



United Nations

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**OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES
INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION**

*This Report is protected by paragraph 18 of
ST/SGB/273 of 7 September 1994*

INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE FRAUDULENT USE OF



REDACTED REPORT

ID Case No. 0007-09

23 JUNE 2009

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. On [REDACTED] the Investigations Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) received a report of possible misconduct implicating United Nations personnel in [REDACTED].
2. Specifically, the [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED] had fraudulently utilized the unique [REDACTED] assigned to other [REDACTED] in order to obtain [REDACTED].
3. OIOS conducted investigations into the matter and found that [REDACTED] had misused the [REDACTED] of [REDACTED].
4. This report details the investigation into [REDACTED] participation and involvement in the reported misconduct.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL NORMS

5. Staff regulations and issuances:

Staff Regulation 1.2

(b) Staff members shall uphold the highest standard of efficiency, competence and integrity. The concept of integrity includes, but is not limited to, probity, impartiality, fairness, honesty and truthfulness in all matters affecting their work and status;

Secretary-General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2004/15 (In effect 1 December 2004)Section 5

- 5.1 Users of ICT resources and ICT data shall not engage in any of the following actions:
 - b) Knowingly, or through gross negligence, making ICT resources ... available to persons who have not been authorized to access them;
 - c) Knowingly, or through gross negligence, using ICT resources ... in a manner contrary to the rights and obligations of staff members;

[REDACTED] Administrative Instruction No. 08/2006 (In effect 1 August 2006)

- (3) Use of the [REDACTED] shall be in accordance with the highest standards of conduct expected of UN staff members and subject to the policy on the use of information and communications technology resources and data (ST/SGB/2004/15).

- (24) Any form of abuse by staff in utilizing their [REDACTED] that may result in financial loss to the organization directly or otherwise will result in the immediate deactivation of this service. Fraudulent use of another [REDACTED] will also result in its immediate deactivation followed by administrative action against the staff involved.

III. IMPLICATED PERSONNEL

6. [REDACTED], a [REDACTED], began [REDACTED] service with the Organization in [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] a position [REDACTED] still [REDACTED]

IV. METHODOLOGY

- 7. The OIOS investigation included, but was not limited to the analysis of the—
 - i) itemized [REDACTED] of [REDACTED];
 - ii) [REDACTED] documentation identifying the [REDACTED] assigned to the [REDACTED] and/or [REDACTED] from which fraudulent [REDACTED] originated; and
 - iii) [REDACTED] corresponding to the times and [REDACTED] of the disputed [REDACTED].
- 8. Finally, OIOS interviewed all relevant witnesses and subjects pertaining to this matter.

V. BACKGROUND

[REDACTED]

9. Due to an increase in [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] experienced [REDACTED] congestion which impacted upon their operational capability. Therefore a [REDACTED] was required to initiate a [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] that were not [REDACTED] official [REDACTED]. As the United Nations has limited [REDACTED] resources, the [REDACTED] issuances were only provided to individual [REDACTED] with [REDACTED]. These [REDACTED] also enabled [REDACTED] to place [REDACTED] at a [REDACTED] rate than that offered by the [REDACTED]. As a result only [REDACTED] could be [REDACTED] without a [REDACTED] all other [REDACTED] required the [REDACTED] to input their individually assigned [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

10. According to the [REDACTED] 'Guidelines on the Use of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Procedures' [REDACTED] catered for the demand for [REDACTED] with, amongst other things, the employment of the [REDACTED] system in [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

11. The [REDACTED] have the capability of retrieving [REDACTED] input by users, without the need for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Therefore, individual [REDACTED] assigned to [REDACTED] were compromised once they utilized the [REDACTED] allocated to other [REDACTED].

VI. INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS

A. [REDACTED]-ASSISTED IDENTIFICATION OF SUBJECT

12. After receiving complaints from [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] to their [REDACTED] that had not been personally incurred, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] collaborated in the identification of possible subjects. The results revealed that [REDACTED] incurred [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] during [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] that originated from the [REDACTED] assigned to [REDACTED].

B. ANALYSIS OF [REDACTED]

13. All relevant information from the respective [REDACTED] summaries was entered into [REDACTED]. This data was then analyzed by sorting and cross-referencing the disputed [REDACTED] with the originating [REDACTED], which were then matched with the individual(s) assigned to those [REDACTED]. The disputed [REDACTED] produced by the [REDACTED] contained [REDACTED] implicating [REDACTED] in the misuse of their [REDACTED]. In addition, the analysis undertaken by OIOS extrapolated further [REDACTED] which were possibly misused by [REDACTED] - [REDACTED] refers.

14. OIOS calculated that the amount defrauded totalled [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. The affected [REDACTED] and a summary of these unauthorized [REDACTED] are depicted in [REDACTED].

C. WITNESS INTERVIEWS

(i) Interview with [REDACTED]

15. On [REDACTED], OIOS interviewed [REDACTED] who admitted utilizing the [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] to make [REDACTED] and claimed [REDACTED] obtained the code from [REDACTED].

(ii) Interview with [REDACTED]

16. On [REDACTED], OIOS interviewed [REDACTED] who stated that [REDACTED] received [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] on [REDACTED], which according to [REDACTED] would have required [REDACTED] to input a [REDACTED] to place the [REDACTED] as they are considered [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] told OIOS that [REDACTED] originated from [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

(iii) Interview with [REDACTED]

17. The OIOS [REDACTED] noted that many of the disputed [REDACTED] originated from [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED], OIOS interviewed [REDACTED] who confirmed that [REDACTED] saw a number of [REDACTED] including [REDACTED] utilizing [REDACTED] to make [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] whilst in the [REDACTED]

D. INTERVIEW WITH SUBJECT

18. On [REDACTED], OIOS interviewed [REDACTED], who confirmed that [REDACTED] was allocated to [REDACTED] in [REDACTED], when [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] of a [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] about [REDACTED], however [REDACTED] was unable to produce a receipt to verify the return [REDACTED]

19. [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] misused the [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] to make [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] explained that a [REDACTED] in its [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] previously [REDACTED]. Accordingly, after having [REDACTED] to other [REDACTED] was able to retrieve their [REDACTED] from the [REDACTED] in order to make [REDACTED] own [REDACTED]

20. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] could not recall the identities or the [REDACTED] whose [REDACTED] misused. [REDACTED] Further, [REDACTED] was unable to recall all of the [REDACTED] but acknowledged that [REDACTED] had made many [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

21. When asked about the distribution of the [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] only utilized the [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] own purposes and did not provide the [REDACTED] to any other person [REDACTED]

VII. FINDINGS

22. OIOS found that [REDACTED] fraudulently misused the [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] in order to make [REDACTED] for which [REDACTED] did not [REDACTED] totalling [REDACTED] in [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] in [REDACTED].

23. Although there was some evidence that [REDACTED] had provided [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] for their improper use, [REDACTED] denied this assertion. In the absence of corroborative evidence, OIOS is unable to make a conclusive finding in this regard.

[REDACTED]

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

24. Based on the evidence collected and the findings above, OIOS concludes that [REDACTED] failed to adhere to the standard of integrity expected of United Nations personnel and that [REDACTED] staff regulation 1.2(b) and relevant administrative issuances.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

25. In view of the preceding findings, OIOS makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: It is recommended that the [REDACTED] take appropriate action against [REDACTED].

Recommendation 2: It is recommended that the [REDACTED] finalize estimated losses and consider seeking financial recovery from [REDACTED] for the [REDACTED].

