



United Nations

Nations Unies

**OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES  
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

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*This Report is protected by paragraph 18 of  
ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994*

**REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION OF AN ALLEGATION OF  
THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF A CONFIDENTIAL  
DOCUMENT BY [REDACTED]**

**REDACTED REPORT**

**ID Case No. 0774-05**

**28 MARCH 2007**

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

This Investigation Report of the Investigations Division of the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services is provided upon your request pursuant to paragraph 1(c) of General Assembly resolution A/RES/59/272. The report has been redacted in part pursuant to paragraph 2 of this resolution to protect confidentiality and sensitive information. OIOS's transmission of this Report does not constitute its publication. OIOS does not bear any responsibility for any further dissemination of the Report.

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ALLEGATION OF THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF A  
CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENT BY [REDACTED]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On [REDACTED] the Investigations Division of the Office of the Internal Oversight Services (ID/OIOS) received an allegation that [REDACTED] with the [REDACTED], had released a confidential [REDACTED] document to [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] without authorization. The confidential document in question was [REDACTED] - of [REDACTED]

II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

2. UN involvement in [REDACTED] commenced in [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED], having determined that the situation in [REDACTED] continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council decided to establish [REDACTED]. As of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] consists of [REDACTED] total [REDACTED], including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], supported by [REDACTED], about [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

3. [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and was [REDACTED]

III. APPLICABLE LAW

4. [REDACTED] - Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving [REDACTED]

III. Definitions:

Section 4 - "Serious misconduct - any act, omission or negligence, including criminal acts, that is a violation of [REDACTED] standard operating procedures, directives, or any other applicable rules, regulations or administrative instructions, that results in or is likely to result in serious damage or injury to an individual or to the [REDACTED]. Serious misconduct includes, but is not limited to:

- Abuse of authority;
- Breach of confidentiality;
- Unlawful acts (e.g. theft, fraud, smuggling, bribery) on or off United Nations premises, with or without the involvement of United Nations vehicles, and whether or not the individual was officially [REDACTED] at the time of the offence."

IV. Standard of Conduct:

Section 5 – "[REDACTED] shall refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and independent nature of their duties and inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the authorized mandate of the operation, the [REDACTED], and other applicable legal norms and standards. [REDACTED] shall respect all local laws and regulations."

Section 6 – "[REDACTED] are required to abide by the highest standards of integrity while [REDACTED]. They shall refrain from any conduct that would adversely reflect on the United Nations and shall not engage in any activity that is incompatible with the aims and objectives of the United Nations. They are also required to abide by [REDACTED] standard operating procedures, directives, or any other applicable rules, regulations or administrative issuances."

5. Code of Personal Conduct for [REDACTED]

Rule 1: "Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, caring, considerate, mature, respected and trusted [REDACTED], displaying the highest integrity and impartiality. Have pride in your position as [REDACTED] and do not abuse or misuse your authority."

Rule 6: "Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment and property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal benefits."

Rule 10: "Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations."

6. [REDACTED] Code of Conduct

"All United Nations personnel in [REDACTED] must conduct themselves in a professional and disciplined manner. Exercise the highest standard of integrity. Dress, think, and behave in a dignified manner befitting a mature, respectable and honourable [REDACTED]"

IV. METHODOLOGY

7. The ID/OIOS investigation included, but was not limited to, the interview of all relevant witnesses and the examination of the subject confidential document. ID/OIOS was unable to interview the subject before [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] home country. Subsequent efforts by ID/OIOS to locate and interview [REDACTED] have been unsuccessful. [REDACTED] is reported to have resigned from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] specific whereabouts are unknown.

## V. INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS

Interview with [REDACTED]

8. On [REDACTED] ID/OIOS interviewed [REDACTED] who stated that [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] and was the [REDACTED] stated that, because of [REDACTED] expertise, [REDACTED] was assigned by [REDACTED] to coordinate with the [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] matters related to the security of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had been to the [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] occasions, but regularly communicated with the [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] by telephone.

9. [REDACTED] stated that during [REDACTED] duty with [REDACTED] learned that [REDACTED] was tasked by the [REDACTED] to head the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that the [REDACTED]'s main objective was to collate and assess [REDACTED]. One of the subjects of that activity was the [REDACTED] operating in the [REDACTED] areas of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] had no official dealings with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] knew that most of the work was done by the [REDACTED] rather than [REDACTED].

10. [REDACTED] told ID/OIOS that on [REDACTED] received a telephone call from [REDACTED] inviting [REDACTED] to meet with the [REDACTED]. At that meeting, the [REDACTED] showed [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] gathered on the [REDACTED] operating at [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] also contained [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] and other places within [REDACTED] where the [REDACTED] operated. The [REDACTED] was marked [REDACTED] - meaning that the [REDACTED] was restricted for dissemination and viewing by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] told ID/OIOS that [REDACTED] was amazed to find that the [REDACTED] had a copy of the [REDACTED], which [REDACTED] was not authorized to receive.

11. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] subsequently learned from [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] had given the [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was not authorized to disseminate the [REDACTED] material. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was often seen at the [REDACTED], however, it was not [REDACTED] job to liaise with the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that the [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] too was surprised to have a copy of such UN [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] informed the [REDACTED] of its dissemination. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not know what intentions were in disseminating [REDACTED] to the [REDACTED].

Interview with [REDACTED]

12. ID/OIOS interviewed [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED] counterpart representing [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] who stated that [REDACTED] stated that one of the [REDACTED]

main aims of the [redacted] was addressing the [redacted] and [redacted] from [redacted] to [redacted] stated that [redacted] informed [redacted] that [redacted] had released a [redacted] document to the [redacted] without authorisation. [redacted] said that [redacted] was aware that [redacted] had given a [redacted] details of [redacted] in [redacted] and [redacted] the former [redacted] of the [redacted] told ID/OIOS that [redacted] had viewed [redacted] and found nothing significant that could be classified as [redacted] or [redacted]

Interview with [redacted]

13. ID/OIOS interviewed [redacted] [redacted] told ID/OIOS that the [redacted] offered its services to [redacted] to establish a peaceful solution to the [redacted] with one such solution being the halting of the [redacted] through its border with [redacted]. With this aim, [redacted] had been established between the [redacted] and [redacted]

14. [redacted] told ID/OIOS that sometime towards the end of [redacted] showed [redacted] a [redacted] containing a [redacted] [redacted] said that [redacted] had informed [redacted] that [redacted] had given the [redacted] to [redacted] told ID/OIOS that [redacted] did not trust [redacted] as the latter was of dubious character. [redacted] stated that [redacted] had never spoken with and did not know [redacted]. Moreover, that [redacted] did not know why [redacted] would have given [redacted] to [redacted]

Interview with [redacted]

15. ID/OIOS interviewed [redacted] a [redacted] who was both the [redacted] in [redacted] and the [redacted] having succeeded to the role after [redacted] on [redacted]

16. [redacted] told ID/OIOS that [redacted] learned from [redacted] that [redacted] had given [redacted] to the then [redacted] [redacted] stated that [redacted] did not know the reason for or purpose of [redacted] having so disseminated [redacted]. [redacted] said that the materials in [redacted] are important as if disclosed the identities of [redacted] and, in the wrong hands, could undermine [redacted] and jeopardize the [redacted] and [redacted]

**VI. FINDINGS & CONCLUSION**

17. ID/OIOS found that [redacted] whilst [redacted] with [redacted] released, apparently without authorization, documents to [redacted]. In so doing, [redacted] violated Rule 10 of the Code of Conduct for [redacted]

which enjoins [REDACTED] to "Exercise the utmost discretion in handling confidential information and matters of official business which can put lives into danger or soil the image of the United Nations."

18. It is not clear under what circumstances [REDACTED] transmitted this [REDACTED] confidential material to [REDACTED], but a reasonable inference can be made that [REDACTED] may have stood to personally gain from providing this information. ID/OIOS attempted to locate [REDACTED] for interview. [REDACTED] is reported to have resigned from [REDACTED] and is currently somewhere in [REDACTED], specific details unknown.

19. ID/OIOS concludes that a *prima facie* case exists that [REDACTED] contravened Section 4 of the Directives for Disciplinary Matters Involving [REDACTED] & [REDACTED], this provision relates to breach of confidentiality and terms such breach as a serious misconduct. [REDACTED] also violated [REDACTED] on conduct of [REDACTED] and the Code of Conduct for [REDACTED] by [REDACTED] unauthorized release of [REDACTED] documents.

#### VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

20. In light of the above findings and conclusion, ID/OIOS recommends the following:

Recommendation 1: It is recommended that, having established a *prima facie* case of the unauthorized distribution of [REDACTED] material and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, [REDACTED] provide a copy of this report to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for appropriate action against [REDACTED].

Recommendation 2: It is recommended that, having established a *prima facie* case of the unauthorized distribution of [REDACTED] material and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, [REDACTED] inform the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] will not be accepted for any current or future [REDACTED].