



## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

# AUDIT REPORT

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## Governance aspects of security management in UNHCR

The existing governance arrangements, especially the organizational structure and accountability framework, need to be improved to increase the effectiveness of security management

28 December 2009

Assignment No. AR2009/160/02

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United Nations  Nations Unies

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES - BUREAU DES SERVICES DE CONTRÔLE INTERNE  
INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION - DIVISION DE L'AUDIT INTERNE

TO: Mr. António Guterres, High Commissioner  
A: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

DATE: 28 December 2009

REFERENCE: IAD: 09- 03266

FROM: Fatoumata Ndiaye, Acting Director  
DE: Internal Audit Division, OIOS



SUBJECT: **Assignment No. AR2009/160/02 - Audit of governance aspects of security management in UNHCR**  
OBJET: **UNHCR**

1. I am pleased to present the report on the above-mentioned audit.
2. Based on your comments, we are pleased to inform you that we will close recommendations 5, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18 and 20 in the OIOS recommendations database as indicated in Annex 1. In order for us to close the remaining recommendations, we request that you provide us with the additional information as discussed in the text of the report and also summarized in Annex 1.
3. Please note that OIOS will report on the progress made to implement its recommendations, particularly those designated as high risk (i.e., recommendations 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15 and 21), in its annual report to the General Assembly and semi-annual report to the Secretary-General.

cc: Mr. Gregory Starr, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security  
Ms. Janet Lim, Assistant High Commissioner, UNHCR  
Ms. Karen Farkas, Controller and Director, DFAM, UNHCR  
Ms. Maha Odeima, Audit Coordinator, UNHCR  
Mr. Swatantra Goolsarran, Executive Secretary, UN Board of Auditors  
Ms. Susanne Frueh, Executive Secretary, Joint Inspection Unit  
Mr. Moses Bamuwanye, Chief, Oversight Support Unit, Department of Management  
Mr. Byung-Kun Min, Special Assistant to the USG, OIOS  
Mr. Christopher F. Bagot, Chief, Geneva Audit Service, OIOS

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## INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION

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### FUNCTION

*“The Office shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations examine, review and appraise the use of financial resources of the United Nations in order to guarantee the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, ascertain compliance of programme managers with the financial and administrative regulations and rules, as well as with the approved recommendations of external oversight bodies, undertake management audits, reviews and surveys to improve the structure of the Organization and its responsiveness to the requirements of programmes and legislative mandates, and monitor the effectiveness of the systems of internal control of the Organization” (General Assembly Resolution 48/218 B).*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Audit of governance aspects of security management in UNHCR

OIOS conducted an audit of governance aspects of security management in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The overall objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of governance arrangements for security management in UNHCR. The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

OIOS' overall conclusion is that while the importance of an adequate governance mechanism for security management was well understood, the existing governance arrangements, especially the current organizational structure and accountability framework, needed to be improved to increase the effectiveness of security management.

Since 2000, UNHCR has been proactive in developing its own security policy and endorsing United Nations system-wide common policies and frameworks for accountability. UNHCR has restructured the Field Safety Section (FSS) and considered opportunities to improve the integration of security functions within a new field security reporting framework. UNHCR has also established a formal dialogue with its Standing Committee on security of staff and beneficiaries, informing the Committee about strategic initiatives and developments in the security management area. However, OIOS identified the following opportunities for improvement:

- The location of FSS within the newly established Division of Emergency and Supply Management (subsequently renamed as the Division of Emergency, Security and Supply - DESS), and the location of the General Services Section (responsible for the Headquarters Security) within the Division of Financial and Administrative Management, did not provide for a single, coordinated line of command for security management. Consequently, there was no formal, direct and non-mediated reporting line between the UNHCR Security Focal Point and Senior Management. *UNHCR, however, stated that the current organizational structure for security management was the result of a detailed review that was part of UNHCR's overall reform process. The High Commissioner has personally assured that security has the highest possible visibility at UNHCR.*
- Guidelines needed to be prepared for security and protection officers in the field to enable joint assessment and physical protection of UNHCR's beneficiaries, i.e. refugees and other persons of concern. *UNHCR confirmed that work has begun to address this issue.*
- The accountability framework, reporting mechanism from the field, definition of security responsibilities in the performance appraisal system, and arrangements for monitoring the implementation of security

measures were not adequately defined. Remedial action is being taken by UNHCR in all of these areas.

- Guidelines for the needs assessment of security resources in the field as well as Terms of Reference for the Regional Field Security Advisors needed to be developed. *UNHCR acknowledged the need to address these matters.*
- The mechanism in place to ensure circulation of updated security policies and guidelines was not efficient. *UNHCR acknowledged the need to review the electronic platform of its security service.*
- There was a general perception among UNHCR managers that the cooperation with the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) was not efficient, and that there was a gap in the understanding of the respective mandates. The mandate of DSS does not include any provision for the safety and security of UNHCR's beneficiaries (i.e., refugees and persons of concern). *UNHCR stated that concerns related to DSS are regularly taken up in different fora.*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Paragraphs
I. INTRODUCTION	1-10
II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES	11
III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY	12-14
IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	
A. Security mandate and mission	15-20
B. Security culture and management commitment to staff security	21-22
C. Legislative body oversight and reporting	23-31
D. Security organizational structure	32-46
E. Accountability framework and reporting lines	47-86
F. Coordination with other UN agencies, DSS and SMT	87-91
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	92
ANNEX 1 – Status of Audit Recommendations	

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of the governance aspects of security management in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) . The audit was conducted in accordance with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing.

2. The primary responsibility of protecting United Nations (UN) staff, their dependents and premises rests with the Host Government, which is considered to have a special responsibility under the UN Charter or the government's agreement with an individual organization.

3. In each country, the UN Secretary-General, in consultation with the executive heads of UN agencies and organizations, appoints one senior official, normally the UN Resident Coordinator, as the Designated Official (DO) for security matters. This individual is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, for the security of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants throughout the country or designated area.

4. A Security Management Team (SMT) is formed comprising the DO and country management of each UN entity present in the country. The DO usually chairs the SMT and representatives of the UN entities serve as members. They consult with and assist DO on all matters concerning security and the implementation of the Country Security Plan and the Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS).

5. The Executive Head of each UN entity appoints a Security Manager/Focal Point at its headquarters to ensure the necessary liaison between the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS), the respective organization's headquarters, and its offices in the field. The Security Manager/Focal Point is responsible for coordinating the organization's day-to-day response to safety and security and providing all the relevant actors with advice, guidance and technical assistance. The head of DSS represents the Secretary-General on all security related matters and is responsible for developing security policies, practices and procedures for UN system personnel worldwide, and coordinating with the organizations of the UN system to ensure implementation, compliance and support for security aspects of their activities

6. Following the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the Secretary-General took a number of steps to strengthen security and safety management in the Organization. The need for further actions were reinforced by the 2003 events in Baghdad, where 24 staff and visitors died and 150 persons were injured. The steps taken resulted in a new security accountability framework, policies and standards. The main efforts led to the consolidation of an integrated security framework to set the ground for common rules for all UN entities participating in the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB).

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7. In resolution 56/255 of 14 February 2002, the General Assembly “noted the lack of an accountability and responsibility mechanism in the area of field security” and requested the Secretary-General “to submit a report on the establishment of a clear mechanism of accountability and responsibility, including such provisions as its scope, depth and common standards and methods of enforcing them in an inter-agency structure”.

8. The Secretary-General’s report (A/57/365 of 28 August 2002), titled “Inter-organizational security measures: framework for accountability for the UN field security management system”, set the basis for a common security management system among the Secretariat and specialized agencies, and funds and programmes of the UN system. The security accountability framework of 2002 was reviewed in 2006 (A/61/531). Both frameworks were approved by the High-Level Committee on Management on behalf of the CEB. The accountability framework of 2006 was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly. UNHCR adopted the framework and has further developed its security policies and organizational structure for security management.

9. Since 2000, UNHCR has developed policies and guidance, engaged in dialogue with stakeholders and security partners, and substantially increased field resources dedicated to security. UNHCR Headquarters has taken the lead for establishment of common policies, coordination with other organizations and DSS, and overall monitoring of compliance with policies and standards.

10. Comments made by UNHCR are shown in *italics*.

## II. AUDIT OBJECTIVES

11. The overall objective of the audit was to determine whether effective governance arrangements were in place for security management in UNHCR. The main objectives were to assess whether:

- (a) a supporting mandate and mission for UNHCR security management activities was in place;
- (b) the security culture and management’s commitment to security were conducive to effective security management at UNHCR;
- (c) the existing security accountability framework and organizational structure ensured a transparent and effective performance management, reporting and accountability system;
- (d) the security policy framework was sufficient to ensure adequate guidelines for security professional in the field; and
- (e) coordination with other organizations including DSS was effective and efficient.

## III. AUDIT SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

12. The audit was conducted from March to June 2009 and focused on UNHCR’s security management in regard to the governance arrangements put in

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place. It covered activities during the period from 2006, when UNHCR's security functions were restructured, up to June 2009.

13. The audit did not cover operational and resource management aspects of UNHCR's security management. It also did not include review of physical controls for the safety and security of UNHCR staff, beneficiaries and premises.

14. The audit used analytical procedures, interviewed key staff and reviewed documentation supporting key activities. A web-based questionnaire was distributed to Representatives and UNHCR security professionals in the field to get feedback on their perception of UNHCR's commitment to security management, as well as on the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNHCR security management system in place.

## IV. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### A. Security mandate and mission

#### Adequate mandate in place for safety and security of staff members

15. As part of the UN system, UNHCR adopted the 2006 framework of accountability for the United Nations security management system (A/61/531) which endorses both the framework of accountability and the Mission statement for the security management system ("The goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority"). Through these documents, as well as the UNHCR Executive Committee (ExCom) decisions A/AC.96/944 and A/AC.96/1034, a clear security mandate exists for UNHCR within which the High Commissioner has the overall responsibility for the security and safety of UNHCR staff members.

#### Urgent need to develop policy guidance and procedures to support the mandate for security and safety of beneficiaries

16. In line with the 2000 ExCom decision (A/AC.96/944) which requested UNHCR to develop and integrate security arrangements for its staff and the population under its care, UNHCR has continued to maintain that it has responsibilities also for the safety and security of refugees and other persons of concern under its mandate (hereinafter, the beneficiaries). The dual responsibility of UNHCR for the security and safety of both staff members and beneficiaries was further clarified in the 2006 ExCom Decision on staff safety and security (A/AC.96/1034). The ExCom Decision required UNHCR to engage with partners in the UN security management system to work towards a comprehensive approach that considers the physical protection needs of beneficiaries as well as the security implications for staff in all aspects of UNHCR operational planning and from the earliest stages.

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17. UNHCR's commitment to the physical security of beneficiaries became more evident in the 2007 and 2008 Standing Committee annual reports on safety and security, which included separate chapters on the activities and follow-up regarding beneficiary security. In 2007 the Field Safety Section (FSS) designated one Senior Field Safety Advisor (FSA) at UNHCR Headquarters as the Security Focal Point for Refugee/Internally Displaced Persons. However, due to lack of resources and increasing requirements for security services, this focal point function was never fully implemented and no formal plan of activities was adopted for this function in 2007, 2008 or 2009.

18. In the field, UNHCR FSAs are mandated to advise and support the Representatives and Heads of Offices in managing the safety and security of staff, premises and refugees or other persons of concern and, as member of the country team, contribute to ensuring the physical protection and security of refugees, providing assessment, analysis, advice and implementing strategies as needed. However, while FSAs can count on a variety of policies and standards for the safety and security of staff members, no criteria, guidance or best practice are available to FSAs for the discharge of their functions with regard to beneficiaries. For instance, both the 2004 Review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation and the 2007 UNHCR Security Policy only marginally deal with physical security of beneficiaries. The Security Policy deals with physical security of beneficiaries in the last paragraph where it merely recognizes UNHCR's obligations for the security and safety of persons of concern and the existence of potential risks associated with this mandate.

19. While the protection doctrine deals with the legal requirements for physical security of beneficiaries and includes some guidelines for working with local authorities and camp management among other disciplines, there is no practical tool to support security professionals in this area. At the time of the audit, FSS and the Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section of the Division of International Protection Services (DIPS) were discussing the need for developing a toolkit using a risk assessment methodology that would enable protection and security staff to work together to identify risks and advise on the strategy to mitigate them. For this purpose, FSS initiated a best practice recognition exercise. However, there was no formal plan with expected deadlines and ultimate objectives for the toolkit project.

### **Recommendation 1**

**(1) UNHCR should review the existing policies and procedures for the physical protection and security of beneficiaries. This should include a definition of roles, responsibilities and expected results; a requirement for a periodic work plan for the Security Focal Point for Refugee/Internally Displaced Persons; and a mechanism for the identification of supporting tools enabling protection and security staff to work together to identify and mitigate risks associated with physical security of UNHCR's beneficiaries.**

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20. UNHCR accepted recommendation 1 and stated that the Organization has made significant efforts in this regard and work has begun to address the problem. The work will start by reviewing the full range of relevant activities in order to determine best practice. Later, and subject to availability of resources, the review will be used as basis for developing guidelines for staff and operations. UNHCR estimates that actions will be implemented by the end of first quarter 2010. Recommendation 1 remains open pending confirmation that actions designed to review existing policies and procedures for the physical protection and security of UNHCR's beneficiaries have been completed.

B. Security culture and management commitment to staff security

High morale among security staff as a result of perceived management commitment to security

21. OIOS distributed a questionnaire to around 100 UNHCR security professionals and Representatives in the field. The questionnaire requested the respondents, among other things, to indicate their perception of the commitment of UNHCR and its local management to staff security. OIOS decision to focus the survey on local management commitment reflects the increased delegation to the field for the management of security.

22. The survey results (see summary in Table 1) indicate general satisfaction among security professionals and Representatives regarding the commitment of UNHCR and local management to staff security, which in OIOS' opinion creates a favourable environment for high morale among security professionals.

**Table 1: Summary of responses to OIOS' survey (2009)**

Question originally formulated	Excellent, Good	Fair	Poor
1. In your opinion, the Organization's commitment to staff security is:	84 (85%)	13 (13%)	2 (2%)
2. In your opinion and in connection with security related matters the commitment of local managers to staff security in the operations where you work is:	74 (90%)	4 (5%)	4 (5%)
3. In your opinion and in connection with security related matters, the "leading by example" of the local managers in the operations where you work is:	68 (83%)	9 (11%)	5 (6%)

The OIOS survey was addressed only to staff members with security responsibilities (i.e., Representatives, Regional FSA, FSA, Assistant FSA and Security Focal Point). Representatives were not surveyed for questions 2 and 3.

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C. Legislative body oversight and reporting

Need to establish proper procedures for follow up and report on implementation of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation review

23. In 2004, the High Commissioner established a High Level Steering Committee to undertake a review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation. The Committee, working under the leadership of the Assistant High Commissioner, issued 80 recommendations under the title "Review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation", relating to policy, operational, human and financial resources, staff welfare, liaison with partners, etc. The Emergency and Security Service (ESS) of UNHCR was tasked to work with other departments and sections to prepare a work plan and detailed budget to support the implementation of the 80 recommendations (EC/54/SC/CRP.20).

24. In 2005, UNHCR announced to the Standing Committee a two-year work plan (for 2005-2006) for follow-up of the results of the Review of Security Policy and Implementation, with the goal of improving UNHCR's security policy and management (EC/55/SC/CRP.21). In 2008, UNHCR reported that it continued to focus on the implementation of the review's findings and recommendations (EC/59/SC/CRP.17). A system was established for monitoring the progress on implementation of recommendations of the 2004 review soon after the first report to the Standing Committee, coordinated by a consultant. However, the last updated progress report provided to OIOS was dated March 2005, around the time when the consultant left the Organization.

25. UNHCR did not conduct a risk analysis associated with the outstanding recommendations of the 2004 review and the new strategic initiatives, in order to determine which action needs to be implemented and in which order of priority.

**Recommendation 2**

**(2) UNHCR should update the status of implementation of the recommendations identified in the 2004 review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation, assess the cost efficiency of implementing each of the recommendations on the basis of a risk analysis, and develop an action plan for implementing the remaining recommendations.**

26. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 2 and stated that it will pursue the topics that are still relevant and address them in line with recommendations made in the present audit report and the internal changes to the security policy and structure. By the end of 2009, FSS will develop an action plan to take into consideration related issues along with previous reviews. Recommendation 2 remains open pending receipt of a copy of the action plan developed by FSS for addressing the relevant recommendations raised in the 2004 Review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation.*

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Need to establish proper procedures for review, follow up and reporting to the Standing Committee on the implementation of strategic security initiatives

27. From 2004 onwards, UNHCR submits to the Standing Committee an annual assessment of staff safety and security management. The report provides stakeholders with the latest security developments, recent strategic initiatives, and follow-up on old strategic initiatives.

28. OIOS reviewed UNHCR's compliance with initiatives announced during the 2004 - 2008 Standing Committees meetings and found that for the following items, there was neither full implementation nor follow-up provided to the Committee:

- In 2005 (EC/55/SC/CRP.21), ESS announced a plan to produce a short, practical Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) booklet to aid UNHCR staff involved in security management in the field with fundamental knowledge on security issues (for instance: What is the role of Representative in the Security Management Team? How do UNHCR and DSS work together?).
- In 2006 (EC/57/SC/CRP.24), UNHCR made a commitment to the Steering Committee to undertake a case-study project to outline UNHCR's operations within the framework of the security management system, resulting in a best practices guide. The guide would serve UNHCR managers in their interaction with partners in the UN security management system and with DSS in particular.
- In 2006 (EC/57/SC/CRP.24), UNHCR announced that a toolkit for field management and security staff to assist in planning, developing and budgeting for security measures was in the final stage and ready to be introduced through visits to targeted UNHCR offices. The same statement was reiterated in 2007 (EC/58/CRP.13).
- In 2008 (EC/59/SC/CRP.17), UNHCR reaffirmed some of its security reform pillars. The report stated that a number of thematic responsibilities had been assigned to FSAs in the field on knowledge sharing.

29. The first two initiatives had not been implemented. Instead, FSS stated that field managers were provided with advice on interaction with the UN security management system. The toolkit for field management and security staff to assist in planning, developing and budgeting had not been issued. A paper was prepared in 2008 on the weaknesses of the current budget system in UNHCR; however, there was no plan for follow-up and corrective action. Thematic knowledge was used in a few ad-hoc instances for the development of specific policies and standards. FSS never developed a framework for thematic responsibilities involving field and headquarters staff. At present FSS is still debating whether using thematic responsibilities is an effective work methodology or not.

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30. FSS is fully involved in the preparation of the annual report to the Standing Committee. FSS informed OIOS that certain commitments were dropped due to limited resources and increasing service requests. In the opinion of OIOS, given the nature and importance of the strategic initiatives, the Standing Committee should be made aware of this, and the risks arising from the items being dropped. The Committee should also be informed of alternative strategies that have been identified.

#### **Recommendations 3 and 4**

**(3) UNHCR should ensure that strategic initiatives announced to stakeholders for improving the security management system in the Organization are followed up, and the results are reported to the Standing Committee.**

**(4) UNHCR should ensure that its reports to the Standing Committee on new strategic initiatives on security management contain information on resource requirements for their implementation, and the risks associated with non- or partial implementation.**

31. *UNHCR accepted recommendations 3 and 4 and stated that the office will endeavour to provide the Standing Committee with the updates on all security initiatives and reports on a regular basis. The briefings will be expanded to include resource requirements and the risks associated with non- or partial implementation. Improvements to security budgeting and tracking of expenditures are already under preparation for 2010. Recommendations 3 and 4 remain open pending confirmation by UNHCR that they have been fully implemented.*

#### D. Security organizational structure

UNHCR's organizational structure for security management needs to be reviewed to provide necessary independence and effective reporting lines

32. In January 2001, UNHCR established ESS, which included FSS, and was located under the Executive Office with a direct reporting line to the High Commissioner. Following a 2006 restructuring exercise, ESS and FSS functions were integrated under the Division of Operational Services (DOS) into the Emergency and Technical Support Service pillar (IOM036/2006-FOM036/2006).

33. In April 2009, ESS was re-assigned to a new Division of Emergency and Supply Management, while FSS initially remained under DOS. However, in July 2009, UNHCR decided that FSS would be transferred under the new Division, which was subsequently renamed as the Division of Emergency, Security and Supply (DESS). According to UNHCR, this would ensure a continuous integration between emergency and security activities and a formal relation with the operational part of the Organization. The Chief, FSS would therefore report to the Director, DESS. OIOS is of the opinion that integration within DESS would diminish the visibility and independence that the security

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management function requires, and the formal direct reporting line with senior management that is necessary for ensuring the security function's effectiveness.

34. For instance, in field operations the security officer's direct and non-mediated access to the Representative and/or Head of Office is one of the criteria to ensure efficient security management. The direct reporting line ensures the transparency and reinforces the accountability of both the Representatives/Head of Office and the security staff, avoiding risks associated with longer information chains.

35. The current UNHCR organizational structure at Headquarters does not formally offer the Chief FSS (the UNHCR Security Focal Point) direct and non-mediated access to the High Commissioner or his/her Deputy and Assistants. However, UNHCR has an informal communication line between Senior Management and the Security Focal Point. The Security Focal Point had ready access and proactive communication with all relevant Managers. While this is commendable, OIOS feels that communication lines should also be formalized in the design of the organizational structure.

36. Further, the Chief, General Services Section (GSS) within the Division of Financial and Administrative Management (DFAM) is responsible for the physical security of Headquarters. No formal reporting lines were in place between the functions accountable for the field and the Headquarters security management functions, respectively. GSS had no staff assigned to security functions and did not have the staffing resources to provide an adequate supervision of security services at Headquarters, which are provided by UNOG. Also, the Chief, GSS had no formal direct reporting line with Senior Management regarding Headquarters security matters, as s/he reports through the Controller and Director, DFAM.

37. The UNHCR Accountability Framework (IOM083/2006-FOM083/20069) recognizes the need for a unified command of security functions: "The executive heads will appoint a Senior Security Manager and/or headquarters Security Focal Point to be responsible for coordinating the organization's day-to-day response to safety and security". However, in UNHCR the Headquarters and field security functions are not united and the existing security policy is silent about Headquarters security.

38. The Chief, GSS was of the opinion that the segregation between field and Headquarters security management mitigates the risk that resources assigned for the security of Headquarters are diverted for field needs. For this reason, in the 2010-2011 budget submission, GSS proposed the establishment of a new security section of two Professional staff and one administrative/finance assistant under GSS.

39. The design of the security management structure has to reflect the importance of security and management's attention and commitment to security. This would be best served with the formation of a separate Security Services Unit with direct reporting line to the High Commissioner, his/her Deputy or his/her Assistants. Such a reporting line would reflect the importance of security and

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ensure coordination with other functions and departments. The existing segregation between Headquarters and field security management could weaken the overall security accountability framework of UNHCR, which the Organization should pay particular attention to.

40. The Senior Management Committee (SMC) is the body in charge of achieving coordination, participation in decision making, and collective responsibility for the effective management and success of UNHCR. The SMC is chaired by the High Commissioner and attended by his Deputy and Assistants and Directors of Divisions and Bureaus. The Director, DOS represented the UNCHR Security Focal Point at the SMC until the last reform. OIOS noted that security is one of the topics of discussion in the SMC, which reflects the increasing concern for security management and incidents that have affected staff and beneficiaries. However, in most of the SMC meetings, there was no regular participation of the Chief, FSS. Instead, the Bureau Directors generally reported on security matters in the field. In OIOS' view, the participation of the Security Focal Point in SMC meetings would increase the visibility of security management and also provide him/her with an independent forum to share security assessments in light of expected operational developments.

#### **Recommendation 5**

**(5) UNHCR should conduct a review to assess whether a Security Services Unit under one command with direct and non-mediated reporting line with Senior Management would promote synergies in the use of resources, better visibility of the security function, and enhanced accountability of security managers.**

41. *UNHCR partially accepted recommendation 5 and stated that the current organizational structure for security management is the result of a detailed review that was part of UNHCR's overall reform process and resulted in the High Commissioner's decision to place FSS in DESS. The audit provided the opportunity to emphasize the strength and responsiveness of the practical relationship DESS/FSS has with senior management and underline the need, given the number of high-level coordinating bodies, to have a reporting line for security that includes substantive senior officers. Managing and coordinating security at a UN agency, fund or programme today requires the active participation of officers at the D-1, D-2 or ASG level. The High Commissioner has assured that security has the highest possible visibility at UNHCR through his personal advocacy, including his active participation and that of the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations in the newly formed Security Steering Committee, managed by FSS. On the other hand, the creation of the P-4 Senior Security Officer at Headquarters as of 1 January 2010 will enhance the security function visibility and delivery at Headquarters. The chain of command between Executive Office and GSS/Security is direct when required. UNHCR is working on a more formalized pattern for the security chain of command. Based on the action taken by UNHCR and the assurances provided by the High Commissioner, recommendation 5 has been closed.*

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Absence of formal criteria to determine the number of security personnel for field operations

42. In the last decade, the number of UNHCR security staff (field, Headquarters and out-posted/roving security officers) has increased considerably. Between 2000 and 2009, the number of UNHCR international FSAs increased from 20 to 40. Between 2004 and 2005, UNHCR employed some 53 international security officers, and the number of Assistant FSAs increased from eight in 2000 to 65 in 2009. In the same timeframe, the restructuring of the UN security management system and establishment of DSS resulted in increased field presence of security officers sponsored by other UN organizations and DSS.

43. The decision to assign UNHCR security staff is based on country-specific security needs assessments. These take into consideration any relevant criteria such as magnitude of the operations as well as presence of other UN agencies and their security officers, among others. Therefore, the presence of security officers varies from country to country. For instance, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, at the time of the audit, had two international FSAs (one was a Regional FSA), supported by five Assistant FSAs. Burundi had two FSAs and four Assistant FSAs, Afghanistan had two FSAs and five Assistant FSAs and Sudan had six FSAs and five Assistant FSAs.

44. FSS and Representations/Bureaus need to cooperate for the identification and selection of security resources, and to ensure their efficient use within a country and regional perspective. The ultimate responsibility to identify resource requirements remains with field managers. However, the Chief, FSS stated that in a few instances, the Bureaus did not sufficiently involve his team in deciding whether to cut or add new security resources.

45. There were no supporting and guiding instructions (i.e. gridlines, best practices, etc) to assist Representatives and Bureaus in their needs assessment for security staff in the field, and to assist them in deciding upon the use of international security officers or local staff. Both the MENA and Africa Bureau, for instance, informed OIOS that they would benefit from guidelines for needs assessment for security resources in the region, considering the trends in the security situation. Such support would benefit both the Representatives and Bureaus in establishing their requirements and for UNHCR to ensure a more transparent and standardized use of its security resources.

### **Recommendation 6**

**(6) UNHCR should develop policy guidelines to support Representatives and local management in their needs assessment for determining the required number of UNHCR security officers in the field. The criteria should include consideration of the security personnel already available (i.e., Department of Safety and Security and other UN agencies) in the country and at the regional level.**

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46. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 6 and stated that DESS will work with the Office of Organizational Development and Management (ODMS) in establishing benchmarks for security management. However, security staffing imperatives do not necessarily correlate with other structural norms or operational parameters. The presence of FSAs is effectively determined on a case-by-case basis in consultation between DESS/FSS and the Field/Bureau. DESS/FSS is working on a policy regarding the administration of FSA posts, which could be of greater importance than the one on needs assessment for the creation of security positions. The present policy provides little control of these positions by FSS and the intention is to change this situation. Recommendation 6 remains open pending finalization of the policy regarding the administration of FSA posts.*

#### E. Accountability framework and reporting lines

##### Urgent need to update and disseminate the accountability framework

47. An accountability framework serves the purpose of assigning accountability to staff members to ensure transparency and responsibility for management actions. Ambiguity or contradiction of policies and guidelines could make any framework less effective.

48. In 2006, UNHCR adopted the accountability framework for the United Nations security management system and integrated it with other documents and policies. Four documents contribute to the establishment of the security accountability framework in UNHCR: the “Framework of accountability of the United Nations Security Management System” (IOM083/2006/ FOM083/2006); the Terms of Reference of FSS (IOM/036/2006-FOM/036/2006); the 2007 UNHCR Security Policy, and the “Restructuring the Field Safety Section” (IOM17/2008-FOM019/2008). In OIOS’ opinion, these provide a fragmented and sometimes contradicting picture of the security accountability framework in UNHCR. In some cases they were generic, while in others they did not take into consideration what was established within existing pieces of legislation. For instance:

a) The 2006 Accountability Framework assigns to the Security Focal Point the accountability for advising the Executive Head or Senior Programme Officers on security matters and keeping them updated on security management issues. The 2007 security policy holds the Chief, FSS accountable only for providing advice on technical matters, while the Regional Bureaus are accountable to maintain situational awareness on emerging threats. Under the IOM-FOM on the Restructuring of FSS (IOM017/2008-FOM019/2008), the responsibility for providing direct analysis/reporting to Headquarters is shared among FSS, the Regional FSAs and country FSAs.

b) The 2006 Accountability Framework assigns the Chief, FSS monitoring functions on compliance with security policies, practices and procedures. The 2007 Security Policy shares accountability for managerial oversight over safety of UNHCR staff among the Director of DOS, ESS, the Chief, FSS, Bureau Directors and the Assistant High Commissioner (Operations). The Terms of

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Reference of FSS (IOM/036/2006-FOM/036/2006) does not recognize oversight and monitoring functions for FSS. Finally the IOM017/2008-FOM019/2008 does not provide FSS any monitoring functions related to security policy.

c) The Terms of Reference of FSS (IOM/036-FOM036/2006) require the Section to “Implement UNHCR Security Policy” while this is not required in any other document.

d) The UNHCR Security Policy was never endorsed with an official IOM/FOM, while all other documents considering security responsibilities and shaping the overall security accountability framework of the Organization were formalized with an IOM/FOM. This might result in inconsistent interpretation of the importance of different sources of guidance.

e) Since UNHCR security management for Headquarters and the field is not unified, the existing security policy does not describe the accountability for Headquarters security.

49. FSS informed OIOS that during the last Inter-Agency Security Management Network meeting held in Budapest in June 2009, it was noted that the CEB had requested each member organization to develop an internal accountability framework showing the responsibilities of their managers, officials and personnel.

50. In line with the ongoing UNHCR Structural and Management Change process, a new Global Management Accountability Framework was under development at the time of the audit, and FSS had not yet been involved in the process. The new holistic Global Management Accountability Framework will still require the inclusion of a specific security accountability framework and all relevant policies, which should be linked to the global framework.

#### **Recommendation 7**

**(7) UNHCR should ensure that clear accountability for the establishment, update and dissemination of a comprehensive accountability framework covering Headquarters and field operations is assigned, and security-related policies, guidelines and Terms of Reference are aligned with the new framework. This should include ensuring that UNHCR security policies are formally promulgated in the Inter-Office Memorandum/Field Office Memorandum (IOM/FOM) format.**

51. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 7 and stated that the security function in the Global Management Accountability Framework launched in October 2009 currently reflects FSS input and related UNHCR security policies. DESS/FSS will revise and update UNHCR’s Security Accountability Framework in response to the audit report, the revised UN Security Accountability Framework and in view of the changes to security governance brought about by the High Commissioner’s decisions in July 2009, including for example the*

creation of Security Steering Committees and the termination of the Security Focal Point system. DESS and ODMS will align the Global Management Accountability Framework with UNHCR's Security Accountability Framework, once this is complete. The new framework is expected to be implemented by end 2009. Recommendation 7 remains open pending provision of the revised and updated UNHCR security accountability framework.

Need to streamline reporting on security developments

52. Organizational security lines of communication are defined in both the 2006 Accountability Framework, IOM017/2008-FOM019/2008 on the Restructuring the FSS, and the Guidance Notes for Security Focal Points (February 2006). Chapter 4 of the UNHCR Manual (revised in 2000) also deals with security reporting requirements from the field. However, the requirements for reporting were not consistent (see Table 2). Reporting lines should ensure vertical (field-headquarters-field) and horizontal (field-field and FSS-Bureaus-FSS) communication on security developments.

**Table 2: Reporting requirements on security**

Source document	Chapter 4 of the UNHCR Manual (revised in 2000)	Guidance note for Security Focal Points (2006)	“Restructuring the FSS” (IOM017/2008/FOM019/2008)
Requirement	A Situation Report (SitRep) covers the same geographical area as the Country Operations Plan (COP) and should be sent to Headquarters using the SitRep Field Software in the first week following the reporting/calendar month. For new offices (particularly those responding to emergency situations), Bureaus may require reports on a daily or a weekly basis. As the situation stabilizes, SitReps may move progressively towards monthly reporting.	Routine security reports to Representatives/Heads of Offices, FSS, FSAs and Desks at Headquarters on a monthly, bimonthly or weekly frequency depending on the security phase of the country.	FSAs are primarily accountable for reporting on security situations to local representatives and jointly to Regional FSA and FSS in Geneva. Critical incidents may be copied to Directors of Bureau, DOS and ESS as well. The same requirement exists for Regional Senior FSA. FSS is accountable for providing analysis and reporting for headquarters. The policy does not set requirements for periodicity of reporting.

53. Bureau managers and FSS staff at Headquarters informed OIOS that regular SitReps with no significant incident issues have a marginal value. For this reason the monthly requirement for SitRep was made optional starting in 2008. In 2009, a few countries submitted regular reports on security to FSS (Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan (Darfur), Sri Lanka, Kenya and Yemen). FSS also currently received regular reports from DSS on Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chad. These countries are considered “hot-spot” security areas.

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For most other countries reporting was not consistent. However, both the Bureaus and FSS staff were satisfied with the existing network of informal exchange of information between field, regional and Headquarters staff members on security issues.

54. FSS considered that most of the field security reports were not analytical but rather a collection of incidents with little analytical perspective. On the other hand, Bureaus stated that they benefited from continuous working contacts with “hot-spot” countries, which submit regular SitReps. Some Bureaus established ad-hoc systems to obtain inputs on security developments also from “non-hot-spot” countries. For instance, the Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific received management letters from Representatives in the region, in which security developments were included, as needed. However, these reports were not regularly shared with FSS.

55. In line with the regionalization process, UNHCR had established seven Regional FSA posts. Their major duty was to provide support and advice to the Bureaus and Desks, including analysis of possible threats to staff safety in their regions and assessment of security gaps and solutions. They also provided support to the field with security audits, training and other services. In practice, the utilization of Regional FSAs was not consistent in all regions and none of the interviewed bureaus and FSS received regular and formal analytical assessments or trend analyses with a regional perspective.

56. While the senior managers interviewed by OIOS agreed that trend analysis (such as trend forecast on the change of security phase and regional security perspectives) would be beneficial for their work and would help shaping the understanding of security trends in the “hot-spots” as well as in potential or non hot-spot countries, UNHCR had no such requirement. At the time of the audit, FSS was planning to draft a new policy for field reporting on security with standard formats and expected deadlines. The new reporting policy would require analytical reporting, instead of incident counting, and should facilitate the development of a trend/analysis system for Bureaus and Senior Management while avoiding duplication with existing reporting systems within UNHCR and DSS.

#### **Recommendations 8 and 9**

**(8) UNHCR should finalize the new security reporting policy, ensuring that there is no duplication in the information sharing mechanisms in place, including the Department of Safety and Security reporting lines in accordance with its mandate.**

**(9) UNHCR should ensure that the new security reporting policy includes requirements for analytical and trend assessments on security.**

57. *UNHCR acknowledged the need for a new security reporting policy, which would take into account any possible duplication, and accepted*

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*recommendations 8 and 9. Reporting norms will include analytical, timely, breadth and quality of information over the benefits of a standardized reporting format. An intranet-based system for reporting critical incidents is being currently piloted, and the process of revising reporting norms started at the FSA Security Risk Assessment workshop in Annemasse, France in October 2009. Recommendations 8 and 9 remain open pending receipt of the new security reporting policy.*

**Mechanisms for the assessment of management performance on security related areas need to be strengthened**

58. As indicated in the 2002 Report of the Secretary-General on the Inter-Organization security measures (A/57/365), performance management is one of the pillars of any accountability system). At the level of individual staff, a performance management system requires that expected responsibilities are included in the job description of each staff member and the related goals are adequately stated. At the level of an organizational unit, a performance management system should identify specific targets and measurement criteria for an established time-frame.

59. The generic job descriptions of Head of Desk, Desk Officers and Senior Desk Officers as well as Bureau Deputy Directors did not indicate responsibilities for security-related tasks. Similarly, during interviews with senior Bureau officers, OIOS was informed that neither Bureau Directors nor Deputy Directors had security-related goals in their annual Performance Appraisal System (PAR). The PAR of Senior Resources Managers for Africa did have reference to the monitoring of MOSS compliance tasks but this represented a rather limited type of security objective. This was not the case for the other bureaus reviewed during the audit. However, all of the above mentioned staff members had significant security responsibilities. The OIOS survey also showed that around 30 per cent of Representatives and 40 per cent of Security Focal Points had no security-related objectives in their PAR for 2008 and 2009.

60. While the Bureaus spent considerable amount of resources on security coordination and arrangements, these functions were not consistently acknowledged in their work plans for 2009. For the biennium 2010-11, UNHCR adopted a new results-based management software – FOCUS. The comprehensive plan for 2010 for the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific, developed under FOCUS, did not include any security-related goal, objective or output. Instead these were reflected in both 2009 and 2010 strategic plans for the Regional Bureau for Africa. Failure to capture the use of resources for security-related activities may hamper the capacity to estimate the real cost of security, the need for additional resources, or opportunities to improve their use.

**Recommendations 10 and 11**

**(10) UNHCR should ensure that security responsibilities are adequately reflected in job descriptions, as well as in the performance appraisal system of staff with security functions.**

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**(11) UNHCR should ensure that relevant security goals, objectives and outputs are included in the new results-based management database (FOCUS) pertaining to the Regional Bureaus, and are regularly monitored.**

61. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 10 and stated that all job descriptions are being revised as part of new initiatives related to performance management and organizational performance. The job descriptions under revision will include security and staff safety as appropriate. The exercise will be completed by the end of 2010 for the majority of job descriptions. On the other side, the new Performance Appraisal and Management System (PAMS) has a revised set of competencies. There is a core competency (required by all staff) called “accountability” which includes the phrase “demonstrates security awareness”, and for P-3 and P-4 levels, there is a specific behavioral indicator: “demonstrates an understanding of the factors which have an impact on security”. Also, there is a managerial competency (required for managers and supervisors) called “Judgment and Decision Making” which includes security implicitly throughout, and explicitly for Level 3 managers (P-3 and P-4) who are normally responsible for implementing security policies. A functional competency for security professionals in security functions will be established. These are being defined now and will become operational in January 2011. Based on the action taken and assurances provided by UNHCR, recommendation 10 has been closed.*

62. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 11 and stated that while the UNHCR’s results framework includes security management under the Rights Group for Headquarters and Regional Support and the Rights Group Logistics and Operations Support, the Organization has to assess carefully how best to capture the operational security management framework. Due consideration should be given to better reflection and integration into the Results Framework as used in FOCUS. As of 2010 UNHCR intends to institutionalize tracking of security related budgets and expenditures in its systems – FOCUS for budgeting and the Management Systems Renewal Project (MSRP) for expenditure reporting. This will strengthen UNHCR’s ability to report on security-related expenditures. Based on the action taken and assurances provided by UNHCR, recommendation 11 has been closed.*

Responsibilities for internal monitoring of implementation of security measures in the field need to be clarified

63. Segregation of duties between the implementation and monitoring functions is one of the key internal controls for any organizational structure. More so for UNHCR, which is gradually shifting toward a regionally driven structure by delegating security functions to the field (i.e. Representatives) and its Headquarters support structures (i.e. Bureaus). The accountability framework requires that Representatives at the respective duty station are accountable for compliance with security-related instructions. The Senior Security Manager and/or Headquarters Security Focal Point is/are accountable, among other roles,

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for monitoring and reporting on compliance with security policies, practices and procedures (Annex I of IOM083/2006-FOM/083/2006).

64. The 2007 UNHCR Security Policy shares the accountability for managerial oversight over the safety of UNHCR staff between the Director of DOS, ESS, Chief of FSS, Bureau Directors and the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations. For this purpose, the High Commissioner is required to set up a procedure which ensures that s/he is regularly informed about security issues. The same policy states that Bureau Directors and Desk Officers are responsible for the overall security management and for ensuring appropriate priority and programming of resources.

65. Sharing accountability for monitoring the implementation of security related measures in the field between Bureaus and other organizational functions is critical to ensure adequate capacity. However, FSS is the most appropriate owner for monitoring security management because it is not directly accountable for implementing security management activities in the field (this is the responsibility of Representatives). Further, FSS is not mandated to engage in proactive security planning and allocation of funds for security (this is the responsibility of the Bureaus). The Security Focal Point is also in the position to ensure that his/her professional judgment is taken into consideration when required.

66. At present, there is no consolidated monitoring strategy and plan which takes into consideration the contribution of all relevant stakeholders. The Chief, FSS informed OIOS that FSS had no resources for this function. He was confident that with the arrival of a new Junior Professional Officer (expected by the end of 2009), FSS would be able to assign resources for monitoring functions. The monitoring strategy should be organically developed taking into consideration the accountability framework and the Performance Appraisal system.

## **Recommendation 12**

### **(12) UNHCR should clarify the roles and responsibilities for monitoring compliance with security policies, practices and procedures.**

67. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 12 and stated that standard inspections by the Inspector-General's Office (IGO) are designed to provide an assessment of managerial and individual compliance with security policies and procedures, as well as to obtain both collective and individual feedback on security matters. This helps to reinforce understanding amongst staff members regarding the possible sanctions related to any security violations.* OIOS is of the view that continuous monitoring of compliance is a managerial function rather than a function for a separate oversight body. If UNHCR intends to assign unique responsibility for continuous monitoring of compliance with security policies, practices and procedures to the IGO, this responsibility should be clearly reflected in the UNHCR security policy. OIOS would like to reiterate that the existing UNHCR Security Policy shares the accountability for

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managerial oversight over the safety of UNHCR staff between the Director of DOS, ESS, Chief of FSS, Bureau Directors and the Assistant High Commissioner for Operations. For this purpose, the High Commissioner is required to set up a procedure which ensures that s/he is regularly informed about security issues. Recommendation 12 remains open pending further clarification from UNCHR on the roles and responsibilities for managerial oversight over compliance with security policies, practices and procedures.

#### Regional security staff did not have uniform Terms of Reference

68. The use of the Regional FSA was not consistent in all regions. For instance in Asia, the Regional FSA was almost completely dedicated to training and the entire South African region was not covered by any Regional FSA. There was no approved documentation establishing the geographical jurisdiction of Regional FSA. Sometimes their area of responsibility was related to the size of Bureaus, in other instances it depended on the jurisdiction of the hosting representation. FSS reported that misunderstandings between Regional FSAs and Representatives hosting the regional security function occurred with respect to their delegation of authority, including financial delegation for their activities. FSS believed that the Regional FSA function would further benefit if their delegation of authority, including their financial delegation, was formally agreed with the Regional Bureaus.

69. Discussion on the adoption of formal Terms of Reference for Regional FSAs had been ongoing since early 2008 and was not finalized at the time of the audit. Finalization of the Terms of Reference for Regional FSAs would ensure a more transparent integration between the local management where Regional FSAs are hosted, the management in the area of work and also with Bureaus. Some Regional FSAs already considered the draft Terms of Reference as their guiding document while others only relied on their generic job description.

#### **Recommendation 13**

##### **(13) UNHCR should finalize the Terms of Reference for Regional Field Safety Advisors as a matter of priority.**

70. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 13 and stated that it acknowledges the need to update the Terms of Reference for Regional FSAs. The final Terms of Reference will depend on the proposal DESS/FSS will make to modify the administration of all Regional FSAs.* Recommendation 13 remains open pending finalization of the Terms of Reference for the Regional FSAs.

#### Arrangements are in place for follow up on security incidents

71. UNHCR had structured arrangements in place for following up on security incidents. When fatalities, major injuries or large scale damage to UNHCR staff and assets occur, the UNHCR IGO conducts inquiries. Similar inquiries may be conducted by DSS for the same incident, if it deems appropriate. When responsibilities for the incidents are attributed to breach of

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UNHCR's Code of Conduct or Staff Rules, disciplinary sanctions can be required.

Need for a regular programme to collect feedback from staff on their views about mechanisms for handling security breaches

72. The OIOS survey noted that a majority of respondents believed (see Table 3) that sanctions for behaviours that violated security were not consistently applied.

**Table 3: Results of OIOS survey (2009)**

<b>Question originally formulated</b>	<b>Yes, consistently</b>	<b>Yes, but not consistently</b>	<b>No, never</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
According to your experience, does management sanction behaviors that violate security standards?	7 (7%)	55 (55%)	25 (25%)	13 (13%)

The OIOS survey only took into consideration staff members with security responsibilities (i.e., Representatives, Regional FSA; FSA, Assistant FSA and Security Focal Point)

73. UNHCR annually publishes a collection of the disciplinary measures taken during the year. This is a good practice; however, it might not be sufficient to assure staff members that an efficient sanction system is in place for violations of security standards. In OIOS' view, UNHCR must remain vigilant of staff perceptions of its capacity to establish an efficient accountability system.

**Recommendation 14**

**(14) UNHCR should periodically assess staff members' perception of the fairness and efficiency of the sanction system for security violations and ensure that appropriate action is taken to respond to their concerns.**

74. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 14 and stated that collective or individual non-compliance with security policies and procedures can amount to misconduct and staff members are required to report any suspected violations to the IGO through the reporting mechanisms established under IOM/FOM/54/2005. Where an IGO investigation finds that the preponderance of evidence substantiates the allegation, a preliminary investigation report is sent to Director, Division of Human Resources Management (DHRM), who is responsible for deciding on whether to follow up with sanctions. A general report on all sanctions is shared with staff members by DHRM every six months, and is posted on the IGO's intranet web site for easy reference. OIOS does not question the mechanism established under IOM/FOM/54/2005. However, staff perception of inconsistent sanctions for behaviours that violate security requirements represents a risk for the security system. Recommendation 14 remains open pending the establishment of a mechanism to monitor and address staff concerns on inconsistent application of sanctions for security violations.*

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UNHCR needs to follow up on security risk assessments for its Headquarters

75. Due to lack of dedicated resources and high involvement of GSS in the current relocation of offices at Headquarters, GSS was not able to implement the recommendations included in the latest (December 2008) Security Risk Assessment for Headquarters performed by the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG).

**Recommendation 15**

**(15) UNHCR should expeditiously follow up the recommendations included in the 2008 Security Risk Assessment for Headquarters.**

76. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 15 and stated that some of these recommendations were brought forward to the attention of UNOG Security by UNHCR GSS (in particular the ones related to the security guards enhanced service requirements). One of the roles of the Senior Security Officer at Headquarters will be to monitor compliance, as soon as the post is covered. Recommendations related to the Montbrillant (MBT) building enhancements are part of the 2010 GSS work plan (2011, where dependencies with the Fondation Immobilière pour le Organisations Internationales – FIPOI - exist, like MBT external perimeter fencing). Recommendation 15 remains open pending receipt of documentation showing the completed follow up on the 2008 security risk assessment.*

Need to improve arrangements for review of security services invoices submitted by UNOG

77. Up to the end of 2007, the settlement of UNOG service charges, including security guards services, was managed between the Finance Section and Programme and Budget Service. Following the out-posting of Headquarters' finance related activities to Budapest starting in January 2008, the Controller and Director, DFAM tasked GSS with the responsibility of managing the Memorandum of Understanding with UNOG for the provision of guards and of reviewing UNOG security charges. GSS had also to review the charges for the first six months of 2008 without additional administrative resources. GSS finalized the review in May 2009, resulting in a potential overcharge of around \$542,000 for the services received in 2008 and communicated these results to UNOG on 10 June 2009. At the time of the audit, UNOG was reviewing this matter.

78. As discussed earlier in this report, in the 2010-2011 budget submission, GSS proposed the establishment of a new security section of two Professional staff and one administrative/finance assistant under GSS who should also ensure adequate administrative management and monitoring of Headquarters security resources.

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## **Recommendation 16**

**(16) UNHCR should ensure the adequacy of resources assigned for the review of invoices received from UNOG for the provision of security services.**

79. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 16 and stated that in April 2009, GSS used the support of a Temporary Assistant SIBA (Staff in Between Assignments) at the level of GL-6, Administrative/Finance Assistant. By July 2009, the reconciliation of 2008 UNOG security guards-related invoices was finalized, and UNOG validated the finding of \$552,000 over-billing for the whole year 2008. As a result of these findings, UNOG Administration further agreed to follow a similar methodology for 2009. In 2010, the newly established post of Finance/Administrative Assistant reporting to the Senior Security Officer at Headquarters will be in charge of monitoring the UNOG security guard invoices' accuracy and timely payment. Based on the action taken by UNCHR, recommendation 16 has been closed.*

### Roles and responsibilities of UNOG and UNHCR for security management of Headquarters premises need to be clarified

80. The existing Memorandum of Understanding between UNOG and UNHCR for the provision of guards' services for UNCHR Headquarters premises is the only document regulating the provision of the service. The Memorandum is silent on key security topics such as accountability for the follow up of security risk assessments, annual assessment of the services provided and individual guards' performance, development of security policy for Headquarters and its monitoring. As discussed above, this has resulted in a lack of coverage of Headquarters in the security policy and a lack of accountability for the follow up of recommendations of the security risk assessment at Headquarters.

81. At the time of the audit, UNHCR was assessing whether to continue with UNOG or to identify a new service provider, in line with the practice in other international organizations in Geneva. Whichever option UNHCR endorses, contract management of the service should include clear identification of responsibilities between the two parties and periodic assessment of the quality of services received. Arrangements with a commercial firm should also include rights of access for UNHCR oversight bodies.

## **Recommendation 17**

**(17) UNHCR should ensure that any contract for provision of security services entered into defines the respective roles and responsibilities of UNHCR and the service provider, and provision is made for monitoring of performance, annual assessment of services, and accountability for the follow up of identified security risks. Arrangements with a commercial firm should include rights of access for UNHCR oversight bodies.**

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82. *UNCHR accepted recommendation 17 and stated that the recommendation is not relevant for the foreseeable future with regard to Headquarters, in view of the opportunities provided by the establishment of the Headquarters Security Unit. Rather, UNHCR envisaged enhancing the Terms of Reference for provision of security guards by UNOG, with more specific delineation of objectives and key performance indicators. That will be one of the 2010 objectives of the Senior Security Officer at Headquarters. Based on the assurances provided by UNCHR, recommendation 17 has been closed.*

The agreement for provision of security services for the Global Service Centre in Budapest needs to be finalized

83. Guards for the Budapest premises were provided by the Hungarian authority as part of the country agreement. However, the service agreement with KSzF (the local police force) was only in draft at the time of the audit.

**Recommendation 18**

**(18) UNHCR should finalize the agreement with the provider of the Hungarian security guards, in respect of the Global Service Centre building in Budapest.**

84. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 18 and stated that the agreement is under review and FSS has provided technical and financial support for the enhancement of security measures at the Global Service Centre. Finalization is expected by the end of first quarter 2010. Based on the action taken and assurances provided by UNHCR, recommendation 18 has been closed.*

The electronic platform to share updated security policies and reports is not easily accessible

85. UNHCR has collected some of its security related policies (including Inter-Agency standards) in the web-link under ESS. No staff is formally assigned with the task of updating the content of the electronic page. FSS informed that this has sometime resulted in non-updated content on the web-link. The OIOS survey found that while the Regional FSAs, FSAs and Assistant FSAs believe that security policies are easy to find, only 40 per cent of Representatives and 60 per cent of Security Focal Points surveyed thought that security related policies were easy to access.

**Recommendation 19**

**(19) UNHCR should regularly update the electronic platform where existing security related policies, standards and guidelines are filed. This should include discussion with staff on how to make the documents easier to find and access.**

86. *UNCHR accepted recommendation 19 and stated that it acknowledges the need to review the electronic platform of its security service. This would*

*require the redesign and promulgation of security guidance material, in addition to the full update of the intranet site. Recommendation 19 remains open pending confirmation that the intranet site for the security service has been updated.*

F. Coordination with other UN agencies, DSS and SMT

The Organization needs to understand and address difficulties in the relation with other members of the UN security management system and address them

87. Efficient relations with DSS and effective integration within the UN security management system are key factors for successful management of security both from a field and headquarters perspective. In a few instances, UNCHR has reported to the Standing Committee difficulties in cooperation with DSS and the security management system in the field, such as different understanding of field presence requirements and operational needs.

88. Concerns on difficult relations were confirmed in the 2004 UNHCR security survey which concluded that managers needed better training to participate in the SMT. The OIOS survey also noted that Representatives and Regional FSAs had a low level of satisfaction with the SMT cooperation, while Assistant FSAs were generally more satisfied with existing cooperation with other UN agencies (see Table 4). Managers at Headquarters consistently reported difficult relations with DSS in the field due to different understanding of each other’s mandate and the alleged deficient support on the side of DSS (e.g. unclear security requirements and non-timely flow of information). A recent survey conducted by FSS in the MENA region showed that field Representatives still believed that UNHCR programme activities were not understood by DSS and their support was not adequate.

**Table 4: Results of OIOS survey (2009)**

<b>Question originally formulated: In your opinion, how responsive is the local security coordination mechanism (such as the Security Management Team and the Area Security Management Team) to UNCHR needs?</b>	<b>Excellent / Good</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Poor / Very poor</b>	<b>Don’t know</b>
Representatives (18 replies)	33.4%	50%	16.7%	0%
Regional FSA (7 replies)	28.6%	42.9%	28.6%	0%
FSA (20 replies)	70%	15%	10%	5%
Assistant FSA (30 replies)	80%	13.3%	6.6%	0%
Security Focal Point (25 replies)	76%	12%	12%	0%

The OIOS survey only took into consideration staff members with security responsibilities (i.e., Representatives, Regional FSA; FSA, Assistant FSA and Security Focal Point).

89. Based on interviews with management at UNHCR Headquarters, OIOS is of the view that differences in the mandate between UNHCR and other components of the security management system may be one of the sources of the

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existing misunderstanding. While UNHCR is required to protect safety and security of staff members and beneficiaries, other organizations have a different, sometimes less stringent, commitment for the security of beneficiaries. In most cases, managers stated that misunderstandings can also arise because the UNHCR mandate requires it to have an extended field presence, sometimes in remote areas. UNHCR needs to ensure that DSS and members of the security management system understand its mandate.

### **Recommendations 20 and 21**

**(20) UNHCR should formally assess the reasons for the apparent dissatisfaction with the existing cooperation among other UN agencies, Security Management Team, and the Department of Safety and Security in particular, and promote corrective actions at multilateral (Inter-Agency Security Management Network) and bilateral level as required.**

**(21) UNHCR should develop a dialogue with the Department of Safety and Security to formally clarify UNHCR's mandate for the protection of refugees and other persons of concern, and its expectations in terms of support from the Department of Safety and Security in this regard.**

90. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 20 and stated that FSS will continue to raise substantive issues with DSS where there is strong or systematic dissatisfaction with the Department. UNHCR is also a proactive participant in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, along with the High-Level Committee on Management Security Steering Committee process that is reshaping the UN security management system, and concerns related to DSS are regularly taken up in these fora. Based on the assurances provided by UNHCR, recommendation 20 has been closed.*

91. *UNHCR accepted recommendation 21 and stated that DESS/FSS will share and consult with DSS on the results of its work. UNHCR has a mandate that was entrusted to it by the General Assembly through the Statute and subsequent resolutions giving the organization a specific role to provide protection to its beneficiaries, regardless of political circumstances and imperatives. No formal clarification is needed in this regard. OIOS takes note of UNHCR's explanation. However, the comments provided by UNHCR do not adequately elaborate on how it plans to deal with its expectations in terms of support from DSS for the protection of security and safety of refugees, for which there is no provision in the DSS mandate. The difficulties to understand the respective mandates between DSS and UNHCR and to establish a satisfactory work environment between the two have been well documented. In OIOS' view, further dialogue to ensure full understanding of reciprocal needs and mandate requirements would boost the hope for improved cooperation. For this purpose the opportunity to share with UNDSS the results of the work on the review of existing policies and procedures for the physical protection and security of UNCHR's beneficiaries would be an important first step, but not the only one.*

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Recommendation 21 remains open pending further clarification on how UNHCR plans to pursue the dialogue with DSS on the issue of the disparate mandates.

## V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

92. We wish to express our appreciation to the Management and staff of UNHCR for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.

## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

Recom. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	C/O <sup>1</sup>	Actions needed to close recommendation	Implementation date <sup>2</sup>
1	UNHCR should review the existing policies and procedures for the physical protection and security of beneficiaries. This should include a definition of roles, responsibilities and expected results; a requirement for a periodic work plan for the Security Focal Point for Refugee/ Internally Displaced Persons; and a mechanism for the identification of supporting tools enabling protection and security staff to work together to identify and mitigate risks associated with physical security of UNHCR's beneficiaries.	Strategy	High	O	Confirmation that actions designed to review existing policies and procedures for the physical protection and security of UNHCR's beneficiaries have been completed.	31 March 2010
2	UNHCR should update the status of implementation of the recommendations identified in the 2004 Review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation, assess the cost efficiency of implementing each of the recommendations on the basis of a risk analysis, and develop an action plan for implementing the remaining recommendations.	Governance	Moderate	O	Receipt of a copy of the action plan developed by FSS for addressing the relevant recommendations raised in the 2004 Review of UNHCR's Security Policy and Policy Implementation.	31 December 2009
3	UNHCR should ensure that strategic initiatives announced to stakeholders for improving the security management system in the Organization are followed up, and the results are reported to the Standing Committee.	Governance	Moderate	O	Confirmation by UNHCR that the recommendation has been fully implemented.	
4	UNHCR should ensure that its reports to the Standing Committee on new strategic initiatives on security management contain information on resource requirements for	Governance	Moderate	O	Confirmation by UNHCR that the recommendation has been fully implemented.	Implemented

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	their implementation, and the risks associated with non- or partial implementation.					
5	UNHCR should conduct a review to assess whether a Security Services Unit under one command with direct and non-mediated reporting line to Senior Management would promote synergies in the use of resources, better visibility of the security function, and enhanced accountability of security managers.	Governance	High	C	Action completed.	Implemented
6	UNHCR should develop policy guidelines to support Representatives and local management in their needs assessment for determining the required number of UNHCR security officers in the field. The criteria should include consideration of the security personnel (i.e. United Nations Department of Safety and Security and other UN Agencies) already available in the country and at the regional level.	Human Resources	High	O	Finalization of the policy regarding the administration of FSA posts.	31 January 2010
7	UNHCR should ensure that clear accountability for the establishment, update and dissemination of a comprehensive accountability framework for the Organization covering Headquarters and field operations is assigned, and security-related policies, guidelines and Terms of Reference are aligned with the new framework. This should include ensuring that UNHCR security policies are formally promulgated in the Inter-Office Memorandum/Field Office Memorandum (IOM/FOM) format.	Governance	High	O	Provision of the revised and updated Security Accountability Framework.	31 December 2009
8	UNHCR should finalize the new security reporting policy, ensuring that there is no duplication in the information sharing	Operational	High	O	Receipt of the new security reporting policy.	31 January 2010

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	mechanisms in place, including the Department of Safety and Security reporting lines in accordance with its mandate.					
9	UNHCR should ensure that the new security reporting policy includes requirements for analytical and trend assessments on security.	Operational	High	O	Receipt of the new security reporting policy.	31 January 2010
10	UNHCR should ensure that security responsibilities are adequately reflected in job descriptions, as well as in the performance appraisal system of staff with security functions.	Human Resources	Moderate	C	Action completed.	Implemented
11	UNHCR should ensure that relevant security goals, objectives and outputs are included in the new results-based management database (FOCUS) pertaining to the Regional Bureaus, and are regularly monitored.	Governance	Moderate	C	Action completed.	Implemented
12	UNHCR should clarify the roles and responsibilities for monitoring compliance with security policies, practices and procedures.	Compliance	Moderate	O	Clarification of the roles and responsibilities for the managerial oversight for compliance with security policies, practices and procedures.	31 March 2010
13	UNHCR should finalize the Terms of Reference for Regional Field Safety Advisors as a matter of priority.	Governance	Moderate	O	Finalization of the Terms of References for the Regional Field Safety Advisors.	31 December 2009
14	UNHCR should periodically assess staff members' perception of the fairness and efficiency of the sanction system for security violations and ensure that appropriate action is taken to respond to their concerns.	Governance	Moderate	O	Establishment of a mechanism aiming to monitor and address any staff concerns that sanctions for security violations are not consistently applied.	Not provided

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15	UNHCR should expeditiously follow up the recommendations included in the 2008 Security Risk Assessment for Headquarters.	Compliance	High	O	Evidence of completed follow-up on the 2008 Security Risk Assessment.	31 December 2011
16	UNHCR should ensure the adequacy of resources assigned for the review of invoices received from UNOG for the provision of security services.	Governance	Moderate	C	Action completed.	Implemented
17	UNHCR should ensure that any contract for provision of security services entered into defines the respective roles and responsibilities of UNHCR and the service provider and provision is made for monitoring of performance, annual assessment of services, and accountability for the follow up of identified security risks. Arrangements with a commercial firm should include rights of access for UNHCR oversight bodies.	Governance	Moderate	C	Action completed.	Implemented
18	UNHCR should finalize the agreement with the provider of the Hungarian security guards, in respect of the Global Service Centre building in Budapest.	Operational	Moderate	C	Action completed.	Implemented
19	UNHCR should regularly update the electronic platform where existing security related policies, standards and guidelines are filed. This should include discussion with staff on how to make the documents easier to find and access.	Information Resources	Moderate	O	Confirmation that the intranet site for the security service has been updated.	30 June 2010
20	UNHCR should formally assess the reasons for the apparent dissatisfaction with the existing cooperation among UN agencies, Security Management Team, and the Department of Safety and Security in particular, and promote corrective actions at multilateral (Inter-Agency Security Management Network) and bilateral level	Strategy	Moderate	C	Action completed.	Implemented

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	as required.					
21	UNHCR should develop a dialogue with the Department of Safety and Security to formally clarify UNHCR's mandate for the protection of refugees and other persons of concern, and its expectations in terms of support from the Department of Safety and Security in this regard.	Strategy	High	O	Further clarification on how UNHCR plans to pursue the dialogue with DSS on the issue of the disparate mandates.	Not provided

1. C = closed, O = open

2. Date provided by UNHCR in response to recommendations.