



INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

INSPECTION REPORT

Inspection of Programme Level Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS):

“While DSS contains the building blocks of an M&E system, with no evaluation unit, no resources devoted, and only a draft evaluation policy, DSS has yet to institutionalize the evaluation function”

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INSPECTION AND EVALUATION DIVISION

FUNCTION *“The Office shall evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation of the programmes and legislative mandates of the Organisation. It shall conduct programme evaluations with the purpose of establishing analytical and critical evaluations of the implementation of programmes and legislative mandates, examining whether changes therein require review of the methods of delivery, the continued relevance of administrative procedures and whether the activities correspond to the mandates as they may be reflected in the approved budgets and the medium-term plan of the Organisation;” (General Assembly [Resolution 48/218 B](#)).*

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**Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services
on the Inspection of Programme Level Monitoring and Evaluation
of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security(DSS):**

“While DSS contains the building blocks of an M&E system, with no Evaluation unit, no resources devoted and only a draft evaluation policy, DSS has yet to institutionalize the evaluation function”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The [Office of Internal Oversight Services \(OIOS\)](#) undertakes inspections of programme-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in all United Nations Secretariat programmes. This report relates to the inspection of the [United Nations Department of Safety and Security \(DSS\)](#), conducted between July and October 2010. This inspection aims to determine the accuracy and adequacy of DSS data presented in the [Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System \(IMDIS\)](#) for 2008-2009 and to assess DSS’s capacity for M&E.

In relation to the accuracy and adequacy of 2008-2009 reporting in IMDIS, OIOS could verify only one-third of DSS IMDIS outputs using other information. A majority of IMDIS outputs had no external information that would allow them to be verified. With respect to the adequacy of the reporting framework, 85 per cent of DSS IMDIS results appeared to adequately capture the concept of interest to measure, suggesting that reporting on achievement of results during the biennium 2008-2009 was mostly comprehensive and sufficient.

In relation to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity, although DSS’s institutional framework contained the building blocks of an M&E system, the system was not operational. In particular,

- A draft Evaluation Policy existed that aspired to meet [United Nations Evaluation Group \(UNEG\)](#) norms and standards and provided an explanation of the role of evaluation in DSS. However, governing bodies had not yet approved this policy.
- DSS’s Evaluation Plan/Form12 for the biennium 2008-2009 was completed. However, management was unaware of its submission and the self-evaluation resources cited in it refer to DSS operational activities such as compliance missions to the field and headquarters (HQ), rather than actual self-evaluation activities.
- DSS dedicated insufficient budget resources to the practice of M&E.
- M&E roles and responsibilities for management were not clearly defined;
- DSS management appeared to find IMDIS irrelevant in the context of their monitoring and evaluation activities as IMDIS did not reflect their work. While indeed there existed systemic secretariat issues with the sequencing of the budget cycle and the lack of IMDIS user friendliness, these negative views of IMDIS also

stemmed from a lack of training, the perceived irrelevance of performance indicators and workplans, and a lack of linkages between HQ and regional and field offices. Both staff and management perceived IMDIS as cumbersome and highly inflexible. As a trickle down effect, staff lacked awareness of the link between Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) tools and departmental goals.

- DSS's capacity for self-evaluation was considerable within Field Support Services and DHSSS. However, the Compliance, Evaluation, and Monitoring Unit's work did not fully correspond to the definition of evaluation.
- With respect to monitoring and data collection, the department had fairly sophisticated monitoring tools such as monthly and bi-monthly newsletters, annual reports and activity monitoring databases. Also, focal points had created innovative data collection tools. However, these efforts had not been streamlined and shared throughout the department. A more organized and targeted effort is needed for DSS to support its M&E capacity and to improve programme performance.
- There was partial evidence that DSS had addressed gender mainstreaming within the context of M&E.

Recommendations:

1. DSS must improve its recordkeeping of officially submitted evaluation plans, the IMDIS output entries used to calculate the accuracy score, and other documents.
2. To formalize its organizational Evaluation Policy, DSS should submit it to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for review and approval.
3. To meet UNEG norms on evaluation resource benchmarks, DSS should reassess core resources to determine the adequate level of resources to be allocated to M&E.
4. To create its evaluation plan, DSS should carry out an assessment of evaluation and self-evaluation needs and requirements based on criteria derived from the UNEG norms and standards and the PPBME.
5. To improve awareness about the importance of M&E, DSS management and staff should undergo training on the role of the M&E and the use of M&E tools.
6. To allocate roles and responsibilities in DSS's M&E system, DSS should more explicitly articulate the M&E tasks and responsibilities of senior managers.
7. To streamline and improve self-evaluation techniques, DSS should undertake a department-wide assessment of its self-evaluation practices at the divisional level and share this information with senior managers.
8. To assure that evaluation ultimately enhances learning and strengthens performance, DSS management should review and consider modifying performance indicators and

workplans to assure that they reflect DSS's actual work.

9. To address the relevance of gender mainstreaming for M&E systems in DSS as well as to highlight its significance as a cross-cutting issue, DSS's evaluation policy should incorporate UNEG guidelines for gender mainstreaming in M&E (when available). Also, DSS should ensure gender mainstreaming is integrated as part of DSS culture so that staff perceive it as a priority.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
CEMU	Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit
CISMU	Critical Incident Stress Management Unit
CPC	Committee for Programme Coordination
DM	Department of Management
DHSSS	Division of Headquarters of Security and Safety Services (New York)
DRO	Division of Regional Operations
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
EA	Expected Accomplishment
ECNA	Assessment of Evaluation Capacities and Needs in the United Nations Secretariat
EDM	Executive Direction and Management
ePAS	Electronic Performance Appraisal System
FSS	Field Support Service
HQ	Headquarters
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security Management Network
IED	Inspection and Evaluation Division
IMDIS	Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System
IoA	Indicator(s) of Achievement
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standards
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management

OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OPPBA	Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts
OUSG	Office of the Under-Secretary-General
PME	Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation Section
PPBME	Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation
PPR	Programme Performance Report
RB	Regular Budget
RBB	Results-based Budgeting
RBM	Results-based Management
SG	Secretary-General
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
USG	Under-Secretary-General
XB	Extrabudgetary

I. Introduction

1. The [Office of Internal Oversight Services \(OIOS\)](#) undertakes inspections of programme-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in the context of programme performance of United Nations Secretariat programmes. Initiated in 2009, these inspections will eventually be conducted on all programmes in the Secretariat. This is a report of the inspection of the [United Nations Department of Safety and Security \(DSS\)](#), which was undertaken during the period July-October 2010. DSS was chosen to be inspected at this time based on an OIOS risk assessment and the priorities determined by the [Under-Secretary-General of OIOS](#).
2. The objectives of the inspection are twofold:
 - a. To determine the accuracy and adequacy of the data presented in IMDIS (Integrated Monitoring and Documentation Information System) for the 2008-2009 biennium Programme Performance Report (PPR);¹ and
 - b. To assess DSS's capacity for M&E, examining specifically the availability of resources, the existence of self-evaluation techniques, the inclusion of gender-mainstreaming at the M&E level, and the challenges to the application of M&E in DSS.

II. Background and Context

3. DSS's M&E function was examined in relation to the provisions for monitoring and evaluation contained in the Secretary-General's bulletin Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (PPBME),² the Standards for Evaluation in the UN System, and the Norms for Evaluation in the UN System as established by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG).³ The PPBME mandates the conduct of evaluation in the Secretariat decision-making cycle, but it does not define in detail the concept, use and roles of individual programmes in the planning and conduct of evaluation - these are better defined by UNEG.⁴
4. The PPR is an analytical document prepared at the end of each biennium and represents an instrument by which the General Assembly assesses the performance of the Organization in implementing its work programme and reporting progress toward achievement of mandates. The PPR for 2008-2009 was submitted to the Committee for Programme Coordination (CPC) and General Assembly at its Sixty-fifth Session (A/65/70).

¹ *Programme Performance Report of the United Nations for the biennium 2008-2009*, 1 April 2010 ([A/65/70](#)).

² *Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (PPBME)* Articles VI and VII. ([ST/SGB/2000/8](#)).

³ *Standards for Evaluation in the UN System and Norms for Evaluation in the UN System*. United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN system, http://uneval.org/Normsandstandards/index.jsp?doc_cat_source_id=4.

⁴ DSS applied to join UNEG on Tuesday, March 16, 2010 as per OIOS email records.

5. Pursuant to General Assembly [Resolution 61/245](#) and the acknowledgement of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget Questions (ACABQ), the General Assembly reaffirmed the responsibilities of programme managers in preparing the PPR. As a result, programme-monitoring functions, including the task of preparing the PPR based on the inputs provided from all programmes, were reassigned from OIOS to the Department of Management (DM). DM prepared an interim report of the Organization's programme performance for a 12-month period for the first time in 2009. This inspection only examines DSS's data from IMDIS and the 2008-2009 PPR.

6. As per the PPBME, M&E is a mandated responsibility for all Secretariat programmes.⁵ UNEG Norm 1.2 characterizes an evaluation as:

*an assessment, as systematic and impartial as possible, of an activity, project, programme, strategy, policy, topic, theme, sector, operational area, institutional performance, etc. It focuses on expected and achieved accomplishments, examining the results chain, processes, contextual factors and causality, in order to understand achievements or the lack thereof. It aims at determining the relevance, impact, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the interventions and contributions of the organizations of the UN system. An evaluation should provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful, enabling the timely incorporation of findings, recommendations and lessons into the decision-making processes of the organizations of the UN system and its members.*⁶

7. IMDIS is a web-based information service designed to facilitate continuous and comprehensive programme implementation monitoring by staff at different levels within the organization.⁷ While IMDIS assists Secretariat programmes to report on the delivery of outputs as scheduled in the approved programme budget, there are limited tools available to assist programmes with assessing their M&E capacity. OIOS's report from 2006, *Assessment of evaluation capacities and needs in the United Nations Secretariat* (ECNA),⁸ found a pattern that indicated a lack of M&E capacity at the Secretariat at all levels. The report highlighted the gap between programmes with functioning evaluation units and clear evaluation policies that fundamentally adhere to the UNEG norms and standards and those lacking these basic building blocks. Programme-level M&E inspections thus provide a

⁵ PPBME, [ST/SGB/2000/8](#), Article VII; Regulation 7.2: *All activities programmed shall be evaluated over a fixed time period. An evaluation programme as well as a timetable for intergovernmental review of evaluation studies shall be proposed by the Secretary-General and approved by the General Assembly at the same time as the proposed medium term plan (b) The evaluation system shall include periodic self-evaluation of activities directed at time limited objectives and continuing functions. Programme managers shall, in collaboration with their staff, undertake self-evaluation of all subprogrammes under their responsibility. Specifically: (i) The timing, scope and other characteristics of a self-evaluation study shall be determined by the nature and characteristics of the activities programmed and other relevant factors; (ii) Methodological support shall be provided by the Central Evaluation Unit in connection with the preparation of self-evaluation reports; (iii) Evaluation plans, which are required for each new and ongoing subprogramme, shall be prepared by programme manager.*

⁶ *Norms for Evaluation in the UN System*. United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), Norms and Standards for Evaluation in the UN system, http://uneval.org/normsandstandards/index.jsp?doc_cat_source_id=4.

⁷ IMDIS User's Guide version 2.6, December 2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/mecd_manual/manual.pdf.

⁸ *Assessment of evaluation capacities and needs in the United Nations Secretariat* ([IED-2006-006](#)).

more detailed analysis of each individual programme's M&E capacity, as well as the accuracy and adequacy of data reported to IMDIS. The report concludes that while evaluation was playing a positive role in improving performance in 2009, overall evaluation capacity of the Secretariat continues to be inadequate.⁹

8. As a background to the DSS inspection, it is important to draw attention to an OIOS report entitled *Review of results-based management at the United Nations (A/63/268)* which explains how "reporting on results does not feed into the budgeting calendar." The results-based budgeting process is sequenced with evaluation occurring after budget allocations have been made. The report states that "although aspirational results are utilized to justify approval of budgets, the actual attainment or non-attainment of results is of no discernable consequence to subsequent resource allocation or other decision-making." The report recommends that the programmatic results framework should be integrated within the first phase of the enterprise resource planning strategy of the Organization. The report also notes that "(a)n inherent constraint of results-based management is that a formalistic approach to codifying how to achieve outcomes can stifle the innovation and flexibility required to achieve those outcomes." This relates to the context of interviews carried out with staff at DSS, as the formalistic approach has led to the creation of many administrative and political hurdles when making changes to the strategic framework. The report cautions that "(i)f results actually produced do not guide General Assembly decision-making and if simultaneously there is no relaxation of process controls, results-based management will continue to be an administrative chore of no real utility." Lastly, the report underlines the fact that the PPBME "blurred the distinction between the separate roles of evaluation as opposed to monitoring and of independent evaluation as opposed to self-evaluation" which may lead to confusion in the context of designing proper self-evaluation and independent evaluation tools.

9. The United Nations General Assembly in its [resolution 59/276](#), part XI on 23rd December 2004, approved the establishment of Department of Safety and Security (DSS). Established in January 2005, DSS provides policy guidance and facilitates security management for all UN operations worldwide. While host governments have the primary responsibility for the security and protection of UN staff members, their eligible dependants, their property, and the agency's property, DSS's role is to support the respective host governments' efforts in addressing security challenges faced by the UN System. To achieve this, DSS deploys security advisors to assist Designated Officials in the performance of their duties. The UN Resident Coordinator is the Designated Official for Security, and as such has the overall responsibility for the safety and security of UN staff members and their eligible dependents. The Designated Official reports to the Secretary General via the Under Secretary for Safety and Security.

10. Guided by United Nations General Assembly resolution 59/276, Part XI, DSS's work is centralized into 3 main pillars: Executive Direction and Management (EDM), Security and Safety Coordination and Regional Field Coordination and Support. The Executive Office (EO) and the Office of the Under-Secretary-General (OUSG) both fall under EDM.

⁹*Strengthening the role of evaluation and the application of evaluation findings on programme design, delivery, and policy directives*. Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 26 February 2009 ([A/64/63](#)).

The Division of Safety and Security Services (SSS) is under Security and Safety Coordination. Finally the Division of Regional Operations (DRO) and Field Support Service (FSS) are under Regional Field Coordination and Support.


11. This inspection serves to provide substantive and analytical feedback to programme staff and management on the revealed strengths and weaknesses in the functioning of the existing M&E system. The inspection also provides the Secretariat with information on the accuracy and adequacy of data collected in IMDIS.

III. Methodology

12. The inspection was conducted at DSS headquarters in New York, with phone interviews with regional and field offices. The inspection examined the following programmes and subprogrammes during 2008-2009:

Programme	Subprogrammes		
Safety and security	A.	Executive direction and management	
	B.1.	Security and safety coordination	
		A.	New York
		B.	Geneva
		C.	Vienna
		D.	Nairobi
		E.	Addis Ababa
		F.	Bangkok
		G.	Santiago
		H.	Beirut
		C.1	Regional field coordination and support
			Regional field coordination
			Field support

Table 1: Structure of DSS (source: IMDIS)



DSS Organizational Structure 2008-2009¹⁰

13. In this inspection, *accuracy* refers to whether outputs that were completed and neither terminated, reformulated or postponed in IMDIS could be verified through the triangulation¹¹ of multiple sources of information such as emails, official documents, publications, or websites. A more detailed explanation follows in the findings section.

14. In this inspection, *adequacy* refers to whether the information was comprehensive and sufficient for overall M&E systems information needs. Adequacy of the M&E framework was measured based on five criteria against which data in the IMDIS system were held:

- a Whether Indicators of Achievement (IoAs) were referred to in the Statement of Results;
- b The existence and availability of baseline, target, and final measures;
- c Whether the unit of measure was aligned with the IoA;
- d Whether the variable reflected the IoA; and

¹⁰ United Nations, Department of Safety and Security, Organigram,

<http://dss.un.org/public/OrganizationalStructure/Organigram/tabid/640/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

¹¹ In the social sciences, triangulation is often used to indicate that more than two methods are used in a study with a view to double (or triple) checking results. This is also called "cross examination". The idea is that one can be more confident with a result if different methods lead to the same result. If an investigator uses only one method, the temptation is strong to believe in the findings. If an investigator uses two methods, the results may well clash. By using three methods to get at the answer to one question, the hope is that two of the three will produce similar answers, or if three clashing answers are produced, the investigator knows that the question needs to be reframed, methods reconsidered, or both.

- e The availability of the periodicity of data.¹²

Essentially, adequacy refers to construct validity of the M&E framework. A more detailed explanation follows in the findings section and in appendix I.

15. The inspection used the following mix of qualitative and quantitative methods:
 - a. A systematic desk review of key United Nations documents, including programme budgets, strategic frameworks and 2008-2009 IMDIS data.¹³
 - b. Twenty-one in-person interviews with senior-level management, programme-level staff members and IMDIS focal points throughout DSS. An inception meeting attended by interviewees and staff members with critical M&E duties initiated the inspection.
 - c. Two self-administered web-based surveys sent out to a sample of 50 staff involved in M&E activities and selected through purposive sampling with a response rate of 46 per cent.¹⁴ Surveys were conducted between 23 August 2010 and 8 October 2010.
 - d. Two quantitative methods assessed: (i) the accuracy of the outputs in IMDIS as verified by internal documents, and (ii) the adequacy of the information within IMDIS that supports the PPR. These methods were devised to quantify and score DSS based on a standardized process. Appendix I provides detailed information on the methodology behind assessing accuracy of outputs and adequacy of results in IMDIS. In obtaining information for accuracy, OIOS relied on the cooperation of DSS staff identified by the official designated focal point for this inspection.

¹² These five categories are taken directly from IMDIS. IoA Referred to in Results Statement refers to whether or not the statements of results were based on initial indicators of achievement. Indicators of achievement are usually a series of milestone measurements over a biennial period. Baseline, Target, Final Measures Available refers to whether or not programmes have recorded an output's baseline data, the target goal and the final data available on an output, i.e. if a country's debt was initially at 17 per cent and the goal was to decrease the debt to 10 per cent, the final measure of the actual percentage of debt at the end of the biennium should be available in IMDIS along with these figures. Unit of Measure corresponds to IoA refers to whether or not a programme has chosen the correct measure to match its indicator of achievement, i.e. if a programme is measuring number of women-owned businesses, it should count the number of businesses owned by women, not the number of houses. Variables that reflect the IoA refers to whether variables, elements of the IoA, match the actual IoA, i.e. if an indicator of achievement is decreased HIV percentage over time, a variable for that indicator would not be number of houses built. Periodicity refers to how often the measurements were carried out over the biennium over the estimated number of planned measures.

¹³ Key documents included monthly programme reports, bi-monthly newsletters, the programme evaluation plan, job descriptions for programme management, internal budget documents, internal reports, self-evaluation tools, and documents pertaining to gender-mainstreaming.

¹⁴ 17 staff of whom 9 staff responded, and 33 managers of whom 14 managers responded, yielding 23 out of 50 respondents.

16. The main limitations of the inspection were:
- a. The inspection did not include staff contracted by agencies such as UNDP who are also working with security, as they have distinct M&E functions in regard to their individual work programmes and budgets.
 - b. The inspection did not undertake a systematic analysis of M&E with regard to programme delivery funded from extra-budgetary resources (XB) including the support account for peacekeeping operations (QSA) and voluntary contributions in cash or in kind by Member States and civil society.
 - c. Since performance reporting in the PPR did not extend to the “Programme support” part of the regular budget, it was not included in the analysis.
 - d. DSS staff from specific subprogrammes may not have provided all the output related data available to OIOS. Thus DSS’s overall accuracy score may have been lowered because of the lack of provision of data to OIOS rather than the actual absence of multiple sources of data to verify the output.

IV. Inspection Results

17. The results and conclusions of the inspection have been grouped under two sections: (A) accuracy and adequacy of DSS’s 2008-2009 IMDIS data reporting and (B) M&E capacity.

A. Accuracy and adequacy of DSS 2009-2009 IMDIS data

Conclusion 1: Only 33 per cent of DSS output reporting was verifiable and accurate, indicating that a majority of outputs (67 per cent) entered into IMDIS were unverifiable.

18. DSS has reported 819 outputs in IMDIS, of these: 763 were implemented, 1 was reformulated,¹⁵ and 55 were terminated.¹⁶ The inspection team assessed the accuracy of DSS reporting on outputs by triangulating IMDIS output data with other data sources consisting of official emails, internal documents, web data, and publications. The majority

¹⁵ Reformulated - Refers to activities/outputs that were completed and delivered to the intended users but which differ from the description in the Programme Budget. An output is considered reformulated if it continues to address the same subject matter of the originally programmed output and to cater to the same intended users. The new citation of each reformulated output should be reflected, along with the reasons for the reformulation. If reformulated by legislative decision, the Intergovernmental Body which took the decision should be specified. Information available from User’s Guide IMDIS v.2.6, <http://iseek.un.org/LibraryDocuments/785-200812021749126415208.pdf>.

¹⁶ Terminated - The outputs terminated are those that are not delivered to the intended users during the current biennium. The reasons for terminating an output should be reflected. Outputs are terminated either by a legislative decision or at the discretion of Programme Managers as provided in rules 106.2(b) and 106.1(d)(iv) of the PPBME. Programme Managers may exercise their discretion to terminate outputs if they become redundant, duplicative, obsolete, irrelevant or when resources are not available to implement them in neither the current nor future biennia, User’s Guide IMDIS v.2.6, <http://iseek.un.org/LibraryDocuments/785-200812021749126415208.pdf>.

of DSS's outputs were verified through internal confidential documents, monthly reports, monthly statistics, standard operating procedures (SOPs) documents, security operation review reports, maintenance reports, training statistics, weekly briefing notes, security control center training manual, key watcher reports and matrices/progress reporting sheets that were sent out to the field to be filled out by staff and were obtained directly from focal points. The triangulation indicates that 33 per cent of the implemented outputs were credible. Since data sources could not be found to verify the remaining 67 per cent of implemented outputs, the credibility of those data is unverified.

19. One example of an output verified by the team was Safety Services which included:

inspect(ing) United Nations premises, including elevators, escalators and machinery rooms, for safety and fire hazards; conduct(ing) safety training programmes for security officers, fire officials, industrial shop workers and guides; coordinate(ing) and conduct(ing) fire drills and safety engineering surveys; issue(ing) safety reports and recommendations; monitor(ing) and inspect(ing) fire and water alarms and practice evacuations of United Nations premises; issue(ing) safety equipment to staff and contractual workers; conduct health inspections of kitchen facilities; conduct(ing) annual safety and sanitation/hygiene inspections of all food preparation, storage and serving areas; process (ing) safety-related claims.

This output was thoroughly verified by maintenance reports and elevator service reports sent in by United Nations Office in Vienna (UNOV).

20. An example of a significant unverified output is: "Inspect areas during bomb threats; respond to all types of alarms and emergencies; investigate motor vehicle accidents, compensation cases, accidents involving visitors and staff members, illnesses involving visitors and damage to personal and United Nations property." This output could not be verified as focal points did not provide relevant supporting documentation.




Figure 1 Accuracy of outputs by subprogramme for biennium 2008-2009

21. Figure 1 shows that among offices that provided any verification data, 89.5 per cent of outputs were verifiable.¹⁷ Unfortunately, some offices, including SSS Geneva, SSS Addis Ababa, SSS Santiago, SSS Beirut and Field Support Services, did not provide any output verification information to OIOS and were therefore given a score of 0, which lowered the DSS accuracy score to 33 per cent.

Conclusion 2: 85 per cent of DSS results reporting was adequate, indicating that reporting on the achievement of results in IMDIS during the biennium 2008-2009 was usually comprehensive and sufficient

22. The adequacy of DSS's data was calculated by reviewing the 69 indicators of achievement (IoAs) contributing to 32 expected accomplishments (EAs). Figure 2 below shows the overall ratings of DSS reporting on results achieved with regard to the five previously discussed components of adequacy.

23. In this inspection, adequacy refers to whether the information was comprehensive and sufficient for overall M&E systems information needs (see Appendix I for details). Adequacy of the M&E framework was measured based on five criteria against which data in the IMDIS system were held:

¹⁷ Average of scores for DHSSS (New York), SSS Vienna, SSS Bangkok and Regional Field Coordination. Please see figure 1.

- Whether Indicators of Achievement (IoAs) were referred to the in Statement of Results
- The existence and availability of baseline, target, and final measures
- Whether the unit of measure was aligned with the IoA
- Whether the variable reflected the IoA
- The availability of the periodicity of data




Figure 2: Adequacy of DSS reporting on results achieved in 2008-2009 by component

24. Figure 3 shows considerable variation of the ratings by components, with an overall programme adequacy score of 85 per cent based on an average of the subprogramme scores. DSS periodicity could be improved as only 51 per cent of planned measurements were actually available.




Figure 3 Adequacy of results reporting by component and subprogramme

25. Figure 3 indicates the ratings for adequacy disaggregated by subprogramme and adequacy component. The lowest scores for periodicity were for Executive Direction and Management (EDM). SSS Geneva, SSS Nairobi, SSS Ababa, SSS Santiago, and DRO all had scores below 40 per cent. In contrast, DHSS, SSS Vienna, SSS Bangkok, SSS Beirut and FSS (Field Support Service) had scores above 40 per cent with FSS scoring 100 per cent. DSS's compliance with instructions to improve periodicity could be improved upon for many subprogrammes.

26. DSS also fared relatively low with similar discrepancy levels for percentage of IoA referred to in the results statement. SSS Nairobi and SSS Geneva had less reliable information for percentage of IoA referred to in the results statement component than other offices and subprogrammes.

27. For the third adequacy component, per cent of IoA aspect in variables, SSS Santiago and DHSS (New York) fared the lowest, with DHSS (New York) at 67 and SSS Santiago at 61. All other subprogrammes and their scores of adequacy components have remained above 70 per cent. Overall, DSS's adequacy was good but could be improved with respect to planning measurements, reporting the IoAs in the results statement and specifying reflective variables to measure the IoA.

B. M&E Capacity

Conclusion 3: The Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit's (CEMU) work does not concur with the Secretariat's definition of evaluation

28. The CEMU unit's work, while critical to DSS's mandate, is comparable to an operational assessment and does not correspond to the Secretariat's definition of evaluation.¹⁸ A review of CEMU reports for Afghanistan (Ref No 2008/01/26; October 2008) and for the Russian Federation (Ref No 2008/01/01; May 2008) revealed that the unit's goal is to "assess the current level of compliance of the duty station with the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) and evaluate the security preparations against existing security standards or planned security arrangements." MOSS reviews include information on training, vehicles, staff, office equipment, telecommunications and country-specific requirements, by organization. The reports assess organizations' levels of compliance, ranging from unacceptable (0 to 50 per cent), to deficient (51 to 70 per cent), to compliance with limitations (71 to 90 per cent) and finally to MOSS Compliance (91 to 100 per cent). MOSS reviews are critical to DSS's mandate but do not fully correspond to the objectives of an evaluation, as noted in the PPBME.¹⁹ One way of integrating evaluation into the compliance review process would be to evaluate the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the MOSS assessment and use the evaluative information to improve the compliance reviews.

Conclusion 4: DSS's institutional framework contains the building blocks of a sound M&E system, though the system is not yet operational

29. Following OIOS recommendations, DSS had developed a draft evaluation policy and submitted an evaluation plan to OPPBA. However, the evaluation policy remains to be endorsed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN).²⁰ To date, DSS's evaluation policy exists as a draft in the CEMU unit.

30. DSS's draft evaluation policy follows all applicable UNEG norms and standards. The draft policy complies with UNEG Norm 3, Standard 1.2 and Standard 1.4 which state that United Nations organizations should develop an evaluation policy that explains the role of evaluation, internal processes, and related issues and provides guidance on follow-up

¹⁸ Based on *Guidance to Programmes for Developing an Evaluation Policy*, "in the context of the UN Secretariat, and in operational terms, evaluation is a systematic and discrete process, as objective as possible, to determine relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and/or sustainability of any element of a Programme's performance relative to its mandate or goals. Evaluation can be used for accountability, learning and/or decision-making purposes. A report of an evaluation is a written document which contains a description of the methodology used, evidenced-based findings, conclusions and recommendations (where applicable)," http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/pages/ied_guidance_for_dev_ep.pdf.

¹⁹ PPBME, (ST/SGB/2000/8), Article VII, Regulation 7.1: *The objective of evaluation is: (a) To determine as systematically and objectively as possible the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the Organization's activities in relation to their objectives; (b) To enable the Secretariat and Member States to engage in systematic reflection, with a view to increasing the effectiveness of the main programmes of the Organization by altering their content and, if necessary, reviewing their objectives.*

²⁰ UNEG Standard 1.2 states that the evaluation policy must have approval by either the governing bodies or the head of the organization.

mechanisms for evaluations, an important measure to ensure changes are implemented once problems are identified. In addition, UNEG norms and standards also specify that United Nations organizations must explain the prioritization and planning of evaluations as part of the evaluation policy.²¹

31. DSS's draft evaluation policy is unique in attempting to integrate compliance evaluations (which are mainly focused on MOSS) with thematic general evaluations and self-evaluations. The policy also outlines other types of evaluations, including strategy and policy evaluations, country programme evaluations, thematic/cluster evaluations and self evaluations. The independence of the future evaluation unit is reinforced by its location within the Office of the Undersecretary General, in line with UNEG Standard 1.1, which states that "(t)he Head of evaluation should report directly to the Governing Body of the organization or the Head of the organization,"²² here the Undersecretary General.

32. DSS's evaluation plan (Form 12) for the biennium 2008-2009 was submitted as per OPPBA instructions.²³ However, upon checking with the department, it is unclear who submitted the form.²⁴ Based on this, it is recommended that DSS should strengthen their recordkeeping and management of departmental submissions to OPPBA.

33. DSS's evaluation plan completed as per rule 107.2 of the PPBME²⁵ focuses on internal audits and compliance missions as self-evaluation tools, though these approaches do not meet the Secretariat's definition of evaluation. A progress report on the implementation of both the evaluation plan and the status of recommendations from previous evaluations should be, but were not, available from the department. Thus, once an evaluation unit is set up, it should thoroughly assess DSS's specific evaluation and self-evaluation needs and requirements at the programme level, based on criteria derived from the PPBME and UNEG norms and standards. DSS should then build its evaluation plan on the basis of this assessment. No independent evaluations have been carried out for biennium 2008-2009.

²¹ UNEG Norm 11 and UNEG Standards 2.5-2.8 as well as 3.10 reference General Evaluation Standards and accepted professional principles.

²² UNEG Standard 1.1 notes that an adequate institutional framework for the effective management of the evaluation function should, inter alia, "(f)acilitate an independent and impartial evaluation process by ensuring that the evaluation function is independent of other management functions. The Head of Evaluation should report directly to the Governing Body of the organization or the Head of the Organization."

²³ Since 2005-2006 all departments have been requested by OPPBA to prepare mandatory evaluation plans in the context of the preparation of the biennial programme budgets, as part of their budget submission to OPPBA.

²⁴ During data collection, OIOS retrieved the Evaluation Plan from its own records for its *Assessment of evaluation capacities and needs in the UN Secretariat* (IED-2006-006) report.

²⁵ PPBME, ([ST/SGB/2000/8](#)), Article VII, Rule 107.2 (b)(ii) states that evaluation plans, "which are required for each new and ongoing subprogramme, shall be prepared by programme managers and shall contain the following elements: a definition of the purpose of the evaluation and the anticipated application of evaluation findings; the evaluation methodology to be employed; the characteristics of the evaluation (e.g., the scope of coverage and the period covered); the measures of change (e.g., the nature of the progress and the impact indicators to be employed); the means of information collection; the administrative arrangements; and the resource requirements."

Conclusion 5: DSS dedicates insufficient budget resources to the practice of M&E

34. PPBME Rule 107.2 states that “all programmes shall be evaluated on a regular periodic basis” and the UNEG norms on ‘responsibility for evaluation’ specify that governing bodies and/or heads of organizations in the United Nations are accountable for fostering an enabling environment for evaluation and ensuring that adequate resources are allocated for effective operation of the evaluation function have been followed through.²⁶ Based on a review of the United Nations family of organizations, the [Joint Inspection Unit \(JIU\)](#) in its report [Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System](#) suggested that as a benchmark, an evaluator post should be designated in the programmes for each increment of US \$125 to \$250 million of total resources managed in a biennium.²⁷ A review of the Proposed Programme Budget for the biennium 2008-2009²⁸ shows that DSS dedicates less than one per cent of budget resources to CEMU. Indeed, only 0.46 per cent was devoted to CEMU.²⁹ As CEMU’s activities focus on operational assessments and not on evaluation, true evaluation has not been allocated any resources at DSS and no evaluation posts exist.³⁰

Conclusion 6: Management lacks commitment to IMDIS because it is not user-friendly and management perceives IMDIS as irrelevant

35. Some focal points stated that management does not use IMDIS because it is “not reflective” of their work. Another focal point stated that managers are in fact “overachieving their objectives but can’t report on them.” Surveys and interviews conducted revealed that managers have an understanding of IMDIS and its link with the strategic framework objectives. However, many managers feel that these objectives have not been updated to reflect current departmental activities. Indeed, one focal point reinforced this fact by noting that “management does understand M&E, however they perceive it as irrelevant. As it should be, you should take this and build a strategy as a division, they don’t do it as there are other more pressing issues and this is not even representative or reflective of our work (...) it is a formality.”

36. Three managers specifically stated that IMDIS was not useful to them for monitoring and evaluation while another explained that she/he had her/his own monitoring and evaluation system for the security environment and did not need IMDIS. Overall, in DSS,

²⁶ PPBME, (ST/SGB/2000/8).

²⁷ Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) report: *Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System* ([JIU/REP/2006/2](#)) (2006); Annex VII, www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/A.60.860_JIU_Report.pdf.

²⁸ *Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, Safety and Security* ([A/62/6 \(Sect.33\)](#)).

²⁹ \$1,816,900 out of a total of \$388,169,200 in the 2008-2009 biennium, based on *Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2008-2009, Safety and Security* ([A/62/6 \(Sect.33\)](#)).

³⁰ Based on its official description document, CEMU is “responsible for inspections, security policies and standards compliance reviews to be undertaken in all United Nations entities (...)the responsibilities include overall system security readiness, as well as MOSS compliance, the implementation of a self-assessment methodology and to identify and compile Lessons Learnt and Best Practices ” While it is true that for 2010-2011, CEMU requested an additional P-4 Investigation Officer and two P-3 Compliance and Investigator Officer positions in Africa to support their activities, as discussed previously, CEMU’s work does not fall under the rubric of evaluation.

M&E systems are not a priority for management and are considered an administrative chore rather than a useful tool.³¹

Conclusion 7: Focal points present mixed views on IMDIS as they struggle to understand the meaning behind assigned perfunctory IMDIS data entry without management support

37. Results of a survey conducted to assess the perceived effectiveness of M&E tools in helping DSS meet its objectives show that while management has an opinion on M&E tools and their effectiveness, at least one third of staff does not know about the link between these tools and the departmental goals, a possible trickle-down effect of the lack of management commitment. Indeed, figure 4 shows that at least 33 per cent of staff responded “I don’t know” when asked about the perceived effectiveness of performance indicators, indicators of achievement, gender mainstreaming principles and programme performance information, in helping achieve departmental goals.




Figure 4 Staff level: effectiveness of M&E tools in helping achieve departmental goals.³²

38. With respect to IMDIS user-friendliness, some focal points expressed that they have found IMDIS extremely inflexible in terms of data entry. For example, initial entries do not allow for changes. One focal point explained how she/he entered “0” number of workshops initially and was unable to update it to reflect changes, so the focal point

³¹ This echoes the conclusion of the OIOS report *Review of results-based management at the United Nations (A/63/268)*.

³² The success in measuring resulting was assessed by reviewing how often: a) Programme performance indicators are successful in measuring DSS’s success in meeting its objectives. b) Indicators of Achievement (as established in DSS’s M&E framework and approved by the General Assembly) are successful in providing a solid basis for measuring results. c) Gender mainstreaming principles are well incorporated into DSS’s planning frameworks and management strategy for achieving results. d) Programme performance information is useful in making make adjustments to the work programme (e.g. modifying, adding, postponing or deleting activities, revising budgets, etc.)

resorted to inputting current information in another section. Comments such as: “I was so focused on IMDIS as a thing to be filled in rather than on evaluation and monitoring as a system,” and “the whole thing (filling in IMDIS) was perfunctory, had to be done,” were not uncommon.

39. Other focal points felt that while IMDIS was inflexible, it was a potentially useful tool when used properly. “IMDIS does monitor work if you do it properly, but no one does it properly so it is not reflective of the work.” Also, IMDIS has taught some focal points about the strategic framework. One focal point stated that “I never paid attention to the strategic framework – through this I learnt a lot about the strategic framework and the budget document.”

40. Comments from focal points further highlight a lack of management support. Indeed, one focal point stated that “We spend 12 man months on it (IMDIS), we never receive feedback from management. It’s something that we do, it just goes into the big machine, it is never about analysis. From a managerial point of view, this is something we need to address. It is too bad, it’s a lot of effort, and the budget is already submitted.” Furthermore, the focal point explained that managers “don’t give us the information because it is not important to put it in. A lot of the work is verbal and there is no minute taking. A lot is very informal.”

Conclusion 8: Limited M&E occurs

41. The work of the Field Support Services, Training and Development Section within the department is exemplary in terms of M&E. Indeed, the division has a very innovative systematic process of monitoring the impact of the training courses they were producing. The division carries out on-site evaluation surveys where they ask for feedback on training performance followed by feedback surveys on security certification programmes after six months. The surveys are sent to the supervisors of the training as well as to the trainees. The surveys address the query of whether staff has been trained for the project that they are required to work on in the field. The different types of trainings include Intermediate Training Programmes and Chief Security Advisor (CSA) trainings (for core security professionals). Both trainings are embedded into the strategic planning of the division, integrating self-evaluation at the outset. In addition to training surveys, management noted lessons learned sessions were also carried out every six months, allowing the division to incorporate prior experiences into future plans. While no copies of actual lessons learned were shared by the training division, DHSSS (Division of Headquarters of Security and Safety Services) shared its lessons learned and best practices section in their internal database. While the content is confidential, the folders were available to be shared. DHSSS also maintains a record of lessons learned and best practices in their internal databases along with a record of all their activities.³³

³³ Interviewees showed DSS had different sets of databases for monitoring of activities which included the personnel database containing information on “postings, rotations, statistics on gender, nationality and age, monthly check of substance abuse test information, all mandatory training priorities, basics in the field, sexual harassment, integrity.”

42. DSS has monthly duty station reports which, along with multiple sources of information, feed IMDIS data entry and allow management to monitor their activities. Additionally, based on interviews and copies of some reports, DHSSS uses tools such as incident reports, client feedback surveys, budget monitoring tools and operational effectiveness reports. In New York for instance, DHSSS keeps a record of total number of visits, total number of staff, ID cars issued, size of the compounds, recruitment, trainings. In addition to the monthly reports, other monitoring tools are standard operating procedures, security operations review reports, bi-monthly DHSSS newsletters, x-ray logs, investigations records, chief weekly briefing notes, pass and ID database, key watcher reports (example), security assessment reports, surveillance and detection weekly reports, maintenance reports, elevator service reports, confiscated items lists, evacuation after action reports, etc. While these tools do not correspond fully to the definition of evaluation tools, they allow the department to monitor its activities.³⁴

Conclusion 9: While there is a system to ensure timely implementation of the divisional workplan, evaluation is not integrated into the learning cycle

43. Interviews reveal that while there are efficient systems to monitor project progress these systems focused monitoring project implementation and discussing issues and progress, rather than on reviewing workplans.³⁵ Indeed, one interviewee stated that:

M&E does not contribute to the learning cycle, with the repetition of the same mistakes, people spending too much time copying rather than sitting and thinking about the workplan, our objectives, indicators of achievements: can we come up with better indicators? Are the indicators measuring what we are trying to measure? How successful are they? What is the impact of the security institution? (...) We want to improve services, we need more learning and development.”

One senior manager specifically stated that there was “no learning and development from M&E.” These statements highlight the need for M&E to be integrated into the programme planning cycle.

Conclusion 10: Lack of awareness of M&E responsibilities pervades DSS

44. Survey results show that 21 per cent of managers are aware of their M&E responsibilities but have not been involved with M&E and 7 per cent stated that they do not have responsibilities related to M&E. Such results suggest a lack of awareness of M&E responsibilities. Also, 71 per cent of managers are not familiar with M&E tools for the Secretariat with senior management amongst those who indicated unfamiliarity.³⁶ Eighty-

³⁴ PPBME, (ST/SGB/2000/8), Article VII, Rule 107.3 on the conduct of self-evaluation by programme managers, indicates that “the primary focus of self-evaluation shall be on the subprogramme, outputs, and activities,” including the usefulness of the outputs to the users and the attainment of [sub] programme objectives.

³⁵ Systems include weekly chief’s meetings, biweekly IASMN meetings and bilateral meetings, as well as monthly videoconferencing and project tracker software on the shared drive to enhance the monitoring of project progress. Interviewee stated that there are “no meetings to discuss work plans.”

³⁶ More specifically, survey results show that for managers, 100 per cent are not familiar with the Glossary of M&E Terms, 93 per cent are not aware of the Evaluation Manual, 83 per cent were not aware of *Guidance to programmes*

six per cent of managers are not familiar with UNEG norms and standards, and of those, most (93 per cent) have M&E responsibilities. As per UNEG Standard 1.1 individuals at the P-5 level should be aware of M&E tools and be involved as part of their responsibilities as managers.³⁷ Similarly, 78 per cent of focal points are not familiar with UNEG norms and standards.

Conclusion 11: M&E roles and responsibilities for management were not clearly defined

45. Examining official job descriptions for DSS senior management, it becomes clear that DSS has not clearly defined roles and responsibilities for M&E. While M&E ought to be a part of general management of the section or division, it is not specifically outlined in managerial duties. As per UNEG Norm 2, heads of organizations and/or of evaluation units are responsible for ensuring that evaluation contributes to decision-making and management fosters an enabling environment for evaluation. As DSS's programme plan is adjusted every biennium, the definition of senior management responsibilities is flexible and should be adjusted to ensure that M&E is integral to the organization. This is a systemic problem throughout the Secretariat, as mentioned in its 2009 report on strengthening the role of evaluation.³⁸ Overall, a strong awareness amongst management is needed to foster a more enabling environment for monitoring and evaluation work.

Conclusion 12: Insufficient training is seen as the greatest challenge to M&E

46. Overall, there has been a department-wide request for training with 64 per cent of focal points³⁹ and 22 per cent of managers requesting improved additional training.⁴⁰ Indeed, focal points state that "there is no formal training. It is all informal training." One person stated that "four weeks ago, I figured out that the log frame is part of how IMDIS works: it is a machine for evaluation, it is not well marketed or trained for, there is no presentation on evaluation." Focal points further stated that "If I learn IMDIS then I can learn it for programme planning" and that because "there was no training, a lot of time is spent aggravated because what you do is based on what you remember."

47. Survey data and raw numbers suggest that the biggest challenge for M&E for biennium 2008-2009 is training, with nearly 80 per cent of managers and staff citing it as a major hurdle (figure 5 below). Difficulties in collecting information present a second challenge, with half of managers and over half of staff stating so. Thus, despite the existence of a training and development division within Field Support Services, interviews and surveys show that no managers or focal points had access to M&E training. Survey

for developing an evaluation policy and 93 per cent were not aware of the *Programme Performance report*; only 1 person actually specified referring to these M&E tools.

³⁷ UNEG Standard 1.1: "UN Organizations should have an adequate institutional framework for the effective management of their evaluation function," http://www.uneval.org/papersandpubs/documentdetail.jsp?doc_id=22.

³⁸ *Strengthening the role of evaluation and the application of evaluation findings on programme design, delivery, and policy directives*, Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 26 February 2009, (A/64/63).

³⁹ 7 out of 11 surveyees.

⁴⁰ 2 out of 9 surveyees.

results indicate that a lack of management interest is not perceived as a major challenge, as only 29 per cent of managers and 22 per cent of staff felt it was so.




Figure 5 Challenges for M&E for biennium 2008-2009




Figure 6: Suggested improvements to streamline and strengthen M&E

48. Consistent with this, survey results show that increased training and work plans are major suggestions for improvements to streamline and strengthen M&E (figure 6). Indeed, 35 per cent of management and 33 per cent of staff highlighted the need for increased training and awareness of M&E activities. Following this recommendation, a second one was to create workplans for evaluations with 22 per cent of staff and 21 per cent of management stressing this need.

Conclusion 13: More meaningful performance indicators and workplans are needed, though this presents an administrative and political challenge

49. Consistent with survey findings that request more representative and appropriate programme performance indicators (figure 6), during interviews, managers felt that the quantification of certain activities led to a misperception of DSS's performance. As explained by one manager:

when our work is evaluated on the things that really happened like unauthorized entries, it's a subversion of the whole system because these are things I have to prevent. For example, if last biennium the number of unauthorized entries was 0 and this biennium, 1 person entered, I will have a 100 per cent increase, statistics are deceiving.

Based on a similar reasoning for building evacuations, another manager stated "I can't see how you can use the information to measure the performance of the security section (because) in security when nothing happens, that means you've worked well."

50. Others also found indicators as non-reflective of their work. One manager noted that the tools and indicators were not appropriate to measure DSS's activities. One manager explained that when calculating work months, IMDIS instructions stated they have to include only the professional services and the general staff. Sometimes there are only 1 or 2 professional staff, over 50 non-professional, non-general staff officers. "In the case of security, the most important output is the officer at the gate, not the manager, I am the support function." The manager went on further to state that "it's ridiculous, to measure the service of the section based on professionals" and to question how the GA could evaluate the section's performance based one ratio of 1 over 50 actors." The manager added that "this may be appropriate for substantive areas, for publication areas, however as a security professional, I don't think the indicators really reflect the results of my job nor the objectives of my daily work." This view was further supported by other managers who complained that "I don't think the whole system is suited for security purposes" and that "I don't think it's a great tool, that's the basic flaw." To remedy this, two managers stated that fewer but more meaningful indicators are needed to accurately reflect DSS's activities. In addition to managers, focal points also complained with one stating "some of these performance measures, they are horrible to measure, you can't really."

51. One of the interviewees noted that the work plan, which is outdated and inflexible, did not reflect his/her current work. The interviewee stated that "the GA doesn't allow us to change it (the workplan) to work that is more reflective of the work of the division(...) you feel constrained by ACABQ, because they think this has been cleared by GA, they keep repeating the stuff." Consequently, mistakes are repeated for multiple biennia. For example output 33.33 (c) *Maintenance of a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week Department of Safety and Security communications center to provide worldwide communications with Department of security professionals, rapid reporting and core communications during a crisis situation* is not part of Regional field coordination and should therefore be moved to its correct location. Many felt it is not relevant to the division's work and thus should not

be part of its IoAs. Some IoAs are not representative of the entire department's work but are yet still cited: for example for IoA *a(i) Maintenance and percentage of threat and risk analyzes for all duty stations*, DSS security officers are not present in all duty stations.

52. Some of DSS's important successes are not easily quantifiable. As stated by DSS staff in interviews, many of the successes in consensus-building or research are invisible and occur at the conversational or policy level and are harder to measure. It is also difficult to track outputs that deal with academic research and their effects on policy or international trade.

53. As stated by an interviewee, a major challenge in making changes lies in the politically charged nature of the task, as DSS must coordinate with the host country in order make changes in the security plan, although in reality host country involvement is minimal in this task. However, the strategic framework and task allocation must reflect the duties of the department in order for it to be an accurate monitoring and evaluation basis and these changes should be given a priority.

Conclusion 14: Links and communication with HQ-Regional or HQ-field offices may be insufficient in the framework of M&E activities, resulting in the design of unrepresentative performance indicators

54. The creation of unreflective performance indicators may be partly explained by a perceived lack of communication between HQ (Headquarters) New York, where performance indicators are formulated, and regional or field offices. Interviews revealed a "lack of communication from HQ." M&E communication from HQ NY that does occur focuses on issuing orders to have the information entered in IMDIS.

Conclusion 15: Focal points have significantly strived to create a streamlined system for data collection and monitoring with respect to M&E. However, their efforts have not been streamlined at the departmental level

55. Despite the lack of an existing system for data collection, some focal points have made a solid effort to streamline data collection. Some examples of data collection and self evaluation initiatives are:

- A standardized data collection tracking matrix (DRO, FSS, DHSSS);
- Comprehensive IMDIS usage guidelines (DHSSS);
- A Field Support Guidance spreadsheet to monitor work and work months and solve the problem of capturing numerous activities which can be updated on a daily basis, lessons learnt from crisis and special projects (FSS);
- Best practices and Lessons Learned available electronically for DHSSS, also on the shared drive with restricted access as they are security sensitive;
- Other evaluations, board of auditors reports available on the shared drive.

56. However, these efforts have not been streamlined at the department level as focal points appear to focus on their own division and have not actively shared information on their respective self-evaluation tools with other focal points.

Conclusion 16: DSS has partially addressed gender mainstreaming within the context of M&E

57. In assessing gender mainstreaming, this inspection looked for evidence that: (a) Consideration was given to the potential for a problem, policy or programme to affect women and men differently; (b) Services were designed and delivered in ways that ensure accessibility to both women and men; (c) The views of both women and men were taken into account when analyzing situations or policies and designing and implementing programmes; (d) Progress and outcomes were reported in gender-disaggregated terms, when relevant.⁴¹

58. DSS has made some efforts to mainstream gender within its strategic framework. For instance, the output “Facilitation of gender mainstreaming in all functional areas of the Department including organization of training workshops for all staff to promote gender balance in the Department” refers directly to gender mainstreaming with information on the number of female participants in the workshops. In order to verify the output, DSS provided OIOS with a list of all workshops related to DSS activities and specified the number of female participants, which rose from 4 per cent to 8 per cent between 2008 and 2009.

59. Gender also has some input into the training development cycle. In interviews, senior management in Field Support Services, Training and Development Section noted that “Gender is an issue we have become more focused on during the past 18 months.” Indeed, DSS launched a new initiative on 23 Aug 2010 entitled “Security Tips for Female Staff, Spouses, and Eligible Dependents.” The initiative included recommendations drafted by the IASMN Working Group on Women. The recommendations were based on “Security Guidelines for Women,” approved in 2006 by the High Level Committee on Management (HCLM) and which addressed issues such as women’s security, information on traveling, sexual harassment, and assault and PEP (Post-Exposure Prophylaxis) kits.⁴²

60. The publication of the Security Tips highlighted the need for awareness on the particular risks and threats women face. The tips are to be provided to female staff to

⁴¹ As per the Secretariat definition of gender mainstreaming contained in the agreed conclusions of the Economic and Social Council (A/52/3/Rev.1), Chap. IV, sect. A: “(m)ainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.”

⁴² Post Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) treatment is an emergency medical response used to protect individuals exposed to the HIV virus. A PEP kit consists of preventive medicine and laboratory tests. The PEP kit is provided in order to initiate medication immediately after possible HIV exposure (e.g. through sexual assault), ideally within two hours and not later than 72 hours. It is emphasized that the earlier PEP treatment is initiated the more effective it is in preventing HIV infection, http://www.missionpharma.com/content/us/products/medical_kits/pep_kit.

complement existing security guidelines and enable them to take control of their own safety and security in their personal and professional lives. In addition to this effort, the Critical Incident Stress Management Unit (CISMU) deals with sensitive issues, in some cases only female-focused topics, such as raped women, sexual harassment etc. CISMU reports data disaggregated by gender.

61. DSS training records also show sex-disaggregated data specifying the number of “female participants” in its programs. Additionally, monthly updates on the geographic distribution of female staff in DHSSS are available for reference.

62. Data suggest a general level of awareness of the importance of gender mainstreaming. Interviewees stated that a forthcoming report on security and safety (not available at the time of writing) would include a section on women and children’s needs. Management also mentioned that they would tailor programmes to suit females’ needs in high risk environments. Interviewees highlighted the fact that “it is a male dominated environment but we stress the importance of giving female candidates equal opportunity” and that “when we draft reports, we outline the percentage of female officers and efforts they have made to keep them and get new ones, we do get information about the recruitment of females and deputy chiefs and chiefs, always inquire on female candidates, we raise awareness, it is also applicable to promotions.”

63. Lastly, DSS’s draft evaluation policy does not highlight the relevance of gender-mainstreaming for M&E. A broad, integrated approach to gender-mainstreaming throughout the subprogrammes’ results frameworks is essential in ensuring the incorporation of gender dimensions and perspectives into M&E processes (including methodologies, strategies, impacts, outputs, and results). The inclusion of gender-mainstreaming in the policy is essential to ensure that existing concepts, definitions, and methods such as questionnaires, self-evaluation surveys, and units of operation used in data monitoring and reporting reflect gender-based differences and inequalities.⁴³

64. Interviewees complained that gender mainstreaming only happens at the IASMN, where they have a working group on security of women. In the working environment at DSS, interviewees stated they had experienced outright comments made such as “oh you’re a woman”, “oh you’re over sensitive” as well as sexual harassment issues. One interviewee stated that “it’s very much a boy’s club” with inside jokes and people being forceful. Thus, while gender mainstreaming exists at the M&E level, interviewees present divergent views on gender mainstreaming at the overall departmental level.

V. Conclusion

65. Evaluation as a whole continues to be inadequate at the Secretariat, and DSS has proved to be no exception. With no evaluation unit, no resources devoted, and only a draft

⁴³ The General Assembly, during its 50th ([A/RES/50/203](#)) and 52nd ([A/RES/52/100](#)) sessions on the 23rd of February 1996 and 26th of January 1998 respectively, called on the United Nations system to promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective at all levels, including in the design, monitoring and evaluation of all policies and programmes.

evaluation policy draft that complies with UNEG norms and standards, DSS has yet to institutionalize the evaluation function.

66. DSS's accuracy score of 33 per cent on reporting on reflects bifurcated performance. Some subprogrammes performed very well, while other subprogrammes did not submit any data to OIOS for review. Management seemed unaware of official document submissions to OPPBA. DSS's adequacy score of 85 per cent on reporting on the achievement of results was good but could be improved with respect to improving estimates of future periodic measures and including IoAs in the results statement.

67. Evidence suggests that management is heavily dissatisfied with the current monitoring tools for M&E for reasons which include the cumbersome nature of IMDIS. In addition to the dissatisfaction, their lack of motivation also results from the sequencing of the programme planning cycle which defeats the purpose of results based budgeting. Further, administrative and political hurdles make the performance indicators inflexible. The lack of training and relevant workplans are also cited as reasons why management and staff lack of awareness of M&E tools. Focal points, who enter data into IMDIS as a perfunctory time-consuming chore, reflect the department's lack of commitment and support for M&E tools.

68. In some divisions, innovative self-evaluation has resulted in the accumulation of considerable internal knowledge. With a more organized, targeted effort, DSS could further streamline M&E practices and use these to improve programme performance at the departmental level.

69. Gender mainstreaming has been partially addressed with the creation of gender sensitive performance indicators and an official recognition of women's special needs in security. However, dissatisfaction with respect to gender issues in the workplace environment prevails.

VI. Recommendations

Recommendation 1

70. DSS should improve its recordkeeping of officially submitted evaluation plans and the IMDIS output entries used to calculate the accuracy score. (Para. 17-18; 27)

Recommendation 2

71. To formalize its organizational Evaluation Policy, DSS should submit it to the Inter-Agency Security Management Network for review and approval. (Para. 24)

Recommendation 3

72. To meet UNEG norms on evaluation resource benchmarks, DSS should reassess core resources to determine the adequate level of resources to be allocated to M&E. (Para. 29)

Recommendation 4

73. To create its evaluation plan, DSS should carry out an assessment of evaluation and self-evaluation needs and requirements based on criteria derived from the UNEG norms and standards and the PPBME. (Para. 28)

Recommendation 5

74. To improve awareness about the importance of M&E, DSS management and staff should undergo training on the role of the M&E and the use of M&E tools. (Para. 41-43)

Recommendation 6

75. To allocate roles and responsibilities in DSS's M&E system, DSS should more explicitly articulate the M&E tasks and responsibilities of senior managers. (Para. 40)

Recommendation 7

76. To streamline and improve self-evaluation techniques, DSS should undertake a department-wide assessment of its self-evaluation practices at the divisional level and share this information with senior managers. (Para. 51)

Recommendation 8

77. To assure that evaluation ultimately enhances learning and strengthens performance, DSS management should review and consider modifying performance indicators and workplans to assure that they reflect DSS's actual work. (Para. 44-46)

Recommendation 9

78. To address the relevance of gender mainstreaming for M&E systems in DSS as well as to highlight its significance as a cross-cutting issue, DSS's evaluation policy should incorporate UNEG guidelines for gender mainstreaming in M&E (when available). Also, DSS should ensure gender mainstreaming is integrated as part of DSS culture so that staff feel it is a priority. (Para. 55-56)

APPENDIX I

Methodology for scoring accuracy and adequacy of IMDIS data

I. Accuracy scoring for output reporting

1. Accuracy was measured by reviewing whether outputs that were completed and neither terminated, reformulated or postponed in IMDIS could be verified through the triangulation of multiple sources of information such as emails, official documents, publications, or websites.

2. Example: XII.33.A Executive direction and management

(a) Step 1: Extract output from IMDIS

Reports to the General Assembly on the functioning of the security management system, including the annual report on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; annual lessons learned and best practices reports; any other ad hoc reports as required

Record identifier: PB132252

Source: programmed

Quantity: 10

Work months:

1

A/63/305 Reports to the General Assembly on the functioning of the security management system, including the annual report on the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel; annual lessons learned and best practices reports; any other ad hoc reports as required

Record identifier: D097597

(b) Step 2: Find external sources of information

Can be triangulated with data at following link:

<http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/63/305>

(c) Step 3: Score

Score: 100

Accuracy score by subprogramme

		Implemented	Reformulated	Terminated	Carried forward	Confirmed	% Confirmed
A	Executive direction and management	102					
	Substantive servicing of meetings	40	26	14		0	
	Parliamentary documentation	10	5	5		5	100%
	Other substantive activities	51	37	13	1	37	100%
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	1	1			1	100%
			69	32	1	43	62%
B	Programme of work	717					
	XII.33.B.1 Security and safety coordination						
	XII.33.B.1.A New York						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	128	128			128	100%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	31	31			30	97%
	New York Total	159	159			158	99%
	XII.33.B.1.B Geneva						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	30	30			0	0%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	10	10			0	0%
	Geneva Total	40	40				0%
	XII.33.B.1.C Vienna						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	8	8			8	100%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	10	10			10	100%
	Vienna Total	18	18			18	100%
	XII.33.B.1.D Nairobi						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	12	12			12	100%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	10	10			5	50%
	Nairobi Total	22	22			17	77%
	XII.33.B.1.E Addis Ababa						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	6	6				0%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	10	10				0%
	Addis Ababa Total	16	16				0%
	XII.33.B.1.F Bangkok						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	11	11			11	100%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	10	10			10	100%
	Bangkok Total	21	21			21	100%
	XII.33.B.1.G Santiago						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	52	52				0%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	10	10				0%
	Santiago Total	62	62				0%
	XII.33.B.1.H Beirut						
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	14	14				0%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	10	10				0%
	Beirut Total	24	24				0%
	XII.33.B.2 Regional field coordination and support						
	XII.33.B.2.A Regional field coordination						
	Other substantive activities	3	3			3	100%
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	54	31			31	100%
	Conference services, administration, oversight	2	2			2	100%
	Regional Field Coordination Total	59	36			36	100%
	XII.33.B.2.B Field support						
	Other substantive activities	5	5				0%
	Training courses, seminars and workshops	291	291				0%
	Field Support Total	296	296				0%
Total	Implemented		763			250	33%
	reformulated	1					
	Terminated	23					

II. Adequacy scoring for results reporting

4. In this inspection, adequacy refers to whether the information was comprehensive and sufficient for overall M&E systems information needs. Adequacy of the M&E framework was measured based on five criteria against which data in the IMDIS system were held:

- Whether Indicators of Achievement (IoAs) were referred to in the Statement of Results
- The existence and availability of baseline, target, and final measures
- Whether the unit of measure was aligned with the IoA
- Whether the variable reflected the IoA
- The availability of the periodicity of data

5. Example: XII.33.A Executive direction and management

(a) Step 1: Extract data from IMDIS

Assessment of programme performance

Expected accomplishment:	(b) Enhanced coordination, integration and compliance of policies and procedures within the United Nations security management system
Statement of accomplishments/results achieved:	During 2008, DSS has been working on rationalizing and standardizing policy, procedure and guidance from pre-DSS elements of the UN Security Management System to provide a more integrated policy base , restructuring the organization of handbooks and manuals to make them more user-friendly, including a reallocation of the contents of the existing "Field Security Handbook" and "Security Operations Manual" to distinguish between "pure policy" needed by managers, and "Policies of the UN Security Management System", and detailed guidance and procedures for implementation by security practitioners, as a result, many of the policies, procedures, and guidance which had been issued as stand-alone directives, memoranda or other publications have now been consolidated into the new publications . The Policy, Planning and Coordination Unit is also part of the USG's immediate office on the development of security strategies, policies, plans and recommendations for the Secretary-General. The Compliance Evaluation and Monitoring Unit (CEMU) conducted 25 compliance evaluation missions and a total of 617 recommendations were made during the biennium. The compliance monitoring system allowed following the progress made on the achievement of the recommendations.

Score	Performance indicator 1:	Increased percentage of common policies, standards and operational procedures updated and promulgated	
100	Indicator of:	results	
100	Performance measure 1:		
100	Units of measure:	per cent	
	Baseline:	2007	70 per cent
	Revised baseline:	-	-
	Target:	2009	80 per cent
	Revised target:	-	-
	Interim measurement 1:	31 Dec 2008	75 per cent
	Description of results:	While progress in this indicator can be shown to be on track for the 80 percent target for the biennium 2008-2009, the indicator only measures a small percentage of the unit's actual work because the indicator was already obsolete before the start of the biennium and does not provide a realistic measure of what the unit is actually expected to do: the indicator assumes that the unit is merely required to update a percentage of existing policies, whereas in reality most of its work concerns the development of new policies and procedures to cover situations not included in the existing body of policy.	
	Methodology:	complete	
	Indicator of achievement:	Increased percentage of common policies, standards and operational procedures updated and promulgated	
		Variables: Number of documents containing common policies, standard and procedure	
100		Data source: informal and official records	
		Collection method: review of records	
		Periodicity: 8	
Score	<u>37.5</u>		
	88		

(b) Step 2: Score

- Average the scores of IoAs = Score for the Expected Accomplishment (EA)
- Average the scores across EAs = Score for the subprogramme (SP)

XII.33.B.1.A
New York

	SPB.1.A	EA(a)	IoA(a)(i)	(a)(ii)	(a)(ii)	EA(b)	IoA(b)(i)	EA(c)	IoA(c)(i)	(c)(ii)
% IoA referred in RS	91	73	100	60	60	100	100	100	100	100
% unit of measure = IoA	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
% PM available	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
% IoA aspects in variables	67	100	100	100	100	0	0	100	100	100
% IoA measurements	53	35	63	21	21	63	63	60	100	21
Score (Total Average)	82	82	93	76	76	73	73	92	100	84

- Average the scores across subprogrammes = Score for the programme

Total Score

% IoA referred in RS	85
% unit of measure = IoA	99
% PM available	100
% IoA aspects in variables	89
% IoA measurements	51
Score (Total Average)	85

ANNEX A

In this Annex, OIOS presents the full text of comments received from DSS on the Draft Inspection of Programme Level Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of United Nations Department of Safety and Security (DSS). This practice has been instituted as per General Assembly resolution 64/263 following the recommendation of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee. Overall, DSS concurred with our findings and conclusions. The comments from DSS on the draft OIOS report have been incorporated as appropriate into this final report.

Comments from DSS on the draft report

Comments from our Security and Safety Services

- The inspection is not negative of DHSSS in general. Often, DHSSS is mentioned for its good practices and tools that are in place.
- The inspection report mentions that one of the issues not addressed is training on IMDIS. My view is that it is not DSS' responsibility to provide training for IMDIS. However, DHSSS has created an instructional package and offers technical support through email and phone to help the duty stations to more easily navigate the system and enter the data.
- In general, the methodology seems confusing and there is no raw data provided to support the results.
- It must be stressed that DHSSS as the primary technical supervisor of SSSs, was not involved when the SSS duty stations were contacted. That happened independently by the inspector(s). Some of the SSS duty stations did not provide the required information. In this case, DHSSS should have been informed in order to make sure that the data was provided.
- Reference is made to page 19, para. 25 note 20; I don't believe it is accurate to say that the IASMN is defined as DSS' governing body and that evaluation plan needs to be approved by the IASMN anyhow.
- I believe that most of the "negative: findings stem from the perceptions about IMDIS (perhaps there is a problem with IMDIS ???)
- Correction on page 29: IMDIS instructions for DHSSS were last updated on 2009 not 2003 as mentioned in the inspection report page 29 para 51.

Comments from our Executive Office

The Executive Office, having read the draft inspection report produced by OIOS, feels that many of the issues highlighted and the recommendations given come down to an issue of resources. In order to improve monitoring and evaluation (M&E) within the Department more resources, financial, human and technological, would be needed to address M&E capacity issues and the position that M&E holds within DSS.

In terms of specific comments on the text, there is one part of the document where we would propose a change in wording. In the executive summary there is the following bullet point:

"DSS did not meet the minimum budget standards recommended for M&E."

Looking at the main body of the report that part of the executive summary seems to be a reference to their conclusion no. 5 on page 21:

"Conclusion 5: DSS dedicates insufficient budget resources to the practice of M&E"

PPBME Rule 107.2 states that "all programmes shall be evaluated on a regular periodic basis" and the UNEG norms on 'responsibility for evaluation' specify that governing bodies and/or heads of organizations in the United Nations are accountable for fostering an enabling environment for evaluation and ensuring that adequate resources are allocated for effective operation of the evaluation function have been followed through.²⁶ Based on a review of the United Nations family of organizations, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) in its report Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System suggested that as a benchmark, an evaluator post

should be designated in the programmes for each increment of US \$125 to \$250 million of total resources managed in a biennium.²⁷ A review of the Proposed Programme Budget for the biennium 2008-2009²⁸ shows that DSS dedicates less than one per cent of budget resources to CEMU. Indeed, only 0.46 per cent was devoted to CEMU.²⁹ As CEMU's activities focus on operational assessments and not on evaluation, true evaluation has not been allocated any resources at DSS and no evaluation posts exist.³⁰

We would like therefore for the executive summary to be changed to more accurately reflect the actual point that is made, as currently it reads as a general point on DSS budgets. Please could you suggest that OIOS change it to align it with their wording in the body of the document, perhaps using directly the wording in the title of Conclusion 5? Or it could be revised to simply read in the executive summary:

"DSS dedicates insufficient resources to the practice of M&E".