipment. OIOS noted the following weaknesses as regards fire safety:

- The Mission did not have a comprehensive fire safety and prevention plan for the office premises;
- There was no firefighting equipment in the Mission area;
- There was no fire assessment conducted to identify fire hazards;
- The Mission had no agreement with local authorities to provide assistance in the event of a fire;
- Staff members were not provided any formal training on fire prevention, fire safety awareness or fire fighting; and
- A fire drill had not been conducted.

84. Mission security management informed OIOS that the lack of a fire safety plan was due to the slow recruitment process for a Fire and Safety Officer.

### **Recommendations 28 to 29**

**(28) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that the Mission has a fully-functioning fire safety programme by: (a) establishing a Fire and Safety Unit; (b) expediting the recruitment of a Fire and Safety Officer; (c) performing a fire safety assessment of all UNAMID**

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premises; and (d) developing a fire safety and prevention plan and initiating the procurement of necessary firefighting equipment based on the results of the fire safety assessment; and

**(29) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that formal training on fire prevention, fire safety awareness or firefighting is given to staff members.**

85. *The DO accepted recommendation 28 and stated that a Fire Safety Unit has been set up following the arrival of a fire safety officer on 28 January 2009. The FS-6 and FS-4 posts are staffed and a third post is being sourced. The newly arrived fire safety personnel have begun an assessment as the first step in the formulation of a comprehensive fire safety and prevention plan. Recommendation 28 remains open pending receipt of documentation on fire safety assessment of all Mission premises and related procurement actions taken to ensure a full-functioning fire safety programme.*

86. *The DO accepted recommendation 29 and stated that training will be included as part of the comprehensive fire safety and prevention plan under development. Recommendation 29 remains open pending receipt of documentation on fire safety prevention and awareness training given to staff members.*

#### Guard force recruitment and management

87. The Guard Force Management Unit (GFMU) is responsible for providing 24-hour/7-day physical security for all UNAMID premises, including access control and perimeter security. The Unit is led by an Officer-In-Charge who reports to the Deputy Security Advisor for Administration and Support. The Unit was comprised of 10 international staff and 191 national staff. International staff members are responsible for supervising security guards and performing various administrative duties. National staff members are employed as security guards.

88. The GFMU was facing several challenges that hampered its ability to protect Mission premises:

- Sixteen (or 76 per cent) of the 21 security guards selected for review by OIOS did not possess the required minimum recruitment standards for the post. The Mission had employed unqualified security guards partly because of the perception that there was no other alternative available in Darfur;
- All 21 security guards sampled by OIOS were not subjected to background checks;
- There was no documented assessment exercise within the recruitment process to determine if candidates have the ability to follow

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basic orders and instructions. Most security guards did not communicate well in English or Arabic;

- Security guards were not supervised. OIOS observed instances where security guards have abandoned their posts, leaving the premises vulnerable to attacks from hostile elements;
- Security guards did not perform their guard duties correctly, e.g., access control procedures, ID card verification, mirror check, etc. In OIOS' opinion, repeated instances of failure to properly perform assigned tasks must be monitored and documented, and should lead to disciplinary actions, dismissal or non-renewal of contracts;
- Training for security guards was inadequate. The Training Unit did not have training officers fluent in Arabic, the language spoken by most security guards. Upon hiring, security guards were only provided with on-the-job instructions on how to perform their duties;
- As of 31 December 2008, GFMU had recruited only 186 security guards out of the authorized 468 National; and
- Security guards were operating without any supplies and equipment such as uniforms, torches, whistles, flashlights, etc.

89. Security guards serve as the first line of defense in the protection of the Mission and its personnel. Inadequacies in the management of security guards can quickly translate into casualties in the event of an attack. UNAMID management took immediate action during the course of the audit to address some of the weaknesses identified such as the deployment of additional international security officers to supervise security guards and the issuance of uniforms to national and international security personnel assigned in GFMU. Also, the military has been tapped to augment the guard force. For example, some Burundian troops are now posted at the gates of the ARC Compound.

#### **Recommendations 30 to 34**

**(30) The Designated Official for Darfur should (a) define the minimum acceptable qualifications for the recruitment of local security guards, considering the available skills in the local market; (b) ensure that successful candidates possess the minimum skills; and (c) provide candidates recruited sufficient and ongoing training to ensure that they can effectively perform their functions.**

**(31) The Designated Official for Darfur should provide adequate supervision over the security guards to ensure the proper performance of their functions.**

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**(32) The Designated Official for Darfur should: (a) take urgent measures to fill the vacant guard force positions to enable the Guard Force Management Unit to become fully operational; and (b) expedite the recruitment of Arabic speaking training officers to enhance the Unit's training capability.**

**(33) The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that: (a) the performance of security guards is properly monitored; (b) repeated instances of unsatisfactory performance of duties are documented; and (c) such instances of poor performance lead to disciplinary action, dismissal or non-renewal of contracts.**

**(34) The Designated Official for Darfur should formalize the assignment of military troops as guards for UNAMID compounds by seeking the assistance of the Office of Military Affairs to revise the Memorandum of Understanding with the Troop Contributing Countries that will be selected to assist in guarding UNAMID compounds.**

90. *The DO accepted recommendation 30 and stated that there is a limited number of qualified candidates on the local labour market and some guards that were hired by the predecessor Mission prior to the deployment of UNAMID lack the necessary qualifications. Recommendation 30 remains open pending receipt of documentation on the new qualification standards for applicants of security guard post and training plan.*

91. *The DO accepted recommendation 31 and stated that the Guard Force Unit has enhanced the supervision of locally recruited staff, to include ongoing training. Recommendation 31 remains open pending receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken to enhance the supervision of security guards.*

92. *The DO accepted recommendation 32 and stated that approval has been received to hire 480 additional security guards on an Individual Contract basis. Recommendation 32 remains open pending receipt of documentation evidencing the hiring of additional security guards and Arabic speaking training officers to enable the Guard Force Management Unit to become fully operational.*

93. *The DO accepted recommendation 33 and stated that significant progress has been achieved in addressing guard force shortcomings, as reflected in better access control at all facilities as a result of training, closer supervision, and the hiring of additional personnel. Recommendation 33 remains open pending receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken to monitor and record the performance of security guards.*

94. *The DO accepted recommendation 34 and stated that in order to maximize mandate implementation, care must be taken not to divert UNAMID military personnel to protection roles that can be adequately carried out by alternate arrangements. OIOS noted that armed guards provided by the Host*

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Government are presently deployed at or near Mission compounds in El Fasher, Nyala, and El Geneina. Based on the action taken, recommendation 34 has been closed.

Controls over the issuance of ID cards

95. The UNAMID Pass and ID Unit is responsible for the issuance and control of ID cards and passes within the Mission area. As of November 2008, a total of 35,966 ID cards have been issued to various groups within the Mission area including civilian staff, military personnel, UN police officers, national staff, contractors and United Nations agencies and other affiliated personnel. The Mission has established standard operating procedures for the issuance of ID cards and passes. The Unit uses the IDTEL system to process and issue ID cards to United Nations personnel.

96. OIOS noted the following weaknesses in the receipt, stock and issuance of ID cards:

- A user of the IDTEL system could generate ID Cards without the proper documentation and authorization. Additionally, there was no supervisory and periodic review to verify the legitimacy of ID cards issued to United Nations personnel and contractors;
- The IDTEL databases maintained in Khartoum and El Fasher were not integrated. Therefore, duplicate issuance and/or numbering of ID cards may occur without being detected. The staff list provided to OIOS by the Personnel Section indicated instances of duplicate ID numbering;
- The Pass and ID Unit did not maintain specimen signatures of authorized signatories;
- The Pass and ID Unit had been issuing ID cards without the United Nations hologram;
- All staff members in the Pass and ID Unit were utilizing the same user name and passwords to access the IDTEL system;
- The IDTEL system allowed users to generate the same ID card more than once; and
- Blank ID-Cards were not kept in a locked cabinet. In addition, there was no stock control over the blank ID cards. There was a risk that unauthorized personnel could be issued an ID card without any detection.

97. Based on the internal control weaknesses noted above, OIOS selected a sample of ID card issuances for detailed testing and found the following:

- Four out 17 local contractors ID cards were issued without the approval of the approving official;

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- Two local contractors were not required to return their ID card upon expiration;
  - No supporting documents were provided for 2 of the 17 local contractors;
  - The Pass and ID Unit did not maintain on file a copy of the national ID card for one of the 17 local contractors selected for testing;
  - Two of the 10 international contractors ID expiration date did not agree with the expiration date stated on the approval letter;
  - The Pass and ID Unit did not obtain a copy of the national passport for 7 of the 10 International Contractors before the issuance of an ID card; and
  - For 10 of the 17 local contractors and 3 of the 10 International Contractors, the approval letter did not specify the expiration date for the contract. Therefore, ID cards may have been issued without supporting documents.

#### **Recommendation 35**

**(35) The Designated Official for Darfur should improve internal controls over the receipt, stock and issuance of ID cards.**

98. *The Designated Official accepted recommendation 35 and stated that the Safety and Security Section is reviewing the procedures of the Pass and Identification Unit with a view to identifying and resolving problems in collaboration with CITS. Recommendation 35 remains open pending receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken to improve internal controls over the receipt, stock and issuance of ID cards.*

## **V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

99. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of UNAMID for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
1	The Designated Official for Darfur should take greater control and ownership of the management of security as intended under the United Nations security framework and provide the necessary leadership and direction needed to achieve a successful security programme at UNAMID.	Governance	High	O	Receipt of documentation indicating the actions taken by the DO to exercise greater control and ownership of the management of security as intended under the United Nations security framework.	Not provided
2	The Designated Official for Darfur should make recommendations to the Department of Safety and Security to adjust the composition of the Security Management Team to only include representatives who are able to practically support the Designated Official.	Governance	Medium	C	Action taken.	Implemented
3	The Chief Security Advisor for Darfur, in cooperation with the UNAMID Communication and Information Technology Section, should ensure that technical communication lines for video-conferences of the Security Management Team are checked prior to the meetings and improved or repaired as necessary.	Operational	Medium	C	Action taken.	Implemented
4	The Designated Official for Darfur should take urgent measures to fill the Principal Officer (D-1 level) position within the Safety and Security Section.	Human resources	High	O	Appointment of Principal Officer within the Safety and Security Section.	1 August 2009
5	The Designated Official (DO) for Darfur should ensure that the Division of Mission Support (DMS) improves its support over the security programme at UNAMID. As a first step, the DO should ask the DMS to	Operational	High	O	Full implementation of the Security Enhancement Plan.	1 March 2010

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
	expedite the enhancement of security installations recommended by the Safety and Security Section, which have been pending for more than a year.					
6	The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that minutes are maintained for all security coordination cell meetings.	Operational	Medium	C	Action taken.	Implemented
7	The Designated Official for Darfur should formulate detailed performance measures, indicators and outputs for the Safety and Security Section to improve the management of and accountability over the security programme.	Governance	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation detailing the performance measures, indicators and outputs for the Safety and Security Section.	Not provided
8	The Designated Official for Darfur should establish a process that ensures the completeness of updates to the security plan and all its annexes.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of the updated Darfur Security Plan, including the steps taken to ensure the completeness of updates to the security plan and all its annexes.	Not provided
9	The Designated Official for Darfur should integrate the military and police components into the Mission security plan.	Operational	Medium	C	Action taken	Implemented
10	The Designated Official for Darfur should formally seek clarification by the Secretary-General and/or the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security of the decision for and accountability over the continued deployment of staff in a security phase IV environment.	Governance	High	O	Receipt of UNAMID code cable ELF-114 of 17 February 2009.	Not provided
11	The Designated Official for Darfur should schedule immediately an evacuation drill to apply the lessons learned from the previous evacuation and to ensure that the evacuation plan is working.	Operational	High	O	Receipt of after-action reports related to the evacuation exercises conducted in January and February 2009.	Not provided
12	The Designated Official for Darfur should produce complete and up-to-date lists of essential and non-essential staff following the guidelines provided in the United	Information Resources	High	O	Receipt of an up-to-date staff priority list.	Not provided

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
13	Nations Field Security Handbook. The Designated Official for Darfur should confirm that United Nations compounds identified as concentration points have the necessary accommodation and adequate stock of emergency rations, water and supplies to support a temporary concentration of staff in case of an emergency.	Operational	High	O	Site visit at concentration points to assess capacity and verify levels of stocks.	Not provided
14	The Designated Official for Darfur should confirm the sufficiency of aircraft needed to evacuate staff members within a safe window of time in the event of an emergency.	Operational	High	O	Receipt of documentation confirming which helicopters and fixed wing aircraft will be used for full evacuation of all unarmed personnel within 5 days.	Not provided
15	The Designated Official for Darfur should identify a suitable, as well as an alternate, Crisis Coordination Centre from which a crisis will be managed.	Operational	High	O	Site visit at Crisis Management Centre established on February 26, 2009.	Not provided
16	The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that the UNAMID Security Enhancement Plan complies with the United Nations Field Security Handbook and seek the advice and approval of the Department of Safety and Security in cases where the Mission's plan is not consistent with the provisions of the security handbook.	Compliance	High	O	DSS review and approval of the Security Enhancement Plan.	1 September 2009
17	The Designated Official for Darfur should procure generators, first aid kits, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers and concertina wires for distribution to staff members, on a cost-recovery/-reimbursement basis, and set a deadline for achieving compliance with the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards.	Compliance	High	O	Procurement of generators, first aid kits, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers and concertina wire for distribution to staff members to achieve compliance with MORSS.	1 January 2010
18	The Designated Official for Darfur should establish a system to ensure that staff	Compliance	Medium	O	The establishment of an adequate system for monitoring MORSS compliance.	Not provided

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19	residences are monitored for compliance with the Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards after the initial inspection. The Designated Official for Darfur should assist staff members in the hiring and training of security guards for residences occupied by UNAMID staff members, if requested to do so	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation indicating the actions taken to assist staff members in the hiring and training of security guards for their residences.	Not provided
20	The Designated Official for Darfur should complete immediately all necessary actions to address the weaknesses in the warden system in order to ensure that it is fully operational, including: (a) the issuance of formal letters of appointment to wardens, setting out clearly their duties and responsibilities; (b) the development of a warden database that includes all critical information about staff members residing in each zone; (c) adjusting the number of staff members assigned to a zone warden to a reasonably manageable level; and (d) taking steps to ensure that wardens participate in daily radio checks.	Operational	High	O	Issuance of formal letters of appointment to wardens, development of a warden database and zone warden compliance with radio checks.	Not provided
21	The Designated Official for Darfur should maintain an accurate and up-to-date staff tracking database in order to know the whereabouts of staff members at all times.	Information Resources	High	O	Receipt of staff data generated from the newly established tracking database.	Not provided
22	The Designated Official for Darfur should establish procedures to ensure that all staff members have been issued a hand-held radio and a call sign to allow them to communicate during an emergency; and ensure that records pertaining to issued radios are accurately and completely maintained.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of data on radio issuances generated from the newly established database.	Not provided
23	The Designated Official for Darfur should	Information	Medium	O	Receipt of records on compliance with	Not provided

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
	ensure that records pertaining to staff members' non-compliance with radio checks and other security instructions are kept in their personnel files and that such staff members are reminded and/or reprimanded.	Resources			radio checks, documentation evidencing the submission of reports to supervisors and actions taken by supervisors to address staff members' non-compliance with radio checks.	
24	The Designated Official for Darfur should maintain a database on the completion of mandatory security courses and set a deadline for the completion of these mandatory courses.	Information Resources	Medium	O	Receipt of data on staff completion of mandatory security courses.	Not provided
25	The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that staff members are regularly informed of the latest security assessment, other information affecting staff safety and security, and the actions that staff members need to take in the event of an emergency.	Information Resources	Medium	C	Action taken.	Implemented
26	The Designated Official for Darfur should enhance the physical security of UNAMID premises to comply with the Darfur Minimum Operating Security Standards.	Compliance	High	O	Enhancement of physical security installations at Mission premises to comply with the Darfur Minimum Operating Security Standards.	1 March 2010
27	The Designated Official for Darfur should take immediate action to further improve and maintain strict access control procedures at all UNAMID premises.	Operational	High	O	Enhancement of security installations at access control points and receipt of documentation evidencing training given to security guards, supervision provided to security guards and the hiring of additional security guards.	1 July 2009
28	The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that the Mission has a fully-functioning fire safety programme by: (a) establishing a Fire and Safety Unit; (b) expediting the recruitment of a Fire and Safety Officer; (c) performing a fire safety assessment of all UNAMID premises; and (d) developing a fire safety and prevention plan and initiating the procurement of necessary firefighting equipment based on	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation on fire safety assessment of all Mission premises and related procurement actions taken to ensure a full-functioning fire safety programme.	1 September 2009

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
29	the results of the fire safety assessment. The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that formal training on fire prevention, fire safety awareness or firefighting is given to staff members.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation on fire safety prevention and awareness training given to staff members.	1 September 2009
30	The Designated Official for Darfur should: (a) define the minimum acceptable qualifications for the recruitment of local security guards, considering the available skills in the local market; (b) ensure that successful candidates possess the minimum skills; and (c) provide candidates recruited sufficient and ongoing training to ensure that they can effectively perform their functions.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation on the new qualification standards for applicants of security guard post and training plan.	1 December 2009
31	The Designated Official for Darfur should provide adequate supervision over the performance of their functions.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken to enhance the supervision of security guards.	Not provided
32	The Designated Official for Darfur should: (a) take urgent measures to fill the vacant guard force positions to enable the Guard Force Management Unit to become fully operational; and (b) expedite the recruitment of Arabic speaking training officers to enhance the Unit's training capability.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation evidencing the hiring of additional security guards and Arabic speaking training officers to enable the Guard Force Management Unit to become fully operational.	1 October 2009
33	The Designated Official for Darfur should ensure that: (a) the performance of security guards is properly monitored; (b) repeated instances of unsatisfactory performance of duties are documented; and (c) such instances of poor performance lead to disciplinary action, dismissal or non-renewal of contracts.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken to monitor and record the performance of security guards.	Not provided
34	The Designated Official for Darfur should formalize the assignment of military troops	Governance	Medium	C	Action complete	Implemented

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/ O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
35	as guards for UNAMID compounds by seeking the assistance of the Office of Military Affairs to revise the Memorandum of Understanding with the Troop Contributing Countries that will be selected to assist in guarding UNAMID compounds. The Designated Official for Darfur should improve internal controls over the receipt, stock and issuance of ID cards.	Operational	Medium	O	Receipt of documentation evidencing the actions taken to improve internal controls over the receipt, stock and issuance of ID cards.	1 September 2009

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by UNAMID in response to recommendations.