



## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

# AUDIT REPORT

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Security provisions applied to staff, site and assets during the execution of the Capital Master Plan

There is a need for the Department of Safety and Security to finalize its policy and procedures for allowing contractor personnel access to United Nations premises, and ensure that they are applied consistently

14 October 2010  
Assignment No. AC2009/514/05

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United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES · BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE  
INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION · DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

TO: Mr. Gregory Starr, Under-Secretary-General  
A: for Safety and Security


DATE: 14 October 2010

Ms. Angela Kane, Under-Secretary-General for  
Management

Mr. Michael Adlerstein, Assistant Secretary-General and  
Executive Director, Capital Master Plan

REFERENCE: IAD: 10- **00867**

FROM: Fatoumata Ndiaye, Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS



SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AC2009/514/05 - Security provisions applied to staff, site and assets during the execution of the Capital Master Plan**  
OBJET: **execution of the Capital Master Plan**

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit.
2. Based on your comments, we are pleased to inform you that we will close recommendations 1, 4 and 9. in the OIOS recommendations database as indicated in Annex 1. In order for us to close the remaining recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.
3. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as high risk (i.e., recommendations 2 and 3) in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.

cc: Mr. Joseph Martella, Senior Security Coordinator, Capital Master Plan  
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors  
Ms. Susanne Frueh, Executive Secretary, Joint Inspection Unit  
Mr. Moses Bamuwamye, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management  
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Special Assistant to the USG-OIOS  
Mr. Gurbur Kumar, OIC, New York Audit Service, OIOS

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## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

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### FUNCTION

*“The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Security provisions applied to staff, site and assets during the execution of the Capital Master Plan

OIOS conducted an audit of security provisions applied to staff, site and assets during the execution of the Capital Master Plan. The overall objective of the audit was to assess arrangements made for security during the design and execution of the CMP and to determine whether the construction manager has been in compliance with contractual obligations regarding security. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

OIOS' main observations were as follows:

- (a) Non CMP contractors and vendors who need to gain access to United Nations premises in New York were not subject to the same level of background checks that were required for CMP contractors.
- (b) The current situation whereby a queue of delivery vehicles sometimes extends from 48<sup>th</sup> Street into First Avenue could worsen as the CMP programme progresses. OIOS has been advised of actions that are being planned to mitigate this risk.
- (c) There were areas where coordination and consultations between the Office of CMP and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) need to be improved. These areas include changes to designs, agreements requiring a specified performance level and training for system handover.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of security provisions applied to staff, site and assets during the execution of the Capital Master Plan (CMP). The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.
2. The initial risk assessment relating to the CMP that OIOS carried out in early 2008 identified security as a high risk area that would require to be managed effectively during the execution of the CMP.
3. The General Assembly has expressed its commitment to the safety, security and well being of staff, delegations, visitors and tourists at the United Nations, and in its Resolution 64/228 dated 5 February 2010 requested “the Secretary-General to ensure that concrete safeguards are in place to achieve these objectives and are part of the standard operating procedures throughout the implementation of the CMP.”
4. Comments made by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Office of the CMP are shown in *italics*.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

5. The main objectives of the audit were to:
  - (a) Review and assess arrangements made for the security of staff, site and assets during the execution of the CMP;
  - (b) Determine whether security considerations are incorporated into the design of the CMP; and
  - (c) Check that the CMP is in compliance with contractual obligations regarding security.

## III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

6. OIOS reviewed relevant records and management information produced by DSS and the Office of CMP. OIOS interviewed personnel of the Office of CMP, DSS, and the CMP construction manager. Site visits and observations were carried out at the Secretariat and other locations as detailed in the report.
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## IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Organization, roles and responsibilities

7. The organization, roles and responsibilities were outlined in the previous OIOS report AC2008/514/06 “Security provisions applied to staff, site and assets during the execution of the CMP,” dated 10 December 2008 and remain basically the same.

### B. Documented procedures

#### Construction Management Agreements

8. The Construction Management Agreements between the construction manager and the United Nations include the construction manager’s obligations with regard to security. These provisions are adequate and are supplemented by more detailed procedures that are provided within the Project Manual.

#### Project Manual

9. The construction manager is contractually required to conform to the Project Manual. OIOS examined relevant sections of the Project Manual which is included on the construction manager’s CMP TeamSite web page. Procedures that were included in the Project Manual were found to be adequately recorded and understood by relevant personnel.

### C. Coordination of the activities of the DSS and the CMP

#### Regular meetings between staff of DSS and the Office of CMP

10. Bi-weekly meetings are chaired by the Senior Security Coordinator, CMP and attended by senior members of the DSS and CMP project management and construction team. A member of OIOS attended one of these meetings as an observer on 14 April 2010. Each of these meetings is supported by an “activities matrix” document which details ongoing works of relevance. The matrices are updated by DSS personnel who are assigned to monitor progress and milestones for different CMP activities. The format of the meetings is to examine the matrix and share knowledge of the CMP activities and discuss any areas of interest between CMP and DSS. On alternate weeks to these bi-weekly meetings the CMP/DSS Unit meets with the Security and Safety Service (SSS) Operations senior officers to communicate and discuss construction related issues, and events that need special consideration. In addition to these regular meetings, ad hoc meetings are held as required.

11. At the bi-weekly meeting of the 14 April 2010 it was reported that the CMP security consultant had performed a system final inspection and produced a “punch list.” (A punch list is a list of tasks to be completed based on an inspection towards the end of a contract). The consultant’s report had been

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submitted directly to the construction manager or the Office of CMP. DSS had not received a copy of the report, and this was seen as a weakness as DSS is an interested stakeholder who will be expected to use and maintain the system after handover. OIOS supports the DSS view on this. The particular report in question related to the North Lawn Conference Building.

12. OIOS considers that the organization and procedures used to coordinate the activities of the Office of CMP and DSS are adequate, but the recommendations within this report reflect some areas where improvements can be made to their operation and control.

### **Recommendation 1**

**(1) The Office of CMP should provide DSS with a copy of relevant system final inspection or “punch list” reports when they are submitted by the security consultant.**

13. *The Office of CMP accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the Office of CMP and DSS had established a working group including the construction manager to ensure that both the closeouts occur and that all documentation is provided as part of the closure process. It was further stated that to date this was working well. DSS concurred and responded similarly to the Office of CMP. Based on the action taken by the Office of CMP, recommendation 1 has been closed.*

#### D. Access of CMP trade contractors' personnel to the UN complex

14. The construction manager has contracted with a company that conducts background checks on contractors' personnel who are employed on the CMP within United Nations premises. The background checks are ordered by a security consultant (the Grounds Pass Manager) who is employed by the construction manager. A grounds pass is a mandatory requirement for any person admitted to the project site. The construction manager provides trade contractors with a written procedure for applying for grounds passes for their personnel. When background security checks are complete, the Grounds Pass Manager refers the security check reports to DSS for approval or rejection. Upon approval, applicants can obtain their passes from the United Nations Pass and I.D. Office. OIOS was informed that less than 2 per cent of applications for passes are rejected.

15. In the two years 2008 to 2009 about 2,500 “permanent” (not exceeding one year) badges have been issued to contractors' personnel after DSS approval. These permanent passes are photo I.Ds. If the background check reveals no issues, then DSS may issue a temporary pass. This may be prior to a permanent pass being approved, or when access to UN premises will be for less than 5 days. OIOS was told that temporary passes are not issued for more than 5 days in a 12 month period. Temporary passes are paper and currently are not generally photo IDs. OIOS was informed that temporary pass cameras are already installed in the North Lawn Conference Building and also one other entrance and would be

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phased in at all other access points over the duration of the CMP. They will be connected to the visitor management system (VMS) with a full database of photographs.

16. On 8 March 2010, OIOS visited the DSS Post 2 on 42<sup>nd</sup> Street starting at 07:00 hours where CMP contractors' personnel gain access to the United Nations premises. The post was manned by two armed DSS staff. The post was equipped with a fully functioning baggage scanner, pass scanner and body scanner. Two cameras covered the room and the DSS staff confirmed that they were functioning and sending images to the Primary Control Security Command Centre. The staff on duty stated that staff were changed by weekly rotation. OIOS enquiries revealed that the baggage scanning machine stops automatically if there appears to be a suspicious item. This enables human intervention by examining a monitor screen. Passes are electronically scanned and DSS staff are alerted if passes have expired as such passes show up in red font on a screen, together with the photo ID which is held on the DSS system. The DSS staff on duty were not aware of any weaknesses in the entry procedures and no weaknesses were observed by OIOS. At 08:05 hours the two DSS staff were replaced by two other staff at change of shift.

17. During the OIOS observations, access was granted to 18 CMP contractors' personnel. All bags were scanned and belts removed. All persons entered through the body scanner and held current passes that held correct photographs. OIOS recorded the names of persons granted entry together with employer details, and later visited the Primary Control Security Command Centre and verified that all details were correctly recorded on the DSS database. No discrepancies were found.

18. A meeting was held between OIOS and the Grounds Pass Manager on 11 March 2010 and checks were carried out to determine whether background security checks had been carried out for the 18 CMP contractors' staff that had entered Post 2 during the OIOS visit on 8 March 2010. It was determined that 2 staff had gained entry without first receiving background checks. Subsequent enquiries by the Grounds Pass Manager revealed that the two staff were subcontracted to a firm that also directly contracts with the UN and (in that context) were not required to undergo background checks. Also, an error must have been made at the Pass and I.D. Office as one of these persons had been issued a white CMP pass without the background check.

19. OIOS made enquiries and determined that there were inconsistencies in the requirements made on contractors working in different activities. Contractors that provided services for Facilities Management Service (FMS) Plant Engineering Section had not previously been subject to background checks and continue to gain access on that basis. However, new contractors now submit background checks that are carried out by firms they select themselves. These are not submitted to DSS, but rather may be approved by FMS. The FMS staff has not been informed by DSS which firms are competent to carry out background checks, or upon which criteria such checks should be approved or rejected.

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20. OIOS was also advised by the FMS's CMP Project Coordination Officer that prior to the CMP, FMS employed fairly small contractors who were told to send people of good character. The contracts did not require formal background checks.

21. OIOS is concerned that the same level of background checks are not conducted for all United Nations contractors and vendors. Contractors who gain access to the same areas of United Nations premises pose the same risk, regardless of whether or not they are working for the CMP. Therefore, in OIOS' opinion, they should all be subject to the same level of background checks. The previous Internal Audit report AC2008/514/06 "Security provisions applied to staff, site and assets during the execution of the CMP," dated 10 December 2008 had recommended that DSS should consistently apply its policies for background checks. The present audit showed that there are still inconsistencies in the background checks made on the different categories of vendors and trade contractors.

22. OIOS enquiries with DSS revealed a draft document dated 21 July 2008 and entitled "Policy on Background Checks for outside Contractors Recommended for Work within the UNHQ Complex". The action taken to implement this document is unclear because of staff turnover, but OIOS considers that after review and amendment this document could form the basis for an updated and consistent policy.

### **Recommendations 2 and 3**

#### **DSS should:**

**(2) Finalize its policy and procedures for allowing contractor personnel access to UN premises and ensure that these are applied consistently in all New York sites by all departments. These procedures should include the requirement for background checks and be made available to Facilities Management Service and other departments who may need to authorize the issuance of grounds passes; and**

**(3) Consider whether grounds passes should only be issued after applications and background checks are approved by DSS Special Investigations Unit.**

23. *DSS accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it has an ongoing procedure for the vetting, to include background checks, of all CMP related vendors and contractors requiring access (grounds pass) to the UN complex. DSS acknowledges the need for an across the board procedure. To that end, the CMP procedure has been edited to encompass all UN approved vendors requiring access to the complex. The expanded procedure is currently under review by OLA. Once the procedure is cleared, discussions will take place with pertinent Departments and Services in order to implement as a UN, New York procedure. It is anticipated that an early 2011 implementation date is possible.*

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Recommendation 2 remains open pending the finalization and implementation of the expanded procedure for UN, New York.

24. *DSS accepted recommendation 3 and stated that UN grounds passes for CMP vendors are only issued upon the approval of DSS, Security and Safety Services. The approval is based on established criteria which includes a background investigation. The approval of an expanded procedure is pending with OLA. Once the expanded procedure is implemented, it will apply to all approved vendors requiring access to the UN, New York complex. Recommendation 3 remains open pending the finalization and implementation of the expanded procedure for UN, New York.*

#### E. Access of CMP contractors' vehicles to the UN complex

25. On 8 March 2010, OIOS visited the DSS Post 3 on 48<sup>th</sup> Street starting at 10:30 hours where CMP contractors vehicles, and other delivery vehicles and cars gain access to the United Nations premises. Delivery vehicles approach via 48<sup>th</sup> Street. The queue of delivery vehicles extended beyond the designated diplomatic parking area on the public road. It was stated that sometimes the queue extends into First Avenue and there have been instances of police issuing tickets to waiting vehicles. Delivery vehicles are not allowed access between 08:00 and 10:00 hours because cars enter at that time. It was stated by the construction manager's dockmaster that the number of CMP delivery vehicles will quadruple as construction within the Secretariat gets underway. He was concerned that the limited numbers of DSS staff, and physical constraints imposed by the access on 48<sup>th</sup> Street and inspection facilities will create large queues of heavy vehicles extending back into First Avenue. The queues could adversely affect relationships with the City authorities. The dockmaster also considered that the rotation of DSS staff causes some lack of efficiency on the part of staff who may take time to conduct entry procedures. DSS and the CMP's Director of Construction informed OIOS that a number of actions would be taken to mitigate the risk of queues of traffic during the peak construction times:

- (a) CMP deliveries will be made 24 hours a day as necessary as the construction schedule advances.
- (b) Vehicles will have a quick turnaround. On entering the campus, vehicles will proceed directly to the hoist where they will be unloaded to enable materials to be hoisted straight up to the appropriate floor level. Unloaded vehicles will then promptly exit the campus. Waste will be lowered in the hoist and loaded directly into dumpsters for removal from site.
- (c) The Grounds Pass Manager is working on an improved delivery scheduling system to facilitate timeslots for all deliveries to be prearranged 48 hours in advance.

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(d) The City of New York is being consulted with a view to lining up waiting delivery vehicles on First Avenue between 37<sup>th</sup> and 41<sup>st</sup> Streets, if necessary.

(e) Extra security staff have been employed to undertake duties necessitated by the CMP. It may be possible to further reduce the times vehicles have to wait off-site by arranging for security inspections of vehicles as they wait in line.

26. Drivers are screened with body scanners. Drivers get a temporary pass at the point of entry where they have a photo I.D. taken and driving licence scanned. These details are retained within the DSS database for 6 months. Entry is approved by the DSS Planning Unit. Delivery drivers are not subject to background checks. The Grounds Pass Manager stated that checks are made to ensure that drivers are not on her list of prior rejected personnel. OIOS was told that vehicles are not checked as they exit to ensure that they are not removing items belonging to the United Nations, or have delivered only part of the load.

27. The construction manager's dockmaster was in attendance at the entry point. He ensures that CMP vehicles have prearranged slot times and are notified in advance to DSS. Vehicle doors and access doors to trailers are opened for the DSS K9 sniffer dogs. The dogs walk around each vehicle and sniff at the vehicle perimeter for explosives. It was stated that the dogs may access the interiors of vehicles at the handler's discretion; (this was not observed by OIOS). Drivers are given a yellow Commercial Vehicle Delivery Permit to be displayed prominently and then surrendered on exit. Drivers drop off the delivery and continue outbound. They are not allowed to leave the vehicle unattended on site.

28. Whilst on site, OIOS' attention was brought to damage to the screening trailer that had been caused by a car mounting the curb. A risk of injury to security staff on that sidewalk was apparent in the event of distracted drivers (mobile phones were cited) or slippery conditions.

#### **Recommendations 4 to 6**

##### **DSS should:**

**(4) Introduce a procedure to make occasional random checks to ensure that delivery vehicles and waste removal dumpsters leaving the UN compound are not used to misappropriate UN assets or materials;**

**(5) Consider whether steps can be taken to reduce the level of staff changes at the vehicle access (Post 3) if queues of vehicles increase as construction proceeds; and**

**(6) Request the Chief Designer, CMP to consult with New York City authorities to determine whether it would be permissible for bollards to be erected in front of the**

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**screening trailer to prevent vehicles from mounting the sidewalk.**

29. *DSS accepted recommendation 4 and stated that there is currently in place a random check at the “Dock” and at Post 2 (42<sup>nd</sup> Street service drive exit) of both passenger vehicles and trucks to ensure there is no misappropriation of UN property. Any UN property to be removed must be accompanied by a “Property Removal” ticket and said property taken off the UN registry of capital goods. Based on the action taken by DSS, recommendation 4 has been closed.*

30. *DSS accepted recommendation 5 and stated that this issue is currently being reviewed by the new Deputy Chief and Assistant Chief of Operation and as soon as a decision is made it will be forwarded to OIOS. Recommendation 5 remains open pending the outcome of the current review.*

31. *DSS accepted recommendation 6 and stated it is being discussed with the Commissioner to the UN and that permission may be forthcoming to allow under the CMP and Security and Safety Services perimeter security portion of the project to install appropriate “architecturally acceptable” bollards along First Avenue. Recommendation 6 remains open pending the outcome of the current discussions.*

#### F. Design issues

32. *OIOS held discussions with DSS staff and a visit was made to the swing space at 305 East 46<sup>th</sup> Street on 31 August 2009. On the second floor, it was pointed out that conduit (two lengths totaling approximately 20 feet) had been installed and later capped off as it was not required. It was stated by DSS that this error was repeated on all seventeen floors and arose because DSS had not been asked to approve the designs before installation. It was also stated that sometimes DSS was not informed of changes prior to their being carried out and these could have security implications that may not be apparent to the supervisors on site. These assertions were later refuted by the ASG and Executive Director of the CMP who stated that DSS is given the opportunity to approve all designs. OIOS was not able to obtain documentary evidence to demonstrate that DSS had been consulted and there is a need for procedures and records of such consultations to be formalized.*

#### **Recommendation 7**

**(7) The Office of CMP should introduce a formal procedure whereby DSS must acknowledge that it has been consulted and has approved designs and changes of specified date/version number prior to construction, with the aim of eliminating the risk of errors or aspects of design that are not acceptable to DSS.**

33. *The Office of CMP accepted recommendation 7 and stated that it concurs with and will implement this recommendation. DSS stated that CMP has not yet introduced a formal procedure. However, DSS, Security and Safety*

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*Services, when receiving a transmittal identifying drawings, logs them and makes appropriate comments. DSS/SSS has and continues to request copies of Project Change Requests and Requests for Information from the Office of CMP and the consultant programme managers allowing for comment when appropriate. Recommendation 7 remains open pending receipt of documentation from the Office of CMP showing that it has been implemented.*

## G. Contract management

34. Agreements for security contracts managed by the Office of CMP require that all service call requests are documented in accordance with a formal process so that the stipulated service performance can be enforced. OIOS consulted DSS and was informed that such a process has not yet been established so there is no assurance that the required level of service is achieved.

35. OIOS was informed that security projects generally provide a contracted number of man-hours for training, but DSS has no assurance regarding the number and suitability of training sessions actually provided. This aspect of contract management will become more important with the commissioning of a new Primary Security Command Centre with its complex technology and systems. Adequate training will be required to avoid user frustration and a risk of damage to new equipment.

### **Recommendations 8 and 9**

#### **The Office of CMP should:**

**(8) Liaise with DSS to identify agreements where formal processes should be established in order to ensure that stipulated service performance is achieved. Contract managers should be identified and given the responsibilities to implement and control this aspect of the agreements; and**

**(9) Liaise with DSS to ensure that there is an adequate procedure for monitoring and controlling used and unused training hours. DSS should review training curricula and either approve them, or recommend amendments.**

36. *The Office of CMP accepted recommendation 8 and stated that it concurs with and will implement this recommendation. DSS also concurred with the recommendation and agreed that resolution of this issue would go a long way to reduce design conflicts and poor communication between various parties. Recommendation 8 remains open pending receipt of documentation from the Office of CMP showing that it has been implemented.*

37. *The Office of CMP accepted recommendation 9 and stated that it concurred with DSS' observation that training has been included with security contracts and is part of the Punch List and Acceptance Commissioning process, and that DSS/SSS monitors this requirement as a member of the acceptance*

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*team.* Based on the action taken by the Office of CMP and DSS, recommendation 9 has been closed.

#### H. Blast protection

38. OIOS reviewed limited documentation related to blast protection and discussed the subject with responsible staff members of the Office of CMP. OIOS does not have expertise to review these critically from the technical point of view, but sought and received assurance from the Office of CMP that necessary measures have been taken to ensure that appropriate blast protection strategies have been incorporated into the design and execution of the CMP.

#### I. Host city relationships

39. OIOS reviewed DSS files and discussed host city relationships with staff of DSS and the Office of CMP. On the basis of this review, it is concluded that relationships were constructive and carried out up to the highest level. A good example of cooperation was that the construction of DSS screening posts may be allowed outwards to a new protective perimeter line along First Avenue, and the visitors' screening tent may be positioned outside the 'hard fence line.'

### V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

40. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of DSS and the Office of CMP for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
1.	The Office of CMP should provide DSS with a copy of relevant system final inspection or “punch list” reports when they are submitted by the security consultant.	Operational	Medium	C		Implemented 1 October 2010
2.	DSS should finalize its policy and procedures for allowing contractor personnel access to UN premises and ensure that these are applied consistently in all New York sites by all departments. These procedures should include the requirement for background checks and be made available to Facilities Management Service and other departments who may need to authorize the issuance of grounds passes.	Governance	High	O	This recommendation remains open pending the finalization and implementation of the expanded procedure for UN, New York to include all UN approved vendors requiring access to the complex.	2 February 2011
3.	DSS should consider whether grounds passes should only be issued after applications and background checks are approved by DSS Special Investigations Unit.	Governance	High	O	This recommendation remains open pending the finalization and implementation of the expanded procedure for UN, New York to include all UN approved vendors requiring access to the complex.	2 February 2011
4.	DSS should introduce a procedure to make occasional random checks to ensure that delivery vehicles and waste removal dumpsters leaving the UN compound are not used to misappropriate UN assets or materials.	Operational	Medium	C		Implemented 1 July 2010.
5.	DSS should consider whether steps can be	Operational	Medium	O	This recommendation remains open	1 February 2011

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
	taken to reduce the level of staff changes at the vehicle access (Post 3) if queues of vehicles increase as construction proceeds.				pending the outcome of the review that is currently being undertaken by the Deputy Chief and Assistant Chief of Operation, DSS.	
6	DSS should request the Chief Designer, CMP to consult with New York City authorities to determine whether it would be permissible for bollards to be erected in front of the screening trailer to prevent vehicles from mounting the sidewalk.	Operational	Medium	O	This recommendation remains open pending the outcome of the current discussions with the Commissioner to the UN regarding the installation of “architecturally acceptable” bollards.	Not provided. DSS stated date is dependent on Office of CMP.
7.	The Office of CMP should introduce a formal procedure whereby DSS must acknowledge that it has been consulted and has approved designs and changes of specified date/version number prior to construction, with the aim of eliminating the risk of errors or aspects of design that are not acceptable to DSS.	Governance	Medium	O	This recommendation remains open pending the implementation of a suitable procedure.	1 January 2011
8.	The Office of CMP should liaise with DSS to identify agreements where formal processes should be established in order to ensure that stipulated service performance is achieved. Contract managers should be identified and given the responsibilities to implement and control this aspect of the agreements.	Compliance	Medium	O	This recommendation remains open pending its implementation.	1 January 2011
9.	The Office of CMP should liaise with DSS to ensure that there is an adequate procedure for monitoring and controlling used and unused training hours. DSS should review training curricula and either approve them, or recommend amendments.	Compliance	Medium	C		Implemented 1 July 2010

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by DSS or Office of CMP in response to recommendations.