



## **INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION**

### **AUDIT REPORT 2013/014**

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#### **Audit of crisis management and coordination of field security operations**

**Overall results relating to crisis management and coordination of field security operations were initially assessed as partially satisfactory. Management has implemented all recommendations satisfactorily**

**FINAL OVERALL RATING: SATISFACTORY**

**1 March 2013**

**Assignment No. AP2011/500/01**

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# AUDIT REPORT

## Audit of crisis management and coordination of field security operations

### I. BACKGROUND

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted an audit of crisis management and coordination of field security operations.
2. In accordance with its mandate, OIOS provides assurance and advice on the adequacy and effectiveness of the United Nations internal control system, the primary objectives of which are to ensure (a) efficient and effective operations; (b) accurate financial and operational reporting; (c) safeguarding of assets; and (d) compliance with mandates, regulations and rules.
3. Security at the locations where UN operates is the responsibility of the host country, but there is an established UN Security Management System that aims to supplement the security provided by the host country.
4. Crisis management refers to an organization's immediate crisis response with the objective of gaining control of a crisis situation quickly. Since its establishment in 2005, the UN crisis management structure has been led by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the system of Designated Officials for security at field locations. Specifically, DSS is the lead for crisis management of situations where peacekeeping operations are not involved and for all hostage incident management. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the lead for crisis management of situations involving peacekeeping operations, and supported by DSS, if necessary.
5. The programme budget for safety and security for the biennium 2012-2013 is \$471 million and includes 2,032 posts comprising 1,072 posts funded by the regular budget and 960 posts financed jointly on a cost-sharing basis between DSS and other organizations covered by the UN Security Management System. Additionally, there are 4,247 security staff who are deployed in missions under the responsibility of DPKO, DFS and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). As a result of integrated functions at the mission level, senior DSS security officers (Chief Security Advisers, Deputy Security Advisers and Field Security Coordination Officers) are responsible for supervising field security sections. DSS has 153 security staff deployed to missions.
6. Comments provided by DSS are incorporated in italics.

### II. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

7. The audit was conducted to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the DSS governance, risk management and control processes in providing reasonable assurance regarding **effective crisis management and coordination of field security operations**.
8. The audit was included in the OIOS 2011 risk-based work plan because of the high level of security risks faced by the UN worldwide. In recent years the UN has faced a number of crises and some of these have resulted in loss of life.
9. The key controls tested for the audit included: (a) security management systems; and (b) staff safety and security programmes. For the purpose of this audit, OIOS defined these key controls as follows:

(a) **Security management systems** - controls that provide reasonable assurance that security management systems are commensurate to the security risks, including: (a) the appointment of officials and creation of forums responsible for security in the UN; (b) minimum operating security standards (MOSS); and (c) the zone warden system.

(b) **Staff security programmes** - controls that provide reasonable assurance that staff security programmes exist to ensure that staff are aware of security policies and procedures, and their responsibility for complying with them.

10. The key controls were assessed for the control objectives shown in Table 1.

11. OIOS conducted this audit from April 2011 to January 2012. The audit covered the period from 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2011.

12. OIOS conducted an activity-level risk assessment to identify and assess specific risk exposures, and to confirm the relevance of the selected key controls in mitigating associated risks. Through interviews, analytical reviews and tests of controls, OIOS assessed the existence and adequacy of internal controls and conducted necessary tests to determine their effectiveness.

### III. AUDIT RESULTS

13. DSS governance, risk management and control processes examined were assessed as **partially satisfactory** in providing reasonable assurance regarding **effective crisis management and coordination of field security operations**. OIOS made 6 recommendations to address issues identified in the audit. The respective roles of DSS and DPKO in a crisis were well understood but needed to be defined in the accountability framework. There was also a need for DSS to: (a) develop a work plan to ensure that the crisis management initiatives it had embarked on are monitored and completed; (b) conduct a training needs assessment and develop a strategy for delivery and funding to ensure that staff can perform their functions effectively especially for crisis response activities; (c) collaborate with DPKO/DFS and other members of the UN Security Management System to ensure that security-related information systems are linked; and (d) establish a formal process for the systematic capture and dissemination of lessons learned in past crises.

14. The initial overall rating was based on the assessment of key controls presented in Table 1 below. The final overall rating is **satisfactory** as all recommendations have been implemented satisfactorily.

Table 1: Assessment of key controls

| Business objective(s)   | Key controls                    | Control objectives                 |  |                        |   |
|---|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|--|------------------------|---|
|   |                                 | Efficient and effective operations | Accurate financial and operational reporting | Safeguarding of assets | Compliance with mandates, regulations and rules |
| Effective crisis management and coordination of field security operations | (a) Security management systems | Partially satisfactory             | Partially satisfactory                       | Partially satisfactory | Partially satisfactory                          |
|   | (b) Staff security programmes   | Partially satisfactory             | Partially satisfactory                       | Partially satisfactory | Partially satisfactory                          |
| <b>FINAL OVERALL RATING: SATISFACTORY</b>                                 |                                 |                                    |  |                        |   |

## A. Security management systems

Including specific roles of staff involved in crisis management within the “Roles and responsibilities of actors within the UN Security Management System” would promote a system-wide approach

15. DSS has the principal lead in security crisis management situations for the UN System including all duty stations, except peacekeeping missions managed by DPKO, where DSS is to support DPKO if necessary. The UN Security Management System remains responsible for the safety and security of UN civilian personnel and their eligible family members, as well as for military and police personnel when not deployed with their contingent or unit. DSS has the principal lead for all crisis situations associated with hostage incidents, including in DPKO-led peacekeeping missions.

16. This division of responsibilities was agreed and understood by both DSS and DPKO/DFS staff interviewed by OIOS. However, it was not explained in the “Inter-organizational security measures: Framework for accountability for the UN Security Management System.” The level of detail in this document is acceptable for crisis management planning so long as duties are more specifically defined in other key security related documents such as security risk assessments, crisis management plans and procedures. However, it would assist a UN system-wide approach to crisis management (as previously recommended by OIOS<sup>1</sup> and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions<sup>2</sup>) if the specific roles of DSS and DPKO staff involved in crisis management are included in future iterations of the “Roles and responsibilities of actors within the UN Security Management System.” Also, there was no mention of the military and police components who are key personnel in DPKO missions and would be expected to take a leading role in security in the event of a crisis.

**(1) DSS in consultation with members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network should include the specific roles of staff involved in crisis management in future iterations of the “Roles and responsibilities of actors within the UN Security Management System” in order to promote an organization-wide approach to crisis management. Also, the division of duties between DSS and DPKO and the military and police components of DPKO missions should be specified.**

*DSS accepted recommendation 1 and stated that a standard operating procedure on crisis management was issued on 26 July 2012, which delineated the roles and responsibilities of actors within the UN Security Management System. OIOS has reviewed the DSS standard operating procedure which clearly explains the crisis management structure together with roles and responsibilities. Based on the action taken by DSS, recommendation 1 has been closed.*

New York Headquarters crisis management plan needed to be updated and finalized

17. Although a revised crisis management plan was developed in 2010, it had not been approved by the Chef de Cabinet as required. As a result, the New York Headquarters crisis management plan in operation was dated 2005. Nonetheless, there were adequate incident command checklists for use in a crisis. Moreover, annual desktop exercises involving federal agencies were conducted.

18. There is a need to update and approve the New York Headquarters crisis management plan, which could serve as a model for other locations.

<sup>1</sup> A/63/379 Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight services - Comprehensive management audit of the Department of Safety and Security, 26 September 2008.

<sup>2</sup> A/59/539 Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions - Strengthened and unified Security Management System for the United Nations, 27 October 2004.

**(2) DSS should seek approval of the updated crisis management plan for New York Headquarters.**

*DSS accepted recommendation 2 and stated that the updated crisis management plan for New York Headquarters has been signed off by the USG, DSS. Based on the action taken by DSS, recommendation 2 has been closed.*

Need for work plan for completing crisis management initiatives

19. DSS and DPKO/DFS were progressing with a number of developments related to crisis management and coordination between the departments. Examples of these developments were the establishment of staff lists and coordination with host country authorities. However, there was not a consolidated work plan outlining the roles and responsibilities and target dates for completing these initiatives.

**(3) DSS should liaise with DPKO to produce a work plan including roles and responsibilities and target dates for completing current and proposed crisis management initiatives.**

*DSS accepted recommendation 3 and stated that it had been implemented in coordination with DPKO under the UN Operations and Crisis Centre Framework. OIOS has reviewed the signed directive on Headquarters-level crisis management which describes roles and responsibilities. Based on the action taken by DSS, recommendation 3 has been closed.*

Lack of training needs assessment and appropriate funding arrangement

20. To ensure that staff can respond to crises in an effective and efficient manner, it is paramount that they are trained adequately. The Chief, DSS Training and Development Section stated that the Section does not have the resources to expand training to cover DPKO/DPA or other staff of the UN Security Management System. A training needs assessment should be undertaken across the UN Security Management System not only for crisis management but for all categories of training. Once completed, a strategy needs to be developed and the funding arrangements agreed.

**(4) DSS should liaise with DPKO and other members of the UN Security Management System to initiate the preparation of a training needs assessment (including crisis management training) for security professionals and devise a strategy for training provision and its funding.**

*DSS accepted recommendation 4 and stated that the training provision and funding portions have been completed. DSS outlined training provided in 2012 and planned for DPKO/DFS missions in 2013. DSS stated that the needs assessment is a core part of Competency Based Learning. Courses are designed based on competencies identified in vacancy announcements, job descriptions, etc. as well as dialogue with the individual DPKO/DFS missions that fund the training. Needs assessments will evolve on an ongoing basis as challenges faced in the security environment and DSS and UN Security Management Service policies, procedures and tools continue to evolve. Based on the action taken by DSS, recommendation 4 has been closed.*

DSS information strategy had been prepared but collaboration on information management systems was needed

21. The DSS information strategy, dated January 2011, is adequate, and its implementation would support effective crisis management and coordination. The systems that have been proposed for development are interdependent, which is important in the event of the need to modify the strategy when resources are not available. *DSS stated that the implementation of the strategy was in progress and would proceed long-term.*

22. The DSS information strategy, however, did not adequately include DPKO/DFS. There had been little collaboration between DSS and DPKO/DFS regarding synergies in using and developing information management systems. There was also no clear policy on whether military and police personnel from peacekeeping components should be included in a proposed staff listing system.

23. DSS advised that other participants in the UN Security Management System could be incorporated into the DSS system developments. For example, the DPKO/DFS Electronic Movement of Personnel System (EMOPS) could be integrated with the DSS Travel Request Information Processing (TRIP) system. DPKO/DFS advised that they would welcome collaboration regarding systems developments, including staff lists to incorporate military and police personnel.

**(5) DSS and DPKO should collaborate with a view to identifying: (a) systems that could be integrated; and (b) areas within their respective information strategies that should be developed between their departments and other members of the UN Security Management System.**

*DSS accepted recommendation 5 and stated that its implementation was completed and reflected in the Integrated United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) Crisis Response Control Concept. DSS further explained that these documents would be formally issued before January 2013, when UNOCC should become operational. Furthermore, DSS and DPKO were bringing their systems into the UNOCC and that while they would be available for use by all, they would not necessarily integrate well-developed systems already in use such as TRIP but have them available for larger use within the UNOCC. OIOS reviewed the "UNOCC Analysis Concept" (final draft, 4 October 2012) and the "Directive on the production of a UN integrated analysis product" (consultation draft, 4 October 2012). OIOS considers that the integration of UNOCC and the documents submitted provide a much improved environment for collaboration in the use of current systems and in developing new systems in future. Based on the action taken by DSS, recommendation 5 has been closed.*

## **B. Staff safety and security programmes**

### Need for formal process for communicating lessons learned

24. OIOS examined records held by DSS on five crises, including: (a) the Haiti earthquake that occurred on 12 January 2010; (b) the attack on the UN Common Compound in Abuja on 26 August 2011; (c) insurgency threats in February 2010 in Chad; (d) the management of a hostage incident in Darfur from October 2010 to January 2011; and (e) another hostage incident that was managed from August 2011 to November 2011 in Darfur.


25. There was no formal process for the systematic capture and dissemination of lessons learned in these cases to be shared with members of the UN Security Management System.

**(6) DSS should establish a formal process for reviewing and communicating lessons learned from crises to members of the UN Security Management System.**

*DSS accepted recommendation 6 and stated that its implementation was completed and reflected in DSS standard operating procedures on Crisis Management dated 26 July 2012. OIOS reviewed the standard operating procedure, which states “When the Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) stands down at the end of every crisis, the Crisis Manager develops, in consultation with CCC members, an action review report for the USG-DSS. The report comprises a post-crisis analysis of DSS crisis management operations, lessons learned and recommendations on how the process can be further improved.” Based on the action taken by DSS, recommendation 6 has been closed.*

#### **IV. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

26. OIOS wishes to express its appreciation to the Management and staff of [insert audited entity] for the assistance and cooperation extended to the auditors during this assignment.



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## STATUS OF AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS

## Audit of crisis management and coordination of field security operations

| Recom. no. | Recommendation   | Critical <sup>3</sup> /<br>Important <sup>4</sup> | C/<br>O <sup>5</sup> | Actions needed to close recommendation | Implementation date <sup>6</sup> |
|------------|--|---|----------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| 1.         | DSS in consultation with members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network should include the specific roles of staff involved in crisis management in future iterations of the "Roles and responsibilities of actors within the UN Security Management System" in order to promote an organization-wide approach to crisis management. Also, the division of duties between DSS and DPKO and the military and police components of DPKO missions should be specified. | Important   | C                    |  | Implemented                      |
| 2.         | DSS should seek approval of the updated crisis management plan for New York Headquarters.  | Important   | C                    |  | Implemented                      |
| 3.         | DSS should liaise with DPKO to produce a work plan including roles and responsibilities and target dates for completing current and proposed crisis management initiatives.  | Important   | C                    |  | Implemented                      |
| 4.         | DSS should liaise with DPKO and other members of the UN Security Management System to initiate the preparation of a training needs assessment (including crisis management training) for security professionals and devise a strategy for training provision and its funding.  | Important   | C                    |  | Implemented                      |

<sup>3</sup> Critical recommendations address significant and/or pervasive deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance cannot be provided regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>4</sup> Important recommendations address important deficiencies or weaknesses in governance, risk management or internal control processes, such that reasonable assurance may be at risk regarding the achievement of control and/or business objectives under review.

<sup>5</sup> C = closed, O = open

<sup>6</sup> Date provided by [client] in response to recommendations. [Insert "Implemented" where recommendation is closed; (implementation date) given by the client.]

| Recom. no. | Recommendation  | Critical/<br>Important <sup>4</sup> | C/<br>O <sup>5</sup> | Actions needed to close recommendation | Implementation date <sup>6</sup> |
|------------|---|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--|----------------------------------|
| 5.         | DSS and DPKO should collaborate with a view to identifying: (a) systems that could be integrated; and (b) areas within their respective information strategies that should be developed between their departments and other members of the UN Security Management System. | Important                           | C                    |  | Implemented                      |
| 6.         | DSS should establish a formal process for reviewing and communicating lessons learned from crises to members of the UN Security Management System.  | Important                           | C                    |  | Implemented                      |