

Confidential

TO: Ms. Eleanor Burns, Chief
A: Peackeeping Audit Service, Internal Audit Division,
Office of Internal Oversight Services

DATE: 8 October 2010

REFERENCE:

THROUGH:

S/C DE:

FROM: Mr. Anthony Banbury, Assistant Secretary-General
DE: Department of Field Support



SUBJECT: **Draft report on OIOS audit of the Integrated Operational Teams in**
OBJET: **DPKO and DFS – Assignment no AP2009/600/03**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft audit report on the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs). We take note that the OIOS audit draws heavily on the DPKO/DFS self-evaluations with a particular focus on some of the findings and recommendations. Our comments, set out below, on the draft report are divided into two sections, general and specific.

General comments

2. DPKO/DFS note with appreciation that the report examines at a good level of detail and takes as a starting point the processes and procedures applied in setting up and managing IOTs, and that it does not assume the need to review the entire concept/existence of the IOTs. It is regrettable, however, that the report does not fully reflect the measures already taken by DPKO and DFS to address the recommendations of the DPKO/DFS internal stock-taking and self-evaluation exercises. In assessing the effectiveness of IOTs and whether the level of support from Headquarters to the field or the performance of the Missions supported by IOTs has seen any operational improvements, the report might also usefully reflect that the IOT concept has been fully operationalized for less than three years. While the report refers to consultations and surveys with the field for the purposes of the audit, it does not reflect the views and feedback from the field on the adequacy and effectiveness of IOTs. Despite teething pains and the typical challenges confronted when introducing significant organizational change, Mission leadership have generally offered good feedback on the support offered by IOTs; as exemplified by the feedback received by the Heads of Political Affairs and Chiefs of Staff of DPKO-led missions during their July 2010 Conference. A copy of the relevant portion of the report of the Conference is attached as Annex A.

3. Additionally, we would suggest that the issue of “under-utilization of staff”, as

currently raised in the audit report does not tackle what may be the underlying reasons for the perception – or cause – of potential under-utilization. Despite having been presented evidence to the contrary, the report does not clearly acknowledge that, as a general rule, when a lower tempo operational requirement or potential under-utilization existed, prompt action was taken by the Office of Operations, in consultation with the specialist areas, to either redeploy specialist officers across IOTs or to temporarily deploy them to work on special projects in the specialist area or to serve in the field on temporary assignment to meet urgent operational requirements. We also note that OIOS by drawing on the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (DPET) 2008 and 2009 evaluations relied on surveys and information conducted six months prior to the release of each of those reports. We also draw your attention to the internal nature of the DPET evaluation and recommend that OIOS include a reference that the DPET evaluations of the IOTs were confidential documents. DPKO/DFS believes that the direct reference to DPET evaluations needs to be changed to “past DPKO/DFS internal review and analysis”.

4. We would also record the concern that OIOS has not broadly consulted specialist areas involved in the support of IOTs or in the technical management of specialist officers. These include, in particular, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) and its Police Division (PD), as well as several IOT team leaders.

5. We would also raise concern with regard to the repeated references to “parent units”, and would suggest replacing the term with a general reference to “specialist areas”. Additionally, the report does not sufficiently differentiate between the IOT police specialists resident in IOTs, in which respect the OIOS recommendations would be relevant, in contrast to the other rule of law specialists located in OROLSI who offer non-resident thematic support to IOTs. We further note that the report makes no recommendations in respect to the OROLSI, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section (DDR), Security Sector Reform Unit (SSR), Criminal Law and Justice Advisory Section (CLJAS) or DPET child protection, civil affairs, gender or HIV/AIDS thematic advisors. It would have been helpful if the report also had addressed the working relationship between OROLSI and DPET thematic advisors, which are not integrated within the IOT structure.

6. Additionally, we would suggest that the report refer to both Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police Contributing Countries (PCCs).

Specific comments

Executive Summary

7. Our comments relating to the Executive Summary are presented at the end of this section.

Introduction (paragraphs 1 - 4)

8. The formulation of Paragraph 3 is factually inaccurate. We would suggest a

reformulation along the following lines: "In July 2007, under Resolution 61/279 paragraph 35, the General Assembly approved the establishment of IOTs and 26 new posts (13 P-5 and 12 P-4, including a D-1 team leader post under the Office of Operations). In January 2008, by its resolution 62/232, paragraph 15, the General Assembly approved an additional 13 posts (4 P-5, 8 P-4 and 1 General Service) for the IOTs to support the backstopping of UNAMID, UNMIS and MINURCAT. In addition to the 36 new posts, the Office of Operations (OO), as of January 2008, also includes 68 Political Affairs Officers."¹

9. We would further recall that the wording of paragraph 15 of GA resolution 232 specifically states that the General Assembly "*decides to approve 13 posts ... for the Integrated Operational Team in order to provide backstopping for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, to be financed through the support account for peacekeeping operations*" [emphasis added]. There can thus be no doubt that the General Assembly has approved the IOT concept and the establishment of the IOT structure, albeit with the flexibility to assign resources to meet evolving operational requirements.

10. We would seek further clarification on the point made by the auditors in paragraph 4 that "there were eight IOTs covering 16 peacekeeping and political missions..." in terms of specifying the referenced time period. We note that, taking into account the transfer of the departmental lead of BINUB from DPKO to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) since 2010, there have effectively been nine IOTs covering 15 peacekeeping and 1 special political mission. We also note that not all IOTs are led at the D1 level; the Middle East, Europe and Latin America IOTs are led by P5-level IOT Leaders. We would suggest that Annex 2 be amended accordingly.

Footnote 1

11. The thematic advisor support delivered by OROLSI and DPET has always been factored into the development of the IOT structure as non-resident members of IOTs. We would suggest that they be referred to accordingly, rather than the auditor reference to them as "not included in the IOT membership".

Establishment of IOTs under Office of Operations (paragraphs 7 – 22)

12. In paragraph 8, we note that the second sentence "These posts are used exclusively by OO, rather than assigning the post incumbent to IOTs and parent units with the greater flexibility anticipated by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), as the work level determines." does not accurately reflect the understood intent of the recommendation of ACABQ in paragraphs 61 and 62 of its report A/61/937, as endorsed by the General Assembly, which state:

¹ This excludes the 1 ASG, 4 D2, 6 D1 IOT Team Leaders and 25 GS staff that are a core part of OO.

“61. The Advisory Committee sees merit in the use of teams to provide an integrated capacity for the day-to-day planning, direction and management of peacekeeping missions, a tool for coordinating action and response and a single entry point at Headquarters for Member States contributing military or police personnel, as well as United Nations and external partners. It also recognizes the Secretary-General’s prerogative in constituting the teams as he deems appropriate. Upon inquiry, the Committee was informed that the reason for proposing to embed the capacity in the regional divisions of the Office of Operations was the previous experience with ad hoc teams, in which capacity constraints had been encountered in obtaining support from the substantive divisions or offices.”

“62. The Advisory Committee notes that the terms of reference of the integrated operational teams are being developed. In this connection, the comprehensive report indicates that, besides experience in their specific areas, the specialists require sufficient seniority to interface at the appropriate levels in their respective functional responsibility centres to coordinate and oversee the critical tasks assigned to them. However, as indicated therein, they would not assume responsibility for the actual mobilization and deployment of resources or for the functional plans, policies, procedures and systems underpinning those resource management processes within their respective functional responsibility centres (see A/61/858, para. 50). The Committee is of the opinion that the effectiveness of the integrated approach would be enhanced by having the participants in the team located in their functional areas and assigned to participate in the teams as required. This should allow greater flexibility in responding to the evolving needs of peacekeeping operations and efficient use of resources. In this connection, the Advisory Committee recommends that the increase in the capacities be in the substantive offices that are proposed to be involved in the integrated operational teams (military, police, logistics, administrative support).”

The General Assembly in its resolution 61/279, in paragraph 35 *“Decides to approve one D1, thirteen P5 and twelve P4 posts for the integrated operational teams, to be located in their functional areas”*.

13. Based on its understanding, the Secretariat has acted within the prerogative of the Secretary-General to establish and change the composition and portfolio of integrated operational teams in response to the operational needs of the field. The Secretariat has always understood that the General Assembly’s endorsement of the IOT concept included the establishment of the IOT structure, per se, in whatever form or number required meeting operational needs; *as determined by the Secretary-General*. Additionally, the Secretariat has understood that the primary purpose for which the resources were approved by the General Assembly was as requested by the Secretary-General for the purpose of providing an integrated capacity for the day-to-day planning, direction and management of peacekeeping operations. Thus, first priority for the utilization of such specialist resources has remained the delivery of integrated support to the field. Where those resources were not/no longer required in an individual IOT, they were redeployed to meet other, more pressing needs in other IOTs, or temporarily assigned for service in the field or to projects in the specialist

areas; the latter two options done on the understanding that such resources would be recalled to an IOT, as required. While the DPKO/DFS internal review underscored the high value of IOT support during periods of high tempo mission activity, such finding does not negate and was not intended to negate the contribution of IOTs to stable missions. While adjustments can – and are – made (as explained below) – to utilize IOT resources where most needed, it cannot be categorically stated that steady state missions have no requirement for integrated strategic and operational guidance and support. A review of recent history, as epitomized in the tragic recent example of Haiti, demonstrates the value of a focused, well-informed integrated team in addressing sudden changes in the operational environment or role of a mission. The dedicated support of the Europe and Latin America Division (ELAD) IOT enabled DPKO and DFS to offer rapid and effective, and fully informed, support to MINUSTAH in its time of crisis.

14. Furthermore, the reference to the exclusive use by OO of the IOT posts rather than using them with greater flexibility between OO and the specialist areas is incorrect. As illustrations, IOT posts have been deployed to the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), Police Division (PD) and Department of Field Support (DFS) at different times to optimise their utilisation. Moreover, although the posts were budgeted effective July 2007, it was only in March/April 2008 that the majority of the posts were filled, due to difficulty in filling some of the profiles. The initial allotment for Military and Police officers was two military and two police officers for the Asia and Middle East Division (AMED), ELAD and Africa Division II (AD II), each. In October 2008, and in view of the varying demands of their missions, ELAD released its Military Liaison Officer at the P-4 level to OMA and the Police Liaison officer at P-4 level to the Police Division, on condition that these posts would revert back when the situation warranted. A similar arrangement was put in place with regard to the P4 DFS Support Officer in ELAD in November 2009. In AMED, the P4 Police Liaison Officer was transferred to the AD II IOT to address the increasing policing challenges faced by MONUC and the West African missions (UNMIL and ONUC); this position is now under recruitment. Since the positions were filled in 2008, Senior Administrative Officers (SAOs) and Senior Support Officers (SSOs) have frequently deployed on temporary duty assignments to Missions as the situation warranted. Such temporary deployments were made to UNAMA, UNMOGIP, UNIFIL, UNMIS, UNAMID, UNMIK and MINUSTAH. In the case of MINUSTAH, the temporary deployment of IOT members represented a critical contribution to the ability of the Mission to restore critical operations within the first week of the tragic earthquake. Additionally, IOT SAOs and SSOs have participated in DFS special projects, including the development of the DFS Global Field Support Strategy. We therefore cannot accept the OIOS finding that “these posts are used exclusively by OO”. We would suggest a reformulation to reflect the more flexible use of these resources.

Paragraph 12

15. We are concerned that, despite these efforts to temporarily assign or reassign members of the IOT to meet operational needs, OIOS concludes that the “*underutilization of staff in the IOTs*” persisted. While we acknowledge that the OIOS

conclusions were formed, in large part, through perceptions gained through contact with IOT specialists, we would wish to delve more deeply into the underlying cause(s) of these perceptions against the efforts made by the Department to address related concerns when raised through the internal stock-taking and self-evaluation. Such efforts recognized the need to more clearly delineate and develop an understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of the IOTs and the specialist areas as well as the terms of reference for the Director of Regional Divisions, IOT Leaders and IOT members in the Office of Operations. While the introduction of a matrix management structure poses significant challenges in a mature organization, it is particularly challenging in the context of introducing the DPKO/DFS IOT concept concurrently with the strengthening of all of the specialist areas represented in the IOTs. That it should take time and considerable effort to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities and to build understanding and support for the organizational change being introduced is not surprising. The DPKO/DFS Senior Management has devoted considerable time and effort to addressing these challenges, including addressing pockets of organizational resistance and ensuring that the staff selected for IOTs possess the required skills and competences and that they are appropriately empowered to perform their duties fully. The DPKO/DFS Senior Management acknowledged these challenges, and took the necessary steps to set down clear principles governing work methods and the delineation of roles and responsibilities of IOTs and specialist areas with the intent to empower the Office of Operations to establish and manage the IOTs in accordance with its role set out in Section 6 of the ST/SGB/2010/1. The Departments would, therefore, request that OIOS amend its findings to reflect their efforts to address precisely the issues raised by the auditors regarding the utilization of resources, including the challenges raised and lessons learned through its internal stock-taking and self-evaluation. The Departments will renew efforts to address perceptions of and real under-utilization of specialist resources, and address the root cause of such issues; including to the extent that they relate to insufficient empowerment and experience/competences of IOT specialist officers.

Page 4 (ii)

16. We would suggest replacing "*incompetent*" with, "have a lack of or insufficient relevant understanding and experience" to reflect more accurately the Departments' experience in the recruitment of IOT specialists.

Paragraph 14

17. We are unclear as to the intent and meaning of this paragraph. Should OIOS mean to say that the Departments should have taken action to replace inexperienced members of the IOTs with more experienced staff, we would reiterate the difficulty encountered in recruiting staff with the full range of the requisite experience. We note that, despite the circulation (and, in some cases, recirculation) of vacancy announcements to attract internal and external candidates, it was not possible to identify sufficiently experienced and/or well-rounded candidates to meet in full the new IOT specialist model. Such was the case not only for the senior military and police specialist officers at the P-4 and P-5 level, who required pre-IOT deployment

training in the Office of Military Affairs and Police Division, respectively, but also for the SAO positions, which required a well-rounded experience in various administrative areas along with field and headquarters experience. In the case of the latter, the contractual arrangements in place in field missions were, as clearly recognized by the General Assembly in adopting its resolution 63/250 to streamline and unify contractual arrangements for all Secretariat staff, an impediment to the retention and development of staff in the field and the mobility of staff between headquarters and field missions. Understandably therefore, the pool of candidates from which to select senior, multi-skilled and experienced staff was severely limited and adjustments had to be made in selecting and balancing SAO profiles. These issues should be resolved in the longer-term, now that the Organization has introduced one series of contractual arrangements and has introduced a uniform approach to the recruitment, selection and management of staff across the Secretariat.

Paragraph 15

18. We concur with the finding that OMA and PD specialist officers should have prior experience in their specialist areas, or at least in Headquarters, before being placed in the IOT. We also agree with the recommendation reflected in paragraph 22 that, when possible, the military and police IOT specialists should be selected from the ranks of OMA and PD, once they have one year of experience. DPKO and DFS had indeed learned this lesson through the internal stock-taking and self-evaluation exercises and have taken measures to address the challenge through the amendment of the existing policy to allow the possibility of serving seconded uniform personnel to apply for IOT positions at the higher level and to have their appointments extended for that purpose beyond the normal two/three-year secondment. We would emphasize the particular challenges confronted in the initial recruitment of military and police seconded personnel; in particular the need to identify sufficient numbers of qualified and suitably experienced external candidates, as purely internal selection would have negatively impacted the work of OMA and PD. We would further note the additional factor of the limited duration of their secondment to the United Nations Secretariat, along with the need for the releasing member state to agree to a change of function/deployment of a serving officer. Additionally, we would highlight that, while filling the IOT military and police positions was a particular challenge in the initial stage, the normal yearly one-third rotation of military and police seconded officers will continue to pose some challenges to the development and retention of qualified officers with the requisite skill and UN field and Headquarters experience.

Paragraph 16

19. DPKO and DFS agree with these findings and undertake to ensure formal and regular interaction between functional units and IOT staff. We also welcome the suggestion to rotate staff between the specialist areas and IOTs, and would envisage doing so after a two-to-three year period in an IOT, as a means of ensuring that staff sustain their skill and knowledge base and to offer appropriate career development opportunities. We would caution, however, that such rotations would not be practical or possible in the case of uniformed military and police seconded personnel, given the

limitations on the duration of their secondment to the United Nations.

Paragraph 19

20. Please see our comments in paragraphs 3 and 15, particularly in connection with periods of lower tempo.

Recommendation in paragraph 21

21. We would suggest that the "strategy" to address the "underutilization of IOT staff" should first assess the number and distribution of Senior Administrative, Support, Military Liaison and Police Liaison officers taking into account the tempo and number of Missions. As the positions were expressly approved for IOTs (see paras. 12-15 above), we are also mindful that the General Assembly would have to be informed if any of these posts were no longer required for the IOTs, or if they were to be reassigned or redeployed to other areas for other than temporary assignments. We therefore propose the following reformulation of this recommendation along the following lines: *DPKO, in consultation with DFS, should develop a strategy to ensure greater flexibility and to prioritise the use of resources, within IOTs, between IOTs, between IOTs and the Missions and between IOTs and the specialist area, in periods of lower tempo to address underutilization of staff. This can be done by assigning staff temporarily to projects or tasks in the specialist area.*

Figure 1 (page 7)

22. The diagram on page 7 is misleading regarding the lead role of the IOTs *vis-à-vis* the specialist offices. The diagram should make it very clear that it pertains only to IOTs and the Missions they support and, even then, the labelling of the arrows (that point to and from OO and are labelled "lead" and "advice") is not entirely accurate. The report should give more information about the current arrangement. As reflected in the delineation of roles and responsibilities in the division of labour matrix, IOTs have responsibility for "cross-cutting, mission-specific" issues. Specialist areas have the lead role for policies in their specific areas of responsibility that affect a given mission or cut across missions. As an illustration, OROLSI, would lead in dealing with any subject or policy falling under OROLSI's areas of responsibility (i.e., anything pertaining to rule of law and security institutions); whether UN system-wide or for a particular Mission. However, when such an issue raises political, support, military or other dimensions of a mission's work, the IOT would be responsible to ensure that the mission would receive integrated advice that is coordinated with OROLSI and other concerned specialist areas. While the IOT would hold responsibility for ensuring integrated backstopping for mission-specific, cross-cutting issues, the IOT is required to consult with the concerned specialist areas and ensure that their views are taken into account. In the event that a specialist area offers guidance to a mission on an area falling within its purview, the specialist area is similarly required to provide such guidance in coordination (i.e. agreement) with the IOT. These working methods and the principals that underpin them are set out in the Division of Labour table. The departments acknowledge teething pains in the

application of the principals and the table, but would expect that these challenges would be viewed within the context of the introduction of significant organizational structural, the simultaneous strengthening of the special areas, and the introduction of significant numbers of staff to new functions over the past, nearly three year period.

Paragraph 25

23. While we take note that "*consultation and cooperation between OO/IOTs and the parent units and thematic advisors of OROLSI were not effective*", it would seem that the report does not go far enough in exploring the root causes of the noted challenges or the coordination mechanisms between the IOTs and the non-resident OROLSI functional areas and the DPET thematic advisers. In this regard, we draw attention to the fact that many of the OROLSI functional areas and DPET thematic advisers have insufficient capacity to offer day-to-day support to the IOTs in the areas of justice, corrections, SSR, DDR, civil affairs, gender and HIV/AIDS. We therefore propose that the recommendation to address this issue in paragraph 28 be reformulated so that *DPKO, in coordination with DFS, should utilize the IOT as the forum for the development of DPKO-DFS positions and strategies on Mission-specific issues that would be presented in coordinating with the wider UN system through the Integrated Mission Task Force.*

Paragraphs 29 - 33

24. It is noteworthy that ST/SGB/2010/1 for DPKO - which provides in section 6, the Secretary-General's understanding of the purpose, functions and structure of the IOTs - was issued only in February 2010, thus leaving open until that time the possibility of different interpretations of the roles and responsibilities of IOTs. With the issuance of the ST/SGB, there can no longer be any doubt as to the agreed understanding within the Secretariat on the functions and structure of the IOTs; particularly as the ST/SGB was reviewed and endorsed by the Department of Field Support, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Management, before submission to the Secretary-General for his final review and approval and its issuance.

25. We would suggest that paragraphs 30 and 31 be merged, since there is a sentence that is nearly identical in both paragraphs.

26. While paragraphs 29 to 33 raise central issues regarding the role and responsibility of the IOTs, we would have welcomed a clear recommendation on how the Division of Labour table could be improved; including from the perspective of managing complex organizational change and a shift in the paradigm to matrix management.

Recommendation in paragraph 33

27. We would suggest some changes, so that the recommendation reads as follow: "*DPKO in consultation with DFS should: (1) ensure that the functions of the IOTs*

reflected in ST/SGB/2011/1 are clearly understood and shared by IOT members, users and other stakeholders; (2) keep under review the Division of Labour Table to clarify the responsibilities between OO/IOTs and specialist units; and (3) ensure adherence to assigned responsibilities defined in the Division of Labour Table."

Recommendation in paragraph 36

28. We would suggest that the recommendation in paragraph 36 be modified so that it also indicates: *"There should be a systematic, transparent method in place to ensure that, as the primary 'clients' of IOTs, and missions are able to provide their feedback on the work of IOTs, so that they can adjust/improve, as needed."*

Paragraphs 37 - 44

29. DPKO and DFS endorse many of the findings in the section of the report dealing with IOT responsibilities for planning, including the recommendation in paragraph 41, which states that DPKO should ensure that the Mission Concepts combine all components plans and are adequately developed for all missions and the practice of substituting the Mission Concepts with the Secretary General's report to the Security Council should be discontinued. At the same time, it should be noted that the development of the Mission Concept is not entirely the responsibility of the IOT. Although the IMPP guidelines on "the Role of the Headquarters" and the DPKO/DFS Division of Labour Matrix state that the IOT is responsible for the development of the Mission Concept, this responsibility is primarily aimed at new missions. When Missions are in a steady state, they hold the primary responsibility to develop their Mission Concept, with the support of the IOTs, coupled with the relatively new introduction of the Mission Concept and the fact that no mission implementation plans/concepts have been uniformly developed across missions, DPKO and DFS will ensure that the clear delineation of responsibility in the development of the Mission Concepts will be reflected in new guidance on the Mission Concept currently under development. This guidance is expected to be completed by the 31 December 2010.

Recommendations in paragraphs 48 and 50

30. These two recommendations should also be modified to indicate that "DPKO and DFS should..."

Recommendation in paragraph 49

31. We would suggest modifications to the recommendation so that it would read as follows: *"DPKO should ensure, without further delay, that the Office of Operations develops guidelines covering the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) and the IOT collaboration platforms/sites in full consultation with team leaders and directors."*

Paragraph 50

32. We would suggest a modification to the recommendation, such that as part of

the IOT specialist officer training programmes could include participation in the specialist area's yearly senior management global conferences/workshops to ensure IOT staff are kept abreast of evolving policies and strategies of their specialist areas and key developments in the field.

Executive Summary

Paragraph 2

33. Reference to the exclusive use by OO of the IOT posts rather than using them with greater flexibility between OO and the parent units is factually incorrect. Please refer to paragraphs 12 to 15 above. With regard to the lack of flexibility of the IOT structure (*last sentence of the second paragraph of the Executive Summary*), we have since the establishment of the IOTs created and adjusted IOTs to form MINURCAT, UNAMA and the Sudan (North/South and Darfur).

Bullet 1

34. The IOT staff were underutilised when missions were operating at a low tempo increasing the risk of ineffective use of resources. We would propose a reformulation of this bullet so that it would read as follows: *“Greater flexibility is needed in the use of resources within IOTs, between IOTs, and between IOTs and specialist units and field missions, in periods of lower tempo to ensure the optimal utilization of staffing resources and avoid any real, or perceived, under-utilization of such resources. This can be done by assigning staff temporarily to projects or tasks in the specialist unit or to the field missions led, directed and supported by DPKO and DFS.”*

Bullet 2

35. Some military and police officers recruited for the IOTs were inexperienced in working in the United Nations, and as a result were returned to their parent organization to gain sufficient experience, reducing the availability of this expertise to IOTs. We would suggest a rephrasing of this observation to indicate that some officers *“were inexperienced in working in UN Headquarters and, as a result, were initially deployed to the Office of Military Affairs or Police Division, as appropriate, for training in OMA/PD policies and practices so that they might gain the required level of familiarization with headquarters processes in their areas of responsibility”*.

Bullet 3

36. The relationship between IOT members and their specialist areas was weak particularly in the area of support functions increasing the risk of IOT members not being kept up-to-date on current practices and procedures and not being fully informed of their parent unit's strategies. If a weak relationship continues, the effectiveness of IOTs, due to the lack of up-to-date knowledge of practices in their parent units may diminish over time. Please refer to our comments in paragraphs 24 and 27.

Bullet 4

37. The roles and responsibilities of IOTs and parent units were not sufficiently delineated leading to increased risks of unclear accountability and duplication of effort. There were no mechanisms to ensure adherence with the comprehensive Division of Labour Table delineating the roles and responsibilities of IOTs and parent units. Please refer to our comments in paragraph 27.

Bullet 5

38. Most missions did not have their Mission Concepts that combine all components' plans. Also, the monitoring of missions' Support Plans by OO/IOTs was inadequate which may reduce the effectiveness of integrated strategic planning by OO/IOTs. Please refer to our comments in paragraph 29.

Bullet 6

39. There was no system established to monitor and evaluate how effective each IOT carries out its responsibilities in accordance with its terms of reference including regular feedback from missions for the quality of the support provided by IOTs. Please refer to our comments in paragraph 28.

Bullet 7

40. Most of the recommendations made by the self-evaluations carried out by DPKO still need to be addressed. We suggest the text be revised to read "*Some of the recommendations made by the self-evaluation carried out by DPKO still need to be addressed.*"

41. We remain available to provide any further information which may be required.

cc: Mr. Le Roy
Ms. Malcorra

**Report of the meeting of the Heads of Political Affairs Components and
Mission Chiefs of Staff - 6-8 July 2010 - New York**

Organization, format and expectations

1. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Office of Operations, in cooperation with the Integrated Training Service (ITS) and the Office of the Chief of Staff, DPKO/DFS, held the first meeting of the Heads of Political Affairs Components (HPACs) and the Mission Chiefs of Staff (CoS) from missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in New York, between 6-9 July. The meeting aimed to establish a triangular dialogue between HPACs and CoSs and HQ interlocutors, in order to: (1) clarify the role and responsibilities of CoS and HPACs and vis-à-vis each other, other mission components and HQ; (2) identify areas where further HQ support would be required to more successfully execute the functions of CoS and HPACs; and, (3) raise awareness of some of the latest developments and new priorities at the HQ of importance to CoS/HPACs.

2. Ten Heads of Political Affairs Components/Senior Political Advisers and eleven Mission Chiefs of Staff from thirteen field presences directed by DPKO gathered in New York to participate in the first meeting (annex 1 – List of participants). As reflected in the attached programme (annex 2), the participants were briefed on contemporary peacekeeping challenges; Integrated Operational Teams; challenges and trends in field support, such as the human resources reform; current thinking on the peacekeeping-peace building nexus, and from ASGs Titov, Obiakor and Banbury on operational issues between the HQ (DPKO and DFS) and the missions. The HPACs and CoSs also met in separate break-out groups to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities, to explore the best use of integration tools and to discuss the challenges/opportunities for interaction with national and regional authorities. The participants identified recommendations for future steps which they themselves and the Office of Operations should take, in close consultation with relevant DPKO/DFS offices, to enhance mission management and mandate implementation.

3. Participants expressed interest in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of the HPACs and CoSs, while also leaving room for flexibility to reflect mission specificities and the views of the SRSG. In addition, they were interested in better understanding/utilizing the support-related functions to facilitate and ensure mandate implementation.

Integrated Operational Teams

4. On the whole, participants provided positive feedback on the IOT concept and its implementation. Both HPACs and CoSs welcomed the broad expertise of IOTs and valued the regular interaction with the IOT Team Leader. They agreed that the IOT leaders should be their primary interlocutors at Headquarters. While a few participants admitted that mission components sometimes continued to bypass IOTs to seek direct feedback from high level contacts within the DPKO/DFS offices, the importance of ensuring a degree of consistency and discipline to make the IOTs work was recognised. Attention was drawn to the ST/SGB/2010/1 and ST/SGB/2010/2 on the functions of DPKO and DFS that had been issued in February 2010 in clarifying some of the roles and responsibilities. Participants seemed to generally welcome the reinvigorated role of the Office of Operations as the integrator at HQ *vis à vis* peacekeeping missions.

RESPONSE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Assignment No. AP2009/600/03 – Audit of the Integrated Operational Teams in DPKO and DFS

Para. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	Accepted (Yes/No)	Implementation date	Client Comments
21	DPKO, in consultation with DFS, should develop a strategy to address the underutilization of Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) staff, insufficient expert knowledge and inadequate relationship of IOT staff with their parent units, in order to mitigate the risks associated with the establishment of the present structural arrangement of the IOTs in the Office of Operations	Governance	High	Yes	4 th Qtr. 2010	Refer to our comments in paragraph 21.
22	DPKO should fill the military liaison and police liaison officers' posts for the Integrated Operational Teams with individuals who have at least one year experience at the Office of Military Affairs and the Police Division and revise their terms of references accordingly.	Human resources	High	Yes	4 th Qtr. 2010	DPKO will implement the recommendation during the next round of filling the military and police liaison officer posts for the Integrated Operational Teams.
26	DPKO should further clarify the management responsibilities and authorities of the Office of Operations (OO) to mitigate the risks of responsibility gaps and inadequate ownership of OO in managing the Integrated Operational Teams.	Governance	High	Yes	Implemented	The Office of Operations' management responsibilities <i>vis à vis</i> the IOTs were clearly articulated in ST/SGB/2010/1 on the functions and roles and responsibilities of DPKO issued in February 2010, following the approval of the Secretary-General.
27	DPKO, in coordination with DFS, should ensure that the leadership role of the Office of Operations is reflected in: (a) the compacts of senior managers and the Performance Appraisal System (ePAS) of the managers of DPKO and DFS units involved in Integrated Operational Teams; and (b) DPKO's Authority,	Governance	High	Yes	a. Implemented b. 4 th Qtr. 2011	a. The recommendation has been implemented. Reference is made to the compacts of the USGs, DPKO/DFS b. The implementation of the recommendation is in progress. The first phase of the DPKO/DFS review of the command and control policy in

Para. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	Accepted (Yes/No)	Implementation date	Client Comments
	Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations policy.					peacekeeping operations is underway. The revision of DPKO's directive and policy on command and control is expected to be completed by the fourth quarter of 2011.
28	DPKO, in coordination with DFS, should develop an effective feedback mechanism for the Office of Operations and other DPKO and DFS units to improve consultation and coordination regarding Integrated Operational Teams.	Governance	High	Yes	4 th Qtr. 2010	Refer to our comments in paragraph 23.
33	DPKO, in consultation with DFS, should: (1) ensure that the functions of the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) are clearly understood and shared by IOT members, users and other stakeholders; and (2) review the Division of Labor Table to clarify the responsibilities between OO/IOTs and parent units.	Governance	High	Yes	4 th Qtr. 2010	Refer to our comments in paragraph 27.
36	DPKO should institute a systematic mechanism to monitor and evaluate how effectively each Integrated Operational Team (IOT) carries out its responsibilities in accordance with its terms of references. This should include receiving regular feedback from the missions for the quality of the support provided by IOTs.	Governance	High	Yes	3rd Qtr. 2011	Refer to our comments in paragraph 28.
41	DPKO should ensure that the Mission Concepts combine all components plans and are adequately developed for all missions. The practice of substituting the Mission Concepts with the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council should be discontinued.	Operational	High	Yes	1 st Qtr. 2011	The guidance on Mission Concepts is under development and is expected to be completed by December 2010. The roll out to and implementation by missions is expected to be completed by March 2011.

Para. no.	Recommendation	Risk category	Risk rating	Accepted (Yes/No)	Implementation date	Client Comments
42	DFS should ensure that the Support Plans of missions are periodically revised to be kept up-to-date.	Operational	High	Yes	Implemented	LSD receives periodic updates from missions on their support plans. This is especially when there is a significant change in the activities of the missions, such as expansion, drawdown, and elections. LSD vets the updates in consultation with other offices and provides guidance to the missions to revise and keep the plans up-to-date.
43	DPKO, in consultation with DFS, should ensure that Integrated Operational Teams' leaders utilize its support specialists to monitor the Support Plans of missions under their purview to ensure they are adequate in fulfilling missions' mandates and integrating the work of DPKO and DFS.	Operational	High	Yes	Implemented	As earlier stated the terms of reference of IOT support specialist officers include the requirement to monitor "mission support plans". These terms of reference form the basis of the ePAS in appraising the performance of these officers.
44	DPKO should ensure that the integration responsibility of Integrated Operational Teams' leaders is adequately reflected in their Performance Appraisal System (ePAS).	Governance	High	Yes	Implemented	The terms of reference of IOT team leaders include the scope of their integration responsibility. These terms of reference form the basis of the ePAS in appraising the performance of IOT team leaders.
48	DPKO should follow up on the status of implementation of recommendations of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division's evaluation and ensure their full implementation.	Governance	High	Yes	4 Qtr. 2010	The implementation of the remaining recommendations of DPETs evaluation is in progress.
49	DPKO should ensure, without further delay, that the standard operating procedures of the Office of Operations covering the functioning of Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) and the IOTs collaboration website are developed in full consultation with team leaders and	Operational	High	Yes	1 Qtr. 2011	Refer to our comments in paragraph 31.

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50	<p>directors.</p> <p>DPKO should ensure that the training programmes for Integrated Operational Team members are provided to all members taking into consideration members' high turn-over.</p>	Human resources	High	Yes	Full implementation is dependent on the provision of resources	Refer to our comments in paragraph 32.